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SAMPLE SBTClimb / Initial Departure

Rough Climb Over Tampa Bay

Carburetor ice, partial power loss, and a water-surrounded departure — the decision clock is short

Piper Warrior · St. Petersburg Clearwater International Airport (KPIE) · Private · Climb / Initial Departure

The scenario

Departing St. Petersburg Clearwater International Airport (KPIE), Pinellas Park, FL — Runway 04, climbing out on a 040° heading over Tampa Bay. Elevation 11 ft MSL; the runway is essentially at sea level.

It is a hazy Florida afternoon in late spring: OAT 28°C, dew point 22°C, altimeter 29.92. Scattered clouds at 2,500 ft, light rain shower two miles to the northeast. Visibility 8 SM. Classic Gulf Coast conditions — warm, moist, and exactly the environment the FAA icing probability chart marks as 'serious icing at glide power, moderate icing at cruise power.'

You are 400 ft AGL, climbing through 79 KIAS (Vy, best rate of climb), heading 040°, when the engine begins to run rough. Power is noticeably down — the tachometer is dropping. The water of Tampa Bay fills the windscreen ahead. KPIE's tower is part-time (0600–2300) and is open; you are in Class D airspace.

Aircraft: Piper PA-28-161 Warrior, solo, full fuel (left and right tanks), within limits. Carbureted Lycoming O-320-D, fixed-pitch prop, steam panel, fuel selector on LEFT tank. Nothing was written up; the airplane was airworthy at departure.

Pilot: you — a Private pilot, current, roughly 200 hours total. You did not apply carburetor heat during the run-up because the engine ran smoothly. You did not apply it after takeoff because you were heads-down on the climb and focused on the departure.

The decision

Before we get into the decision tree — what do you already know about carburetor ice in the PA-28-161? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)

What the record shows

What the NTSB files show

NTSB CEN12LA175 (2012): A Piper PA-28-161 on an instrument instructional flight encountered carburetor ice during climb through 6,500 feet. The engine lost power progressively. A contributing factor was limited carburetor heat valve travel from recent maintenance — the carb heat system could not deliver full heat. The pilot did not recognize the icing condition early enough to recover. The probable cause was loss of engine power due to carburetor icing.

NTSB LAX03LA238 (2003): A Piper PA-28-161 experienced partial engine power loss during initial climb due to carburetor icing. The pilot failed to apply carburetor heat. During a go-around attempt, the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed, resulting in a stall and collision with power lines and terrain. The probable cause was carburetor icing and the pilot's failure to use carburetor heat and maintain airspeed.

NTSB CEN09CA532 (2009): A Piper PA-28-161 lost engine power during descent one mile from the airport due to carburetor icing. The pilot made a forced landing in a corn field and sustained a broken arm. The probable cause was loss of engine power due to carburetor icing as a result of the pilot's failure to use carburetor heat in icing-conducive conditions.

NTSB ATL04LA124 (2004): A Piper PA-28-161 lost engine power during climb in conditions favorable for carburetor ice formation. The pilot made a forced landing on a beach. The probable cause was the pilot's failure to use carburetor heat when weather conditions were favorable for carburetor ice formation.

NTSB NYC03LA012 (2002): A Piper PA-28-161 student pilot on a solo instructional flight lost engine power due to carburetor ice. The accident resulted from the student pilot's improper use of carburetor heat, which failed to remove accumulated ice. A factor was the carburetor icing conditions.

The local environment at KPIE makes this scenario particularly unforgiving: Runway 04's departure end is open water — Tampa Bay. An engine failure on the Runway 04 departure at low altitude is a ditching, not a field landing. There is no open field, no road, no park. The water is the off-field environment. This is not hypothetical; it is the NLCD ground cover off that runway end.

NTSB LAX89LA222 (1989, fatal): A Grumman AA-1C stalled on final approach to a coastal airport after an unstable low-altitude approach in gusting winds. The airplane impacted the water short of the runway. The mechanism — low altitude, low airspeed, pilot trying to stretch the approach to the runway — is the same trap that kills pilots who delay the ditching decision and try to glide to the runway instead.

The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports and in other aircraft — NOT at St. Petersburg Clearwater International Airport. KPIE has its own accident history (see field dominant patterns), but these specific events happened elsewhere. The scenario is localized to KPIE to make the off-field environment real and consequential for you as a student here.

The consistent thread across all these events: carburetor ice in the PA-28-161 is insidious. It builds gradually, the first symptom is roughness and a dropping tachometer (not a dramatic power cut), and by the time it is obvious, it may be too late for a comfortable recovery. The fix — full carburetor heat, immediately, at the first sign of roughness in conducive conditions — is simple. The failure is always a delay.

