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Sample scenario-based training
SAMPLE SBTApproach / Landing

The Turn to Final

A base-to-final stall in the pattern — the SR20's energy management trap and the CAPS decision

Cirrus SR20 · St. Petersburg Clearwater International Airport (KPIE) · Private / Commercial · Approach / Landing

The scenario

Departing St. Petersburg Clearwater International Airport (KPIE), Pinellas Park, FL — Runway 18, a 9,730 ft concrete runway. Elevation 11 ft MSL. You are a Private pilot with 180 hours total, 45 hours in the Cirrus SR20, and 12 hours of dual in the pattern at KPIE. This is your third solo flight at this field.

It is a warm afternoon in late spring: OAT 27°C, wind 160° at 8 kt gusting to 14 kt — a light crosswind from the left for Runway 18. Visibility 10 SM, scattered clouds at 3,500 ft, light thermal activity. KPIE tower is active (0600–2300 local). You are in Class D airspace; the overlying Tampa Class B begins at 1,200 ft MSL.

You have completed three touch-and-go landings. On the fourth approach, you are on downwind for Runway 18, 800 ft AGL, airspeed 90 KIAS, flaps 25%, power 1,500 RPM. The tower clears you to land. You begin the base turn — a left turn from downwind (heading 350°) to base (heading 080°). The crosswind is from the left, so the base turn is a climbing turn into the wind.

Aircraft: Cirrus SR20, solo, 2,800 lb gross weight, within limits. Constant-speed prop, fuel-injected Continental IO-360-ES, glass panel (Avidyne Perspective). Fuel selector on LEFT tank. Nothing was written up; the airplane is airworthy.

Pilot: you — Private pilot, current, 180 hours total, 45 hours SR20, 12 hours pattern work at KPIE. You have not flown in crosswind conditions this strong. You have not practiced stall recovery in the pattern. You have heard about CAPS but have not deployed it and do not fully understand when it is the correct response.

The decision

Before we get into the decision tree — what do you already know about stall risk in the SR20 during the approach and landing? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)

What the record shows

What the NTSB files show

NTSB WPR20LA152 (2020): A Cirrus SR20 flown by a student pilot on a solo cross-country flight stalled during a steep descending turn to final approach at low altitude. The accident resulted from the pilot exceeding the aircraft's critical angle of attack during a steep and descending turn to final approach. The parachute was deployed, but at 195 ft AGL there was insufficient altitude for the parachute to inflate and slow the descent before impact. The pilot was killed.

NTSB GAA19CA099 (2018): A Cirrus SR20 on a training flight stalled during a go-around when the student pilot aggressively pitched up after being instructed to abort the landing. The accident resulted from the student pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack during the go-around and the flight instructor's delayed remedial action. The parachute was deployed at adequate altitude and the crew survived.

NTSB ERA23FA358 (2023): A Cirrus SR20 student pilot on a solo night flight impacted trees during initial climb after the fourth takeoff of the evening. The accident was attributed to the pilot's failure to maintain a positive climb rate after takeoff due to spatial disorientation (somatogravic illusion). The pattern of multiple takeoffs and landings in sequence, fatigue, and loss of situational awareness are consistent with the scenario's fourth approach.

The regional precedent NTSB LAX89LA222 (1989, Grumman AA-1C) shows the same failure mode: a stall on final approach in crosswind conditions at low altitude, with the pilot attempting to continue the descent rather than executing a go-around. The outcome was fatal.

The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports and in other aircraft — NOT at KPIE. KPIE's dominant accident pattern (LOSS_OF_CONTROL_INFLIGHT 21.2%, STALL_SPIN 12.1%) reflects the broader risk of stall/spin accidents in the pattern, particularly in crosswind conditions and during go-arounds.

The consistent thread across all these events: the SR20's constant-speed prop and slippery wing make energy management unforgiving. A slow descent in a turn at low altitude can quickly exceed the critical angle of attack. The stall warning is a late indicator — by the time it sounds, the margin is thin. The correct response to a stall warning at low altitude is immediate action: add power, reduce flaps, level the wings, or go around. Attempting to continue the descent or recover by control inputs alone is the trap that kills pilots in this airplane.

