Low Fuel, Wrong Tank, No Power

Departing Brooksville–Tampa Bay Regional Airport (KBKV), Brooksville, FL — Runway 09, climbing out on a 90° heading. Elevation 76 ft MSL. You are a commercial pilot with roughly 800 hours total, 200 in the SR22. The airplane is well-maintained, recently out of annual.

It is a clear, warm Florida afternoon: OAT 31°C, winds 080° at 6 kt, altimeter 29.94. You departed KBKV at 1430 local on a personal cross-country flight to a field 140 nm northeast. You climbed to 4,500 ft MSL and cruised at 120 KIAS for 1 hour 15 minutes. The flight has been smooth and uneventful.

At 1545 local, 25 nm northeast of KBKV, you begin descent to land at your destination. You level off at 2,000 ft MSL and reduce power to 1,500 RPM. The engine is running smoothly. You are on a 10-mile straight-in approach. The tower clears you to descend to 1,500 ft MSL and maintain 90 KIAS on final.

At 1,500 ft MSL, 5 nm from the runway, you notice the fuel quantity indicators: LEFT tank shows 8 gallons, RIGHT tank shows 6 gallons. Total usable fuel: 14 gallons. At your current descent rate and power setting, you have roughly 18–20 minutes of fuel remaining — more than enough to land. But you are not thinking about fuel tank selection. You are focused on the approach.

Aircraft: Cirrus SR22, solo, within weight and balance limits. Continental IO-550-N fuel-injected engine, constant-speed prop, glass Perspective panel. Fuel selector currently on LEFT tank. You have not switched tanks during the descent because the left tank still shows fuel and you are on approach — the workload is high, and fuel management is not top-of-mind.

Pilot: you — a commercial pilot, current, 800 hours total, 200 in type. You did not brief a fuel-tank switching plan before descent. You did not verify fuel quantity during the cruise segment. You did not confirm fuel selector position before beginning descent. You are on approach, focused on the runway, and fuel is in the back of your mind.

NTSB CEN21LA057 (2020): A Cirrus SR22 on approach experienced erratic high oil temperature indications. The pilot improperly adjusted the engine mixture control in response, resulting in total loss of engine power. The pilot deployed the ballistic parachute for a survivable landing. The accident resulted from the pilot's improper adjustment of the engine mixture control, with a contributing factor being a disconnected oil temperature connector damaged during recent maintenance. The lesson: do not chase erratic engine indications with mixture adjustments — diagnose first, then act.

NTSB ERA20LA064 (2020): A Cirrus SR22 on a personal cross-country flight experienced total engine power loss due to camshaft fatigue failure caused by a manufacturing defect. The pilot deployed CAPS and made a survivable landing in trees. The accident illustrates the value of CAPS as a primary recovery tool for engine failure at low altitude.

NTSB CEN20LA020 (2019): A Cirrus SR22 experienced total engine power loss due to detonation caused by improper magneto timing and a rich fuel mixture. The pilot deployed the ballistic recovery parachute and made a forced landing in a field. The lesson: improper engine management (mixture, magneto timing) can cause total power loss.

NTSB CEN19LA320 (2019): A Cirrus SR22 experienced total engine power loss due to separation of the No. 1 connecting rod caused by piston pin bushing migration. The accident resulted from the mechanic's failure to follow manufacturer guidance during the most recent oil change. The lesson: post-maintenance inspection and break-in procedures are critical.

NTSB WPR24LA167 (2024): A Canadian Car & Foundry Harvard MK IV lost all engine power due to fuel starvation when the pilot improperly selected the left fuel tank at low fuel levels. The accident resulted from improper fuel tank selection and a malfunctioning fuel selector. The lesson: fuel tank selection is not optional, and a fuel-tank switching plan prevents starvation.

NTSB GAA19CA534 (2019): A Piper PA-28 lost engine power during descent to land after the pilot switched to the left fuel tank and failed to follow the emergency power loss checklist. The accident resulted from improper fuel management and failure to switch to the right tank containing usable fuel. The lesson: when power is lost, systematically troubleshoot the fuel system (selector, pump, mixture) rather than assuming the tank is empty.

NTSB WPR12LA023 (2011): A Cessna 185 lost engine power during descent near Bend, Oregon, when the pilot inadvertently left the fuel selector on the left tank despite having usable fuel in the right tank. The pilot executed a forced landing on an unpaved road and the aircraft nosed over during rollout. The lesson: verify fuel selector position matches intended tank; establish habit of confirming selector setting before descent and approach phases.

NTSB ERA17LA205 (2017): A Cessna P206 on a post-maintenance break-in flight lost all engine power due to fuel starvation when the pilot mismanaged fuel selection and ran the right tank dry. The pilot made a forced landing in trees short of the runway after the engine quit during approach. The lesson: monitor fuel quantity and tank selection continuously during approach; avoid running a single tank to exhaustion.

The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports and in other aircraft — NOT at Brooksville–Tampa Bay Regional Airport (KBKV). KBKV has its own accident history (hard landings, forced landings, runway excursions), but these specific fuel-starvation events happened elsewhere. The scenario is localized to KBKV to make the off-field environment real and consequential for you as a student here.

The consistent thread across all these events: fuel starvation in single-engine aircraft is insidious. It occurs when the selected tank runs dry, even if usable fuel remains in the other tank. The fix — a fuel-tank switching plan briefed before descent and executed systematically — is simple. The failure is always a delay or a forgotten switch.