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SAMPLE SBTDescent / Approach

Fuel Tank Selection and a Silent Engine

Fuel starvation on descent to Brooksville — a constant-speed prop, glass panel, and CAPS as the safety net

Cirrus SR20 · Brooksville–Tampa Bay Regional Airport (KBKV) · Private · Descent / Approach

The scenario

Departing Brooksville–Tampa Bay Regional Airport (KBKV), Brooksville, FL — Runway 09, climbing out on a 90° heading. Field elevation 76 ft MSL. You are on a 2.5-hour cross-country flight in a Cirrus SR20, solo, with 45 minutes of fuel remaining in the tanks as you begin descent to return home.

It is a clear, calm Florida afternoon: OAT 26°C, winds light and variable. Visibility 10 SM. You are at 4,500 ft MSL, 25 nm northeast of KBKV, beginning a descent to land. The tower is active (it is 1400 local; tower operates 0700–2200). Class D airspace. You are well within the Tampa Class B ceiling of 6,000 MSL at your current altitude.

Aircraft: Cirrus SR20, solo, 3,000 lb gross weight. Fuel system: LEFT and RIGHT tanks, no BOTH position. The fuel selector is currently on the RIGHT tank. You have not switched tanks during the flight — you departed on the right tank and have been burning it continuously for 2.5 hours. The left tank has not been touched.

Before descent, you glance at the fuel gauges: right tank reads approximately 15 gallons (roughly 90 minutes of endurance remaining at current power). Left tank reads approximately 35 gallons (full or near-full). You did not verify fuel quantity before flight — the airplane was topped off yesterday by the line crew, and you assumed it was still full.

Pilot: you — a Private pilot, current, roughly 300 hours total time, 50 hours in type (SR20). You are familiar with the fuel selector (LEFT / RIGHT, no BOTH position) but have not flown a cross-country in the SR20 that required deliberate tank switching. You have a habit of selecting one tank and leaving it alone. Your CFI has mentioned fuel management in the SR20, but you have not internalized the discipline of switching tanks at planned intervals.

The decision

Before we get into the decision tree — what do you know about fuel management in the Cirrus SR20? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)

What the record shows

What the NTSB files show

NTSB WPR24LA167 (2024): A Canadian Car & Foundry Harvard MK IV lost all engine power due to fuel starvation when the pilot improperly selected the left fuel tank at low fuel levels. The accident resulted from improper fuel tank selection and a malfunctioning fuel selector, requiring a forced landing that struck a dirt berm. The probable cause was the pilot's failure to properly manage the fuel system and the fuel selector malfunction.

NTSB GAA19CA534 (2019): A Piper PA-28-161 lost engine power during descent to land after the pilot switched to the left fuel tank and failed to follow the emergency power loss checklist. The accident resulted from improper fuel management and failure to switch to the right tank containing usable fuel, leading to fuel starvation and a forced landing on a road.

NTSB WPR12LA023 (2011): A Cessna A185F lost engine power during descent near Bend, Oregon, when the pilot inadvertently left the fuel selector on the left tank despite having usable fuel in the right tank. The pilot executed a forced landing on an unpaved road and the aircraft nosed over during rollout.

NTSB ERA17LA205 (2017): A Cessna P206 on a post-maintenance break-in flight lost all engine power due to fuel starvation when the pilot mismanaged fuel selection and ran the right tank dry. The pilot made a forced landing in trees short of the runway after the engine quit during approach.

The consistent thread across all these events: fuel tank mismanagement in multi-tank aircraft is a leading cause of engine failure in cruise and descent. The SR20, with its LEFT / RIGHT fuel selector (no BOTH position), is particularly vulnerable to this error. The pilot must plan tank switching intervals in advance, confirm the selector position before descent, and never run a single tank to exhaustion when usable fuel remains in the other tank.

The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports and in other aircraft types — NOT at KBKV. Brooksville–Tampa Bay Regional Airport has its own accident history (see field dominant patterns: hard landings, forced landings, runway excursions), but these specific fuel starvation events happened elsewhere. The scenario is localized to KBKV to make the descent to landing real and consequential for you as a student here.

The off-field environment off Runway 09 at KBKV (heading 90°) is open developed areas, pasture/hay, and medium development — good forced-landing terrain. An engine failure on approach to Runway 09 is survivable if you recognize the problem early and execute a controlled forced landing or CAPS deployment. The preventable error is the fuel tank mismanagement that caused the engine failure in the first place.

