FlightEdge
Sample scenario-based training
SAMPLE SBTLanding / Approach

Float and Overshoot at Clearwater

Excess approach energy, a short runway, and the decision to go around — managing landing energy in a fuel-injected 172R

Cessna 172R · Clearwater Air Park (KCLW) · Private · Landing / Approach

The scenario

Departing Clearwater Air Park (KCLW), Clearwater, FL — Runway 16, a 4,108 ft asphalt runway. Elevation 71 ft MSL. You are a Private pilot with 180 hours total, 45 hours in the C172R, and this is your second visit to KCLW. You are familiar with the airplane but not intimately familiar with this field.

It is a clear, VFR afternoon: OAT 24°C, wind 160° at 8 knots — a 4-knot crosswind from the left on Runway 16 (true heading 155°). Visibility 10 SM. A textbook Florida day. You are returning from a 1.5-hour local flight and planning a full-stop landing.

You are on a 3-mile final for Runway 16, descending through 800 ft AGL at 90 KIAS. The airplane is stable, flaps are at 10°, and you are planning to add full flaps (30°) on short final. The runway is ahead, clearly visible. You have never landed on a 4,100 ft runway in the C172R before — your home field is 5,500 ft.

Aircraft: Cessna 172R, solo, 1,850 lb (well within limits). Lycoming IO-360-L2A fuel-injected engine, 160 hp, fixed-pitch prop, fixed gear, steam panel. Fuel selector BOTH, boost pump on. Nothing was written up; the airplane is airworthy.

Pilot: you — Private, current, 180 hours total, 45 hours C172R. You have landed on runways 5,000 ft and longer. This is your first approach to a 4,100 ft runway in this airplane. You are not rushed, but you are also not thinking deeply about landing energy or go-around criteria.

The decision

Before we get into the decision tree — what do you already know about landing energy and go-around decision-making in the C172R? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)

What the record shows

What the NTSB files show

NTSB CEN24LA263 (2024): A Cessna 172R performed a power-off 180° maneuver and landed too high on the runway. The pilot was unable to stop within the remaining distance. The aircraft overran the runway end, breached the perimeter fence, and came to rest upright. The probable cause was the pilot's decision to continue the landing attempt with insufficient runway remaining. This is a classic excess-energy landing: the pilot was high and fast, tried to salvage the landing instead of going around, and ran out of runway.

NTSB CEN24LA233 (2024): A Cessna 172R on an instructional flight veered left of the runway centerline during landing. The pilot's correction attempts resulted in a right veer, causing the aircraft to exit the left side of the runway and strike a distance marker. The probable cause was the pilot's failure to maintain directional control during landing. The crosswind was light, but the pilot's overcorrection and loss of directional control during rollout caused the excursion.

NTSB ERA22LA280 (2022): A Cessna 172 flown by a student pilot during touch-and-go landings experienced a porpoising landing after an improper flare. The student's attempt to recover by pulling back caused a skid, and subsequent overcompensation with rudder input resulted in a runway excursion and collision with a taxiway sign. The probable cause was the student pilot's improper flare, which resulted in a loss of control during landing. This is the exact scenario: improper flare → porpoising → loss of control → excursion.

NTSB ERA21LA249 (2021): A Cessna 172R on a solo cross-country instructional flight experienced loss of directional control during landing when the nose gear contacted the runway. The accident resulted from the student pilot's failure to maintain directional control, resulting in a runway excursion and collision with an airport sign. The probable cause was the pilot's failure to maintain directional control of the airplane during landing. Again, the pattern: loss of directional control during rollout → excursion.

NTSB ERA21LA119 (2021): A Cessna 172R on a personal flight veered left off the runway during landing in gusting crosswind conditions and struck the ground with the propeller and left wing tip. The probable cause was the pilot's failure to maintain directional control during landing in a gusting crosswind, which resulted in a loss of control and runway excursion. Even a light crosswind requires active rudder input during rollout; loss of directional control is the common thread.

All of these accidents occurred at other airports — NOT at KCLW. However, KCLW's own accident pattern shows RUNWAY_EXCURSION as a significant risk (18.5% of accidents at this field involve runway excursions or loss of directional control during landing). The 4,108 ft runway at KCLW is short for the C172R — landing distance from 50 ft AGL is roughly 1,200–1,400 ft depending on weight and conditions. Excess approach energy on a short runway leaves little margin for error.

