Float and Climb at St. Petersburg
A balked landing, improper flap configuration, and a low-altitude stall in a high-performance airplane — the margin for error is measured in seconds
The scenario
Departing St. Petersburg Clearwater International Airport (KPIE), Pinellas Park, FL — Runway 18, returning to your home base after a local VFR flight. Elevation 11 ft MSL. The runway is 9,730 ft of concrete, plenty of room. The afternoon is clear, light winds, visibility 10 SM. Class D airspace, tower is active (0600–2300 local).
You are on short final to Runway 18, 500 ft AGL, descending at 77 KIAS (Vref, full flaps, short-field configuration). The Cirrus SR22's constant-speed prop is set to high RPM, power is at 1,200 RPM idle, and you are trimmed for the approach. The runway is made; the landing looks stable.
At 200 ft AGL, about 0.5 nm from the runway threshold, you notice the aircraft is floating — not descending as expected. The runway is still ahead, but you are not sinking. You have full flaps (100%, 104 KIAS max flap extended speed). The landing is no longer stable. You make a split-second decision: abort the landing and go around.
Aircraft: Cirrus SR22, solo, full fuel, within limits. The airplane is airworthy; no write-ups. You are a Private pilot with 350 hours total, 120 in type. You have made dozens of landings in this airplane. You know it floats — the SR22 is a fast, slippery airplane with a high wing loading. You have never had a problem recovering from a float before.
Pilot: You — current, proficient, and confident. You have not flown in 10 days; this is your first flight back. You are familiar with KPIE and have made this approach many times. You are not fatigued, not distracted, and not rushed. The conditions are benign. This should be routine.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KPIE · St. Petersburg Clearwater'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '4/22 · 18/36'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '11 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'SR22'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Takeoff / Landing'}
The decision
Before we get into the decision tree — what do you already know about go-around procedures and flap management in the SR22? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
NTSB WPR11LA169 (2011): A Cirrus SR22 on return to its home base at Falcon Field, Arizona, encountered excessive float during landing flare. The pilot aborted the landing and retracted flaps to climb out, but the aircraft stalled at low altitude and lost control. The probable cause was the pilot's attempt to correct a landing float by adding power, followed by his premature attempt to climb the airplane out of ground effect during a balked landing, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to properly configure the flaps for the balked landing attempt. The aircraft struck the runway, veered left, and collided with a parked Cessna 172.
NTSB WPR20FA019 (2019, FATAL): A Cirrus SR22 stalled during landing approach while maneuvering in the traffic pattern at low airspeed and descended into a residential area. The probable cause was the pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack while maneuvering for landing, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of control. The accident was fatal.
NTSB CEN18FA204 (2018, FATAL): A Cirrus SR22 on a personal flight from Midland to Ruidoso stalled during initial climb at 200 feet and entered an uncontrollable descent, impacting terrain. The probable cause was an inadvertent stall, with contributing factors including high density altitude and the student pilot's limited experience. The accident was fatal.
NTSB ATL06LA035 (2006): A Cirrus SR22 on a business flight encountered icing conditions while climbing to 9,000 feet in an area where the aircraft was not certified to operate. The accident resulted from inadequate preflight planning, failure to obtain current weather information, and continued flight into known icing conditions, leading to ice accumulation, airspeed decay, stall, and spin.
The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports and in other aircraft types — NOT at St. Petersburg Clearwater International Airport. KPIE has its own accident history (see field dominant patterns: LOSS_OF_CONTROL_INFLIGHT 21.2%, STALL_SPIN 12.1%), but these specific NTSB events happened elsewhere. The scenario is localized to KPIE to make the off-field environment real and consequential for you as a student here.
The consistent thread across all these events: the SR22 is a high-performance, fast, slippery airplane. It floats on landing. A go-around requires full commitment: full power, positive climb, and staged flap retraction. Attempting to climb out of ground effect with full flaps at low airspeed is the trap. The stall is quick; the recovery altitude is zero. The CAPS parachute is the POH's primary response to an unrecoverable stall or loss of control at low altitude — not control inputs.
