Float and Overshoot at Brooksville
Excess approach energy, a long runway, and the decision to go around — or press on and lose the runway
The scenario
Departing Brooksville–Tampa Bay Regional Airport (KBKV), Brooksville, FL — Runway 09, a 7,001 ft concrete runway. Elevation 76 ft MSL. You are on a local instructional flight with your CFI in the right seat, practicing approaches and landings.
Current conditions: VFR, 1,500 ft scattered, 5 SM visibility. Wind is from 120° at 12 kt gusting to 18 kt — a crosswind from the right on Runway 09. Temperature 24°C, altimeter 29.95. The wind is workable but requires attention to crosswind technique.
You have completed two touch-and-go landings on Runway 09. Both were acceptable but a bit long — you touched down around 1,500 ft down the runway. Your CFI has not commented, but you sense the landings were not crisp. On this third approach, you are determined to land shorter and cleaner.
You are now on a 3 nm final approach to Runway 09, descending through 800 ft AGL, airspeed 75 KIAS (slightly fast for approach). The runway is in sight. Your CFI is quiet, observing. You have not yet added flaps.
Aircraft: Cessna 172R, solo (you and CFI), within limits. Fuel-injected Lycoming IO-360-L2A, fixed-pitch prop, fixed gear, steam panel. Best glide 65 KIAS, approach speed (short final, full flaps) 62 KIAS. Vref is 62 KIAS.
Pilot: you — a Private pilot, roughly 150 hours total, 40 hours in the C172R. You have landed at KBKV a dozen times. You are current and proficient but still building judgment about energy management on approach.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KBKV · Brooksville–Tampa Bay'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '3/21 · 9/27'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '76 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'C172R'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Cruise'}
The decision
Before we get into the decision tree — what do you know about approach energy management and the go-around decision in the C172R? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
NTSB CEN24LA263 (2024): A Cessna 172R performing a power-off 180° maneuver landed too high on the runway and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. The aircraft overran the runway end, breached the perimeter fence, and came to rest upright. The probable cause was the pilot's decision to continue the landing attempt with insufficient runway remaining, which resulted in a runway overrun. The real event occurred at a different airport, but the mechanism is identical to the scenario at KBKV.
NTSB CEN24LA233 (2024): A Cessna 172R on an instructional flight veered left of the runway centerline during landing. The pilot's correction attempts resulted in a right veer, causing the aircraft to exit the left side of the runway and strike a distance marker. The accident was attributed to the pilot's failure to maintain directional control during landing — a classic case of overcontrolling with rudder in response to a crosswind gust.
NTSB ERA22LA280 (2022): A Cessna 172 flown by a student pilot during touch-and-go landings experienced a porpoising landing after an improper flare. The student's attempt to recover by pulling back caused a skid, and subsequent overcompensation with rudder input resulted in a runway excursion and collision with a taxiway sign. The lesson: an improper flare (too high, too fast) leads to porpoising, and overcontrolling with rudder makes it worse.
NTSB ERA21LA249 (2021): A Cessna 172R on a solo cross-country instructional flight experienced loss of directional control during landing when the nose gear contacted the runway. The accident resulted from the student pilot's failure to maintain directional control, resulting in a runway excursion and collision with an airport sign.
NTSB ERA21LA119 (2021): A Cessna 172R on a personal flight veered left off the runway during landing in gusting crosswind conditions and struck the ground with the propeller and left wing tip. The accident was attributed to the pilot's failure to maintain directional control during landing in a gusting crosswind.
All of these accidents occurred at other airports — NOT at KBKV. However, the mechanisms are identical: excess approach energy (float), directional control loss (crosswind overcontrol), and a decision to press on instead of going around. At KBKV, the off-field environment off Runway 09 is open developed (parks/large lots), which is survivable. At other airports, the off-field environment might be a building, a road, or water — with more severe consequences.
The consistent thread: runway excursions are almost always preceded by an unstable approach, excess energy, or a loss of directional control. The decision to go around is not a failure — it is the correct decision when the approach is unstable or the runway is no longer assured. Every pilot who has survived a runway excursion has said, 'I should have gone around.'