Key lesson — In the Cirrus SR20, fuel tank selection is a critical task on cross-country flights. The LEFT / RIGHT selector (no BOTH position) requires deliberate tank switching at planned intervals to avoid running one tank dry while usable fuel remains in the other. Plan your tank switching before flight (e.g., every 1–1.5 hours), confirm the selector position before descent and approach, and monitor fuel quantity continuously. An engine failure due to fuel starvation on short final is preventable — it is the result of a planning and discipline failure, not a mechanical failure.

Debrief — teaching points

The SR20 fuel selector has no BOTH position — tank switching is mandatory on cross-country flights.

Unlike some aircraft (e.g., Cessna 172 with BOTH), the SR20's fuel selector has only LEFT and RIGHT positions. There is no BOTH position. This design requires the pilot to actively manage tank selection throughout the flight. On a cross-country flight, plan to switch tanks at regular intervals (e.g., every 1–1.5 hours) to balance fuel burn and avoid running one tank dry. Establish this discipline before flight — do not leave it to chance or workload.

Fuel quantity gauges in the SR20 are mechanical and can be unreliable — verify fuel before flight and plan accordingly.

The SR20's fuel quantity indicators are mechanical (not electronic) and can be inaccurate, especially at low fuel levels. Before every flight, visually inspect the fuel tanks (open the filler caps and look inside) to confirm fuel quantity. Do not rely solely on the gauges. On a cross-country flight, plan your tank switching based on time and power settings, not on gauge readings. If you depart with full tanks and fly at a known power setting, you can calculate fuel burn and plan tank switches accordingly.

Fuel starvation on approach is preventable — switch tanks before descent, not during it.

The classic fuel starvation accident occurs when a pilot runs one tank dry during descent or approach, unaware that usable fuel remains in the other tank. The fix is simple: plan your tank switching before descent. If you have been flying on the right tank for 1.5 hours, switch to the left tank before beginning descent. Confirm the selector position visually and by feel. Do not wait until the engine is rough or the approach is unstable to switch tanks.

If the engine quits on approach, switch tanks immediately — the other tank may have fuel.

If the engine fails on approach and you have not switched tanks recently, your first action (after establishing best glide speed of 96 KIAS) is to switch the fuel selector to the other tank. The engine may restart if fuel is available. This is not a guarantee, but it is the only engine-recovery option available. If the engine does not restart within 5–10 seconds, proceed with the forced landing or CAPS deployment.

CAPS is the SR20's primary safety system for unrecoverable emergencies at adequate altitude.

The SR20's whole-airframe parachute (CAPS) is designed for unrecoverable situations: loss of control, unrecoverable spin, or engine failure with no safe landing site. If you are at adequate altitude (typically 800 ft AGL or higher) and cannot reach a runway or safe landing area, CAPS deployment is the correct decision. The parachute brings the aircraft down at a controlled descent rate (approximately 17 ft/sec) into whatever terrain is below. Survival rates in CAPS deployments are significantly higher than in uncontrolled crashes. Deployment is not failure — it is airmanship.

Best glide speed in the SR20 is 96 KIAS — fly this speed if the engine quits.

Best glide speed for the SR20 at gross weight (3,000 lb) is 96 KIAS. This speed maximizes glide distance and gives the most time to manage the emergency. If the engine fails, lower the nose to 96 KIAS immediately. Do not attempt to stretch the glide by flying slower — this reduces glide distance and increases the risk of a stall. Fly 96 KIAS, manage the descent, and execute the best available landing option (runway, forced landing, or CAPS).

Built from the real accident record

Scenario inspired by NTSB WPR24LA167 (2024 Harvard fuel starvation / improper tank selection), GAA19CA534 (2019 PA-28 fuel mismanagement / power loss on descent), WPR12LA023 (2011 Cessna A185F fuel selector error), and ERA17LA205 (2017 Cessna P206 fuel starvation on approach). Real events occurred at other airports and aircraft types — NOT at KBKV. Localized to Brooksville–Tampa Bay Regional Airport (KBKV) and the Cirrus SR20.

NTSB reports: WPR24LA167 · GAA19CA534 · WPR12LA023 · ERA17LA205

ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.II.C — Fuel System Management · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors

Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.185

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