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SAMPLE SBTLanding / Approach

Float and Overshoot at St. Petersburg Clearwater

Excess approach energy, a long runway, and the decision to go around — runway excursion risk in the C172R

Cessna 172R · St. Petersburg Clearwater International Airport (KPIE) · Private · Landing / Approach

The scenario

Departing St. Petersburg Clearwater International Airport (KPIE), Pinellas Park, FL — Runway 18, a 9,730 ft concrete runway. Elevation 11 ft MSL. You are a Private pilot with roughly 180 hours total time, current and proficient. This is your first visit to KPIE; you have trained at smaller fields with shorter runways.

It is a clear Florida afternoon: OAT 26°C, winds 180° at 8 kt gusting to 12 kt — a light crosswind from the left on Runway 18. Visibility 10 SM. KPIE tower is active (0600–2300 local). You are in Class D airspace (ceiling 1,600 ft MSL); overlying Class B begins at 1,200 ft MSL.

You have completed a 1.5-hour cross-country flight and are now on a 4-mile final approach to Runway 18. Your approach has been stable: 62 KIAS (Vref, short-field approach speed), 10° flaps, descent rate 300–400 fpm. The runway is long and straight ahead. You are on glide path, on speed.

At 500 ft AGL, tower clears you to land. You begin to reduce power for the descent to touchdown. At 300 ft AGL, you notice you are drifting slightly left of the runway centerline — the crosswind is pushing you. You make a small correction with right aileron and right rudder. The airplane responds, but the correction feels sluggish.

Aircraft: Cessna 172R, solo, full fuel, within limits. Fuel-injected Lycoming IO-360-L2A, fixed-pitch prop, fixed gear, steam panel (vacuum-driven). Nothing was written up; the airplane is airworthy. You have flown this model before, but not extensively.

Pilot: you — a Private pilot, current, roughly 180 hours total. You have landed at smaller fields (3,000–5,000 ft runways) many times. This is your first landing at a 9,730 ft runway. The length is comforting — you feel you have plenty of room. You have not briefed a go-around plan.

The decision

Before we enter the decision tree — what do you know about runway excursion risk in the C172R? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)

What the record shows

What the NTSB files show

NTSB CEN24LA263 (2024): A Cessna 172R performing a power-off 180° maneuver landed too high on the runway and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. The aircraft overran the runway end, breached the perimeter fence, and came to rest upright. Probable cause: the pilot's decision to continue the landing attempt with insufficient runway remaining, which resulted in a runway overrun. The pilot had adequate runway to stop if the landing had been executed in the first third of the runway — but the high touchdown, combined with a late decision to commit to the landing, resulted in the overrun.

NTSB CEN24LA233 (2024): A Cessna 172R on an instructional flight veered left of the runway centerline during landing. The pilot's correction attempts resulted in a right veer, causing the aircraft to exit the left side of the runway and strike a distance marker. Probable cause: the pilot's failure to maintain directional control during landing. The sequence was: initial left drift (crosswind), late correction, overcorrection to the right, loss of control, and runway excursion. The instructor was present but did not intervene until it was too late.

NTSB ERA22LA280 (2022): A Cessna 172 flown by a student pilot during touch-and-go landings experienced a porpoising landing after an improper flare. The student's attempt to recover by pulling back caused a skid, and subsequent overcompensation with rudder input resulted in a runway excursion and collision with a taxiway sign. Probable cause: the student pilot's improper flare, which resulted in a loss of control during landing. The sequence was: improper flare (too high, too aggressive), balloon, attempt to recover by pulling back (which worsened the porpoise), skid, overcorrection with rudder, and runway excursion.

NTSB ERA21LA249 (2021): A Cessna 172R on a solo cross-country instructional flight experienced loss of directional control during landing when the nose gear contacted the runway. The accident resulted from the student pilot's failure to maintain directional control, resulting in a runway excursion and collision with an airport sign. Probable cause: the pilot's failure to maintain directional control of the airplane during landing, resulting in a runway excursion.

NTSB ERA21LA119 (2021): A Cessna 172R on a personal flight veered left off the runway during landing in gusting crosswind conditions and struck the ground with the propeller and left wing tip. Probable cause: the pilot's failure to maintain directional control during landing in a gusting crosswind, which resulted in a loss of control and runway excursion.

The common thread across all these accidents: the pilots did not execute a go-around when the approach became unstable. In CEN24LA263, the pilot was high on the runway and committed to landing instead of going around. In CEN24LA233 and ERA21LA249, the pilots lost directional control and did not recover. In ERA22LA280, the student porpoised and overcorrected. In ERA21LA119, the pilot did not maintain crosswind control. In every case, a go-around at the right moment would have prevented the accident.

