Three Greens
Gear management, distraction, and the Arrow's most expensive checklist item
The scenario
Departing and returning to Lakeland Linder International Airport (KLAL), Lakeland, FL — elevation 142 ft MSL, Class D airspace, tower 24 hours. You are flying the school's Piper Arrow (PA-28R-201), a complex aircraft with retractable hydraulic gear, constant-speed prop, and a fuel-injected Lycoming IO-360.
The flight is a solo cross-country return. You've been airborne about 1.5 hours. KLAL tower clears you for a straight-in approach to Runway 10 — the 8,500-foot primary runway, heading 090°. Winds are calm, sky clear, visibility unrestricted. A picture-perfect afternoon in central Florida.
On the way in, tower calls traffic — a Cessna doing touch-and-goes on Runway 05. You spend 20 seconds scanning for it, find it, report in sight, and go back to flying the approach. You're comfortable. You've done this dozens of times.
What you haven't done in the last 60 seconds: run the Before Landing checklist. The gear handle is still UP.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KLAL · Lakeland Linder'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '5/23 · 10/28'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '142 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'PA-28R'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Takeoff'}
The decision
Before we run the scenario — which of these Arrow-specific gear facts are already in your head? (Pick all that apply — no wrong answers; this records your baseline.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
Gear-up landings in the Piper Arrow are not rare. NTSB records from 2011 through 2025 include at least five PA-28R accidents with nearly identical probable cause language: the pilot failed to extend the landing gear before landing due to distraction and failure to conduct the Before Landing checklist.
The distraction sources vary — skydiving traffic at an unfamiliar airport (CEN24LA288), radio congestion and pattern traffic (CEN25LA120, CEN25LA133), a loose external seatbelt (CEN25LA133) — but the mechanism is the same: a task interrupts the checklist flow, the pilot's attention returns to flying the approach, and the gear state is never re-verified. The warning horn is heard but rationalized.
A separate failure mode also appears in the record: the hydraulic system fails to extend the gear even when selected (WPR22LA040 — an improper door rod-end bolt; CEN11LA418 — a failed power pack motor). In both cases, the pilot had a manual emergency extension available and did not use it in time. The Arrow's emergency gear extension — a J-handle or hand pump depending on variant — is the backup when the hydraulic system fails to produce three greens.
The class-peer record (Beechcraft S35, A36, 95-series) shows the same pattern across all retractable singles: distraction, checklist omission, gear-up touchdown. The Arrow is not uniquely dangerous — it is representative of the entire complex-aircraft population.
None of the accidents described above occurred at Lakeland Linder International Airport (KLAL). They occurred at airports across the United States. This scenario is localized to KLAL for training purposes only.
Key lesson — In the Piper Arrow, 'gear handle down' and 'gear locked down' are not the same thing. Three green lights is the only confirmation that all three gear are locked. GUMPS on downwind, GUMPS again on final, and a deliberate three-green check before crossing the threshold — every time, without exception, regardless of distraction.
Debrief — teaching points
GUMPS is not optional — it is the gear-up accident prevention system.
Gas (fuel selector on the fuller tank), Undercarriage (gear DOWN and three greens confirmed), Mixture (rich for landing), Prop (full forward), Seatbelts. Run it on downwind. Run it again turning final. The Arrow's hydraulic gear system is reliable — but 'reliable' is not 'infallible,' and the checklist is the only layer that catches both pilot omission and mechanical failure. Every PA-28R gear-up in the NTSB record involved a pilot who skipped or was interrupted during this check.
Three greens is the standard — the handle position is not.
The gear handle selects hydraulic pressure to the actuators. It does not confirm that all three gear are locked down. A faulty door rod-end bolt (WPR22LA040), a failed power pack motor (CEN11LA418), or a tripped circuit breaker can prevent extension even with the handle in the DOWN position. The three green indicator lights — one per gear — are the only confirmation of locked-down status. No greens, or a red, means do not land.
The warning horn is a cue, not a checklist.
The Arrow's gear warning horn activates when manifold pressure is reduced below approximately 14 inches with the gear up. It is designed to catch exactly this scenario. But the accident record shows pilots hear the horn and rationalize it — 'it's just the power reduction,' 'it goes off all the time.' The horn is a cue to look at the gear lights and run GUMPS, not a nuisance to be silenced. If the horn is sounding on final, the gear is up.
Distraction is the proximate cause in the majority of Arrow gear-up accidents.
Traffic calls, radio congestion, passenger questions, unfamiliar airports, loose equipment — any of these can interrupt the Before Landing checklist at the exact moment the gear item is due. The defense is not to avoid distraction (impossible) but to build a habit that is resistant to it: complete GUMPS before the distraction occurs (on downwind), and re-verify three greens after any interruption on final. If you cannot confirm three greens, go around.
Know the emergency extension procedure before you need it.
If the hydraulic system fails to extend the gear — no greens after selecting DOWN, or a red light — the Arrow has a manual emergency extension system. Depending on the variant, this is a J-handle (free-fall) or a hand pump. The procedure is in the POH Emergency section and must be memorized, not looked up at 500 ft AGL. CEN11LA418 is the proof: the power pack motor failed, the emergency extension was available, and the pilot did not use it. The airplane landed wheels-up on a runway that had 8,500 feet available.
Built from the real accident record
Composite scenario built from multiple NTSB PA-28R gear-up landing events and class-peer retractable-single accidents. See based_on list. Anonymized and localized to KLAL.
NTSB reports: CEN24LA288 · WPR22LA040 · CEN11LA418 · CEN25LA133 · CEN25LA120 · ERA26LA045 · CEN26LA028 · WPR26LA016 · ERA25LA343 · CEN25LA319 · GAA17CA105 · ERA21LA119
ACS tasks: PA.IV.A — Normal Approach and Landing · PA.IV.B — Normal Takeoff and Climb · PA.IX.C — Systems and Equipment Malfunctions · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.II.A — Pilot Qualifications
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.205
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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