Key lesson — In the SR20, a base-to-final stall in a crosswind turn is the most dangerous scenario in the pattern. The constant-speed prop and slippery wing make deceleration aggressive; a slow descent in a turn at low altitude quickly exceeds the critical angle of attack. The stall warning is a late indicator. The correct responses are: (1) add power and reduce flaps immediately, (2) level the wings to reduce load factor, or (3) go around. If a stall develops at low altitude and recovery by control inputs is not immediate, CAPS is the primary response — deploy it. The SR20 is NOT certified for intentional spin recovery; CAPS is the design intent for unrecoverable situations.

Debrief — teaching points

The SR20's energy management is unforgiving — the constant-speed prop and slippery wing make deceleration aggressive.

The SR20's Hartzell constant-speed propeller automatically adjusts blade pitch to maintain RPM; when you reduce power, the prop pitch increases, increasing drag. Combined with the SR20's clean aerodynamic design (low drag, slippery wing), this means the airplane slows quickly when power is reduced. In the pattern, a power reduction of 300 RPM can result in a 10–15 KIAS deceleration in seconds. This is not a Cessna 172, where energy changes are gradual. Plan your descent and deceleration early; do not attempt to slow down late in the approach.

A base-to-final stall in a crosswind turn is the most dangerous scenario in the pattern.

The base-to-final turn combines three stall-risk factors: (1) low altitude (300–500 ft AGL), (2) a turn (increased load factor), and (3) a descent (reduced airspeed). In a crosswind, the turn is a climbing turn into the wind — the aircraft's performance is degraded. If the pilot reduces power too early or flies too slowly, the critical angle of attack is exceeded during the turn. The stall warning may sound, but there is no time to recover by control inputs. CAPS is the primary response.

The stall warning in the SR20 is a late indicator — by the time it sounds, the margin is thin.

The SR20's stall warning horn sounds when the angle of attack reaches a threshold — roughly 5–7 KIAS above the stall. At 75 KIAS in landing configuration (Vs0 = 56 KIAS), the stall warning sounds at roughly 62 KIAS. If you are in a turn at 300 ft AGL when the warning sounds, you have seconds to respond. The correct response is immediate: add power, reduce flaps, level the wings, or go around. Do not continue the descent hoping to reach the runway.

Crosswind conditions degrade the SR20's performance in the pattern — plan accordingly.

A crosswind base turn is a climbing turn into the wind. The SR20's performance is reduced — it climbs more slowly, turns more slowly, and requires more power to maintain altitude and airspeed. A 14 kt crosswind is not extreme, but it is significant enough to change the pattern dynamics. Plan a wider downwind, a shallower descent, and a longer base leg. Do not attempt to tighten the pattern or descend aggressively in crosswind conditions.

If the approach is unstable, go around — do not continue the descent trying to salvage the landing.

An unstable approach is defined as: airspeed more than 10 KIAS above or below target, descent rate more than 700 ft/min, altitude more than 500 ft above the glide path, or any other condition that requires aggressive maneuvering to land. In the SR20, an unstable approach at low altitude is dangerous. The correct response is a go-around: add full power, reduce flaps to 0%, climb to 1,500 ft, and rejoin downwind for a second attempt. A go-around is not a failure; it is airmanship.

Built from the real accident record

Scenario built from NTSB WPR20LA152 (2020 SR20 stall on final approach), GAA19CA099 (2018 SR20 stall during go-around), ERA23FA358 (2023 SR20 spatial disorientation / loss of control), and regional precedents LAX89LA222, ERA10CA300, ATL83LA356, FTW99LA205. Real events occurred at other airports — NOT at KPIE.

NTSB reports: ERA23FA358 · WPR20LA152 · WPR12FA235 · GAA19CA099 · LAX89LA222 · ERA10CA300 · ATL83LA356 · FTW99LA205

ACS tasks: PA.VII.A — Approach and Landing · PA.VII.B — Go-Around / Rejected Landing · PA.VIII.A — Slow Flight · PA.VIII.B — Stall Prevention and Recovery · PA.I.H — Human Factors

Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.21

Run this scenario yourself

Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.

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