The consistent thread across all these events: excess approach energy (high and fast on final), improper flare technique (too aggressive, too high), and loss of directional control during rollout. The fix is simple: manage landing energy, execute a stable approach at Vref (62 KIAS), flare smoothly, and maintain directional control throughout the landing rollout. If you are high and fast at 100 ft AGL, the go-around is the correct call — do not try to salvage a bad approach.

Key lesson — Landing energy management is the foundation of safe landing technique in the C172R. A stable approach at Vref (62 KIAS, short field, full flaps) with a smooth flare is the standard. If you are above Vref on short final or you float more than 1/3 down the runway, the go-around is the correct call. On a 4,100 ft runway like KCLW's Runway 16, there is no margin for excess energy. Manage the descent, execute a stable approach, and maintain directional control throughout the landing rollout.

Debrief — teaching points

Vref is the target speed on short final — not a suggestion, a requirement.

Vref for the C172R in short-field landing configuration (full flaps, 30°) is 62 KIAS. This is the speed that allows the slowest possible touchdown speed (near Vs0, 33 KIAS) with a normal flare. If you are above Vref on short final (say, 75–80 KIAS), you have excess energy. The flare will be longer, the float will be longer, and the touchdown will be farther down the runway. On a 4,100 ft runway, excess energy at 100 ft AGL is a go-around, not a landing.

The go-around at 100 ft AGL with excess energy is the correct call.

If you are high and fast at 100 ft AGL (above Vref, or floating more than 1/3 down the runway), the go-around is the correct decision. Advance the throttle to climb power, reduce flaps to 10°, and climb away from the runway. Set up for another approach. This is not a failure; it is airmanship. The NTSB CEN24LA263 pilot who continued the landing attempt with insufficient runway remaining crashed. The pilot who goes around lives to land again.

A proper flare reduces descent rate gradually — not aggressively.

The flare begins at roughly 50 ft AGL and reduces descent rate gradually by reducing power and raising the nose slightly. The goal is to touch down at or near Vs0 (33 KIAS stall speed, landing configuration) with a descent rate near zero. An aggressive flare (pulling back hard at 60 ft AGL) causes the airplane to balloon and float down the runway. A flare that is too high (starting at 80+ ft AGL) causes the same problem. A normal flare is smooth and gradual.

Porpoising is a sign of improper flare — release back pressure and go around if altitude permits.

Porpoising (nose-up, nose-down oscillation) usually results from a flare that is too high or too aggressive. If you feel the nose pitch up after touchdown, release back pressure immediately — do not pull back harder. If you are still airborne and have altitude, go around. If you are on the ground, release back pressure, maintain directional control with rudder, and allow the airplane to slow naturally. The NTSB ERA22LA280 pilot's attempt to recover from porpoising by pulling back made it worse and resulted in a runway excursion.

Directional control during rollout requires active rudder input, especially in crosswind.

Even a 4-knot crosswind requires active rudder input during landing rollout to maintain directional control. The airplane will naturally drift downwind; you must correct with rudder. Overcorrection is the enemy — apply rudder smoothly and progressively. If the airplane veers left, apply right rudder; if it veers right, apply left rudder. Avoid sudden, large rudder inputs that can cause a secondary veer in the opposite direction. The NTSB CEN24LA233 pilot's overcorrection caused a veer and runway excursion.

A 4,100 ft runway is short for the C172R — plan accordingly.

Landing distance from 50 ft AGL for the C172R is roughly 1,200–1,400 ft depending on weight and conditions. A 4,100 ft runway leaves roughly 2,700–2,900 ft of margin. This is adequate, but it is not generous. Excess approach energy (high and fast) consumes runway quickly. On a short runway, the stable, energy-managed approach is not optional — it is the standard.

Built from the real accident record

Scenario built from NTSB CEN24LA263 (2024 C172R power-off 180 landing overshoot), CEN24LA233 (2024 C172R directional control loss on landing), ERA22LA280 (2022 C172R porpoising and runway excursion), ERA21LA249 (2021 C172R loss of directional control / runway excursion), and ERA21LA119 (2021 C172R crosswind directional control loss). Localized to KCLW.

NTSB reports: CEN24LA263 · CEN24LA233 · ERA22LA280 · ERA21LA249 · ERA21LA119

ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.II.E — Approach and Landing · PA.II.F — Go-Around / Rejected Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing

Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.21

Run this scenario yourself

Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.

Open the interactive scenario →

All sample scenarios · More Cessna 172R scenarios · More scenarios at KCLW