Key lesson — Stabilize the approach early: by 500 ft AGL, you should be at Vref (62 KIAS), on glide path, and in control. If the approach is unstable — too fast, too high, or losing directional control — execute a go-around. A go-around is not a failure; it is the correct decision. The go-around decision window closes quickly: by 3,000 ft down a 7,001 ft runway, the margin is gone. Recognize the float, make the decision early, and never press on when the runway is running out.
Debrief — teaching points
Approach stability is the foundation of safe landings.
By 500 ft AGL on final approach, you should be stable: at Vref (62 KIAS for the C172R at full flaps), on glide path, and in control. If you are faster than Vref, higher than the glide path, or losing directional control, the approach is unstable. An unstable approach at 500 ft AGL is a go-around. Do not press on and try to salvage it. The go-around is the correct decision.
Float is excess airspeed, not altitude.
Float occurs when the airplane is traveling faster than Vref during the flare. The airplane does not want to land because it still has lift. The airplane drifts down the runway at 30–40 ft AGL, still flying. The fix is not to pull back harder on the yoke (that makes it worse); the fix is to reduce power to idle, lower the nose slightly, and let the airplane land. If the float is severe and the runway is running out, go around.
Vref is 62 KIAS for the C172R at full flaps on short final.
This is the speed at which the airplane will land softly and stop within a reasonable distance. Approaching faster than Vref makes a soft landing difficult and increases float distance. Approaching slower than Vref risks a stall. Stabilize at Vref well before the runway and maintain it on short final.
The go-around decision window closes quickly.
At 3,000 ft down a 7,001 ft runway, you have 4,001 ft remaining — enough to stop comfortably if you land now. At 4,000 ft down the runway, you have 3,001 ft remaining — still workable but the margin is shrinking. At 5,000 ft down the runway, you have 2,001 ft remaining — the margin is gone. By 5,000 ft, you are committed to landing. The go-around decision must be made by 3,000–4,000 ft down the runway, not later.
Crosswind gusts require smooth, coordinated rudder inputs.
A gust from the right will push the airplane to the left of the centerline. The correct response is a small, smooth rudder input to the right to bring the airplane back to the centerline. Do not overcontrol. Aggressive rudder inputs cause the airplane to oscillate left and right, which can result in a loss of directional control and a runway excursion. If a gust pushes you off the centerline, make a small correction and let the airplane settle.
Flap timing affects descent rate and landing quality.
Adding full flaps early (at 300 ft AGL or higher) increases the descent rate and can result in a steep, firm landing. Adding full flaps late (below 100 ft AGL) leaves little time to adjust the descent rate. The optimal timing is to add 10° flaps at 500 ft AGL (to increase drag and slow down), then add full flaps (30°) at 200 ft AGL (to increase drag further and set up for the flare). This gradual approach allows you to manage the descent rate and land smoothly.
A 7,001 ft runway is long, but that does not mean you can land anywhere on it.
Landing in the first third of the runway (approximately 2,300 ft) leaves margin for error and ensures a safe stop. Landing at 4,000 ft down the runway leaves only 3,001 ft to stop — workable but tight. Landing at 5,000 ft down the runway leaves only 2,001 ft to stop — the margin is gone. Aim to touch down in the first third of the runway, and if the approach is unstable or the float is severe, go around.
Built from the real accident record
Scenario built from NTSB CEN24LA263 (2024 C172R power-off 180° landing overrun), CEN24LA233 (2024 C172R directional control loss on landing), ERA22LA280 (2022 C172 porpoising and runway excursion), ERA21LA249 (2021 C172R directional control loss / runway excursion), and ERA21LA119 (2021 C172R crosswind directional control loss). Localized to KBKV.
NTSB reports: CEN24LA263 · CEN24LA233 · ERA22LA280 · ERA21LA249 · ERA21LA119
ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.VIII.D — Approach and Landing · PA.VIII.E — Go-Around / Rejected Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.209
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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