Key lesson — In warm, moist Gulf Coast air, the PA-28-161's carbureted O-320-D can accumulate serious carburetor ice even at cruise power and above-freezing temperatures. Apply full carburetor heat at the first sign of engine roughness or unexplained RPM loss. At low altitude over water, the decision window is measured in seconds — not minutes. Off Runway 04 at KPIE, the off-field environment is Tampa Bay: a delayed response means a ditching, not a field landing. Remember: the PA-28-161 has LEFT / RIGHT fuel selector with no BOTH position — tank management is your job. Verify the active tank before any emergency descent.

Debrief — teaching points

Carburetor ice forms in conditions you would not expect.

The FAA icing probability chart shows 'serious icing at glide power' at temperatures between roughly 20°C and 30°C when relative humidity is high — exactly the Gulf Coast afternoon conditions at KPIE. You do not need visible ice, freezing temperatures, or IMC. Warm, moist air at reduced power is the classic carb-ice environment. The PA-28-161's Lycoming O-320-D is carbureted; it has no fuel injection or alternate air system. Carburetor heat is the only tool.

The first symptom is subtle — a dropping tachometer and engine roughness.

In a fixed-pitch airplane like the PA-28-161, carburetor ice first shows as engine roughness and an unexplained RPM decrease. There is no dramatic power cut. Pilots who are not actively monitoring the tachometer miss the early warning. By the time the roughness is obvious, significant ice has accumulated. Scan the tachometer as part of your regular instrument scan, especially in conducive conditions.

Apply full carburetor heat — not partial — and expect an initial RPM drop.

When you apply carb heat to an iced carburetor, the RPM will drop further before it rises. This is expected and normal: the heat is melting ice and the resulting water is briefly disrupting combustion. Do not remove carb heat when the RPM drops — that is the heat working. Hold it full on. The RPM will recover as the ice clears, typically within 15–30 seconds depending on ice accumulation. Partial carb heat can worsen the situation by partially melting ice into water ingestion without fully clearing the restriction.

At KPIE Runway 04, an engine failure on departure is a ditching.

The off-field environment off Runway 04's departure end (heading 040°) is open water — Tampa Bay. There is no alternate landing surface. If the engine quits on the Runway 04 departure and altitude is insufficient to return to the airport, the outcome is a ditching. This is not a worst-case scenario; it is the geographic reality. Best glide is 73 KIAS. Doors unlatched before water contact. Master off just before impact. Flaps for slowest possible touchdown speed — impact energy rises with the square of touchdown speed, so the slowest possible speed matters most. Know this before you line up on Runway 04.

The PA-28-161 has LEFT / RIGHT fuel selector with no BOTH position — tank management is your job.

Unlike some high-wing Cessnas, the Warrior has no BOTH position. You must actively manage fuel selection between LEFT and RIGHT tanks. In an emergency descent or approach, verify which tank is feeding before you commit to the landing. Fuel starvation from neglecting to switch tanks is a Piper-class accident. Make tank switching part of your pre-descent checklist in any emergency.

Proactive carb heat use in conducive conditions is not optional.

The PA-28-161 POH and the FAA Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge both recommend applying carburetor heat when conditions are conducive to icing — before the symptom appears. In a Gulf Coast summer departure, with OAT near 28°C and dew point near 22°C, that means applying carb heat during the run-up check (and confirming the expected RPM drop, then recovery) and considering its use during climb in visible moisture or high humidity. Waiting for the roughness to appear at 400 ft AGL over Tampa Bay is waiting too long.

Built from the real accident record

Scenario built from NTSB CEN12LA175 (2012 PA-28-161 carburetor ice during climb, limited carb heat valve travel), LAX03LA238 (2003 PA-28-161 carb ice / stall on go-around), CEN09CA532 (2009 PA-28-161 carb ice / forced landing), ATL04LA124 (2004 PA-28-161 carb ice / beach landing), and NYC03LA012 (2002 PA-28-161 improper carb heat use). Regional precedents LAX89LA222 (1989 stall on final in crosswind), ERA10CA300 (2010 stall/spin on climbing turn), ATL83LA356 (1983 stall on short final). Anonymized and localized to KPIE.

NTSB reports: CEN12LA175 · LAX03LA238 · CEN09CA532 · ATL04LA124 · NYC03LA012 · LAX89LA222 · ERA10CA300 · ATL83LA356

ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.II.B — Engine Starting / Systems Preflight

Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.185

Run this scenario yourself

Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.

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