Key lesson — The SR22 floats — it is a high-wing-loading, slippery airplane. Anticipate the float on approach. If you go around, commit fully: add full power, establish a positive climb, and retract flaps in stages. Never attempt to climb out of ground effect with full flaps at low airspeed. At 200 ft AGL, the margin between a successful go-around and a stall/spin is measured in seconds. Off Runway 18 at KPIE, the off-field environment is medium development and open developed areas — not a safe landing surface. Know your go-around procedure cold.
Debrief — teaching points
The SR22 floats — it is a design characteristic, not a surprise.
The SR22 has a high wing loading (weight per unit wing area) and a slippery fuselage. It is reluctant to sink on approach. A float of 500–1,000 ft down a long runway is normal. Anticipate it: plan for a longer landing distance, be ready to go around, and do not fight the airplane trying to force it down. KPIE's Runway 18 is 9,730 ft long — plenty of room for a float. Shorter runways require more aggressive pitch control and earlier descent planning.
A go-around requires full commitment: full power, positive climb, staged flap retraction.
When you decide to go around, advance the throttle to full power immediately. The constant-speed prop will automatically adjust to high RPM for climb. Establish a positive climb attitude. Do not attempt to climb with full flaps at low airspeed — the drag is enormous and the stall speed is high (59 KIAS Vs0 in landing configuration). Retract flaps in stages: first to 50% (Vfe 119 KIAS), allow airspeed to build to 90+ KIAS, then retract to 0°. This staged approach avoids the sudden pitch change and loss of control authority that comes from full flap retraction at low airspeed.
Full flap retraction at low airspeed causes a sudden pitch-down — plan for it.
When you retract flaps from 100% to 0° at low airspeed (e.g., 77 KIAS), the loss of lift and the change in pitch moment cause the nose to pitch down sharply. At 200 ft AGL, this pitch-down can result in a dive. Staged flap retraction (100% → 50% → 0%) distributes the pitch change over time and allows airspeed to build between stages. This is the correct technique.
Stall speed in landing configuration (full flaps, clean) is 59 KIAS (Vs0); clean stall is 70 KIAS (Vs).
In the SR22, Vs0 (stall speed in landing configuration, full flaps) is 59 KIAS. Vs (stall speed clean) is 70 KIAS. A banked turn increases the stall speed — at a 15° bank, stall speed increases by roughly 1%; at a 30° bank, by roughly 4%. At 77 KIAS on short final with full flaps, you are 18 KIAS above stall speed — a margin, but not a large one. A turn to an alternate runway at this airspeed and configuration is risky. A go-around with staged flap retraction is safer.
The SR22's CAPS parachute is the POH's primary response to an unrecoverable stall or loss of control at low altitude.
The SR22 is not approved for intentional spins. The POH's primary response to an unrecoverable stall, inadvertent spin, or loss of control at low altitude is to deploy the CAPS (Cirrus Airframe Parachute System) — the whole-airframe parachute. At 200 ft AGL with an unrecoverable stall developing, deploying CAPS is the correct decision. The descent rate under CAPS is roughly 1,500 ft/min; at 200 ft AGL, you have about 8 seconds before impact. The impact is survivable. CAPS saves lives.
Off Runway 18 at KPIE, the off-field environment is medium development and open developed areas — not a safe landing surface.
The off-field environment off Runway 18's departure end (heading 171°) is medium development, open developed areas (parks, large lots), and dense development. There is no open field, no road, no park suitable for a forced landing. A stall/spin in this environment at low altitude is catastrophic. This is why the go-around procedure is critical: commit fully, climb to a safe altitude, and plan the next approach carefully. Do not attempt to stretch a glide to the runway or land on an unsuitable surface.
Built from the real accident record
Scenario built from NTSB WPR11LA169 (2011 SR22 balked landing / stall at low altitude), WPR20FA019 (2019 SR22 stall during landing approach), CEN18FA204 (2018 SR22 inadvertent stall on initial climb), and ATL06LA035 (2006 SR22 stall/spin in icing). Anonymized and localized to KPIE.
NTSB reports: WPR11LA169 · WPR20FA019 · CEN18FA204 · ATL06LA035
ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.II.D — Approach and Landing · PA.II.E — Go-Around / Rejected Landing · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.9
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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