Dry Side
Fuel mismanagement, a silent engine, and nowhere good to land at Clearwater Air Park
The scenario
Field: Clearwater Air Park (KCLW), Clearwater, FL — elevation 71 ft MSL, single runway 16/34, 4,108 ft of asphalt. You are inbound to land Runway 34, non-towered, CTAF 123.075. Tampa Class B begins overhead at 3,000 ft MSL.
Aircraft: Diamond DA40 with the Lycoming IO-360-M1A, G1000 glass panel, constant-speed prop, fixed gear. Fuel selector is LEFT or RIGHT — there is no BOTH position. You departed two hours ago on the LEFT tank, switched to RIGHT at the one-hour mark per your habit, and have been descending on RIGHT for the last 20 minutes.
Weather: CAVU, light and variable winds, density altitude near field elevation. A beautiful Florida afternoon — the kind of day that breeds complacency.
Pilot: you — a Private pilot, ~200 hours, comfortable in the DA40. You fly it regularly. Nothing unusual on the preflight. You did not write down fuel quantities at departure; you eyeballed both tanks as 'about half' and figured you had plenty for the 1.8-hour trip.
The situation: On a 3-mile final for Runway 34 at KCLW, gear down (fixed — nothing to do there), flaps LDG, airspeed stabilizing toward 70 KIAS. The engine note changes. Then it changes again. Then it quits.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KCLW · Clearwater Air Park'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '16/34'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '71 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'DA40'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Approach'}
The decision
The engine just quit on a 3-mile final at KCLW. Before you act — what's actually in your head right now? (Pick all that apply — no wrong answers; this records your starting mental model.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
The four seed cases behind this scenario — WPR24LA167 (Harvard MK IV, California), GAA19CA534 (Piper PA-28, 2019), WPR12LA023 (Cessna 185, Oregon, 2011), and ERA17LA205 (Cessna P206, 2017) — all share the same chain: a pilot who did not verify fuel state precisely, ran one tank dry, and faced a forced landing with limited or no good options. None of these events occurred at Clearwater Air Park.
The DA40 is particularly unforgiving of fuel mismanagement because its fuel selector has no BOTH position. LEFT and RIGHT are discrete selections. If the selected tank runs dry, the engine stops — there is no passive crossfeed, no automatic switch. The pilot must manage it actively, every flight.
At KCLW, the stakes are elevated by geography. Both runway ends — off Runway 16 to the south (155°) and off Runway 34 to the north (335°) — are surrounded by dense development: residential neighborhoods, commercial buildings, roads. The USGS land-cover data rates both ends as 'poor' for off-field forced landings. There is no open field waiting for you. The runway is your only reasonable option.
The NTSB probable cause language across these cases is consistent: 'the pilot's improper fuel management, resulting in fuel starvation and a total loss of engine power.' In ERA17LA205, the pilot landed in trees short of the runway. In GAA19CA534, the pilot landed on a road. In WPR12LA023, the aircraft nosed over during rollout on an unpaved road. In WPR24LA167, the aircraft struck a dirt berm.
The DA40-specific lesson: know your fuel state in gallons, not impressions. Write it down at departure. Switch tanks on a schedule — not when you think about it. Never begin an approach on a tank you have not verified has adequate fuel. At KCLW, an engine-out on approach means the runway is your only option — and you need to be at 73 KIAS to have any chance of making it.
Key lesson — The DA40 fuel selector has no BOTH position — running a tank dry stops the engine, period. At KCLW, both runway ends are surrounded by dense development with no viable off-field landing areas. Precise fuel management — verified quantities, scheduled tank switches, never beginning an approach on a tank you have not confirmed — is not a best practice here. It is the difference between landing on a runway and landing on a roof.
Debrief — teaching points
The DA40 fuel selector has no BOTH — you own every tank switch.
Unlike a Cessna with a BOTH position, the DA40 requires the pilot to actively select LEFT or RIGHT. There is no passive crossfeed. If the selected tank runs dry, the engine stops immediately. This means fuel management is not a background task — it is an active, scheduled responsibility on every flight. Write down fuel quantities at departure. Switch tanks on a defined schedule (e.g., every 30–45 minutes). Verify the selected tank has adequate fuel before beginning any descent or approach.
Best glide is 73 KIAS — establish it before you do anything else.
When the engine quits, the first action is to pitch for 73 KIAS best glide. This is not negotiable. Every second spent at the wrong airspeed costs altitude you cannot recover. The DA40's composite airframe is aerodynamically clean and rewards best glide speed with meaningful glide performance — but only if you fly it. Troubleshoot after the nose is down and the speed is right.
Fuel-injected engines need the boost pump to restart after starvation.
The IO-360-M1A is fuel-injected — there is no carburetor, no carb heat. After fuel starvation, the injection system loses prime. The electric boost pump is the tool that re-primes it. The engine-out memory flow must include: fuel selector to the fuller tank, boost pump ON, mixture RICH, throttle cracked. Switching tanks alone and waiting is not enough. Know this flow cold — you will not have time to find it on the G1000.
At KCLW, the runway is your only forced-landing option.
Both ends of Runway 16/34 at KCLW are surrounded by dense development — residential neighborhoods, commercial structures, roads. The USGS land-cover data rates both ends as poor for off-field forced landings. There is no open field, no park large enough to land in safely. This means an engine-out on approach at KCLW is a binary situation: make the runway, or land in a neighborhood. Fuel management that prevents the engine from quitting is not optional at this field.
After a fuel-starvation restart, land at the first opportunity — do not go around.
An engine that restarted after running a tank dry is an engine you do not fully trust. The LEFT tank may have been contaminated by the starvation event; the boost pump may not maintain prime through a climb; the engine may stumble again. After a fuel-starvation restart on approach, the correct decision is to land straight ahead at the first available opportunity. A go-around over dense development on a recently-restarted engine is a high-risk gamble. Get it on the ground.
Built from the real accident record
Composite scenario built from NTSB cases WPR24LA167, GAA19CA534, WPR12LA023, and ERA17LA205 — fuel starvation events in single-engine pistons. Localized to KCLW. Anonymized.
NTSB reports: WPR24LA167 · GAA19CA534 · WPR12LA023 · ERA17LA205
ACS tasks: PA.II.A — Pilot Qualifications and Preflight Preparation · PA.II.B — Weather Information · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.II.C — Cross-Country Flight Planning
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.151
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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