At KPIE, Runway 18 is 9,730 ft long — one of the longest runways in the region. The length can create false confidence: pilots assume there is always enough room and do not execute a go-around when the approach is unstable. The NTSB data shows that runway length is not protective — in fact, it can be a trap. A stable approach at 62 KIAS (Vref), with early crosswind correction and a go-around plan, is the standard. If the approach is unstable at any point, go around.

The real accidents cited above occurred at various airports and in various conditions — NOT all at KPIE. KPIE's own accident history (see field dominant patterns) shows LOSS_OF_CONTROL_GROUND (15.2%), STALL_SPIN (12.1%), and GEAR_UP_LANDING (9.1%) as significant patterns. Runway excursion is a subset of loss-of-control-ground accidents. This scenario is localized to KPIE to make the runway length and crosswind conditions real and consequential for you as a student here.

Key lesson — A long runway can hide a bad landing decision. At KPIE's 9,730 ft Runway 18, a high touchdown or unstable approach can still result in a safe landing — but only if you maintain directional control and do not lose sight of the go-around option. Crosswind drift, improper flare, ballooning, and overcorrection with rudder are the classic sequence leading to runway excursion. A go-around at any point in this sequence prevents the accident. Maintain a stable approach at 62 KIAS (Vref), correct for crosswind early, and execute a smooth flare. If the approach is unstable, go around.

Debrief — teaching points

A long runway can create false confidence.

KPIE's Runway 18 is 9,730 ft long — significantly longer than the 3,000–5,000 ft runways at many training fields. The length can create a false sense of security: pilots assume there is always enough room and do not execute a go-around when the approach is unstable. The NTSB data shows that runway length is not protective — in fact, it can be a trap. The C172R's landing distance from 50 ft AGL is approximately 1,075 ft in normal conditions. Even a high touchdown at 3,000 ft from the threshold leaves 6,730 ft of runway — plenty of room. But the margin is smaller than it was, and a series of poor decisions (late crosswind correction, improper flare, overcorrection with rudder) can quickly turn a safe landing into a runway excursion.

Crosswind control requires early correction and coordinated aileron and rudder.

A light crosswind (8–12 kt) on Runway 18 is manageable, but it requires active crosswind correction throughout the approach and landing. The key is to correct early — at 300 ft AGL, not 100 ft AGL. A small correction with coordinated aileron and rudder (not just aileron) will keep the airplane on centerline. A late correction at low altitude is abrupt and can lead to overcorrection and loss of directional control. The NTSB CEN24LA233 and ERA21LA119 accidents both involved late or inadequate crosswind correction.

The flare is the most critical phase of landing — improper flare leads to porpoising and loss of control.

The flare is where many runway excursion accidents originate. An improper flare — too high, too aggressive, or too shallow — can result in ballooning, porpoising, or a hard nose-gear contact. The correct flare is smooth and gradual: reduce power smoothly as you descend through 50 ft, raise the nose gently to slow the descent, and touch down in the first third of the runway. If you balloon (lose descent and float up), execute a go-around immediately. Do not try to recover by pushing the nose down — that leads to a hard landing and potential loss of control.

Vref (62 KIAS) is the correct approach speed — flying faster increases float and landing distance.

Vref for the C172R in short-field configuration (full flaps) is 62 KIAS. This is the speed that minimizes landing distance and gives the best control authority during the approach and landing. Flying faster (e.g., 70 KIAS) increases float and landing distance — at 70 KIAS, the airplane will float further down the runway before touching down. At KPIE, with a 9,730 ft runway, the extra landing distance may not matter — but the habit of flying Vref is critical at shorter fields. Maintain 62 KIAS on final approach.

A go-around is always an option — and it is the correct decision if the approach is unstable.

The NTSB data shows that every runway excursion accident in the C172R could have been prevented by a go-around at the right moment. If the approach is unstable — if you are drifting off centerline, if you are too high, if you balloon, if you lose directional control — execute a go-around. Advance the throttle to full power, raise the flaps to 10°, and establish a climb at 60 KIAS (Vx, best angle of climb). Advise the tower and re-enter the pattern. A go-around is not a failure; it is airmanship. The alternative is a runway excursion, which is an accident.

Built from the real accident record

Scenario built from NTSB CEN24LA263 (2024 C172R power-off 180° landing overshoot), CEN24LA233 (2024 C172R directional control loss during landing), ERA22LA280 (2022 C172R porpoising and runway excursion), ERA21LA249 (2021 C172R loss of directional control / runway excursion), and ERA21LA119 (2021 C172R crosswind directional control loss). Localized to KPIE.

NTSB reports: CEN24LA263 · CEN24LA233 · ERA22LA280 · ERA21LA249 · ERA21LA119

ACS tasks: PA.II.H — Approach and Landing · PA.II.I — Go-Around / Rejected Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing

Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13

Run this scenario yourself

Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.

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