Wrong Tank, Wrong Time
Fuel starvation in the DA40 over Tampa Bay — the selector that wasn't where you thought it was
The scenario
Departing Albert Whitted Airport (KSPG), St. Petersburg, FL — Runway 07 in use, climbing out over Tampa Bay on a 62° heading into clear skies. You're returning from a 1.8-hour cross-country to Lakeland (KLAL) and have been in the pattern at KSPG for two touch-and-goes before this final departure leg back to your home tie-down at a nearby field.
Aircraft: Diamond DA40, N-number yours, solo, within limits. Fuel-injected Lycoming IO-360-M1A, constant-speed prop, G1000 glass panel. Fuel selector: LEFT or RIGHT — no BOTH position. You topped off the left tank before the KLAL leg but did not add fuel on return. You've been running LEFT the entire flight.
Weather: VMC, clear, winds 070° at 8 knots, visibility unrestricted. Density altitude near sea level — KSPG sits at 7 ft MSL. No mechanical squawks noted.
Pilot: you — a Private pilot with 210 hours, 90 in type. You're comfortable in the DA40 and consider yourself methodical. You've flown this route before. The G1000 fuel quantity pages have been showing 'low left' for the last 20 minutes, but the right tank reads half-full and you've been meaning to switch.
The scenario begins at 400 ft AGL, climbing out over open water off Runway 07, when the engine stumbles.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KSPG · Albert Whitted'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '7/25 · 18/36'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '7 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'DA40'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Takeoff'}
The decision
Before the engine stumbles — which of these are actually in your head during the climb-out? (Pick all that apply; this records your pre-event awareness.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
The accidents that built this scenario happened at other locations — not at Albert Whitted Airport. ERA12FA002 involved a Temco Swift ditching in the Chesapeake Bay after the pilot failed to verify fuel selector position before flight or after power loss. ANC17LA043 involved a Cessna T207 on a Part 135 commuter flight that ditched near Coghlan Island, Alaska, after fuel starvation compounded by unreliable fuel quantity indicators. LAX97LA278 involved a Cessna 150G banner-tow operation ditching in the Pacific Ocean after the pilot forgot to switch to the auxiliary tank. LAX98LA168 involved a Cessna T210M ditching in the Pacific Ocean on final approach after improper fuel selector positioning.
The common thread across all four events — and across the DA40-specific starvation risk — is not a mechanical failure. It is a management failure: the pilot knew (or should have known) that a tank was low or the selector was wrong, and did not act on that information in time.
The DA40's fuel system has no BOTH position. LEFT and RIGHT are the only options. This is not a flaw — it is a design that forces the pilot to actively manage fuel. The G1000 displays fuel quantity on both tanks continuously. There is no excuse for being surprised by an empty tank in this airplane; the information is always in front of you. The accident happens when the pilot sees the indication and defers the action.
Albert Whitted's Runway 07 climb-out is directly over Tampa Bay. An engine failure at 400 ft AGL on that heading is a water landing — period. There is no field, no road, no park. The off-field environment off Runway 07 is open water. That reality makes fuel management on departure from KSPG Runway 07 a life-safety item, not a bookkeeping item.
The NTSB probable cause language in fuel-starvation events is almost always the same: 'the pilot's improper fuel management, resulting in fuel starvation and total loss of engine power.' The fix is always the same too: verify selector position during preflight, set a tank-switch schedule and stick to it, never ignore a low-fuel indication, and treat the fuel selector as a primary flight control — because over Tampa Bay, it is.
Key lesson — The DA40 has no BOTH position. LEFT or RIGHT — and an empty selected tank over Tampa Bay is a ditching, not an inconvenience. The G1000 told you the left tank was low for 20 minutes. The accident is the decision to defer the switch.
Debrief — teaching points
The DA40 fuel selector has no BOTH — active management is mandatory.
Unlike a Cessna 172 with a BOTH position, the DA40 requires the pilot to actively select LEFT or RIGHT. There is no passive 'set it and forget it' option. This means fuel management must be a scheduled, deliberate act on every flight — not something you get to when you think about it. A common practice: switch tanks every 30 minutes, or at each checkpoint, and verify the switch was made. The G1000 shows both tank quantities continuously; use that information.
The G1000 low-fuel indication is a command, not a suggestion.
When the G1000 fuel quantity page shows a low indication on the selected tank, the correct response is immediate: switch to the fuller tank, verify fuel flow returns to normal, and update your fuel plan. Deferring that action — 'I'll switch in a few minutes' — is how starvation events begin. In this scenario, the pilot had 20 minutes of warning and did not act. That is the accident.
Runway 07 at KSPG puts you over open water immediately — know your environment.
Albert Whitted's Runway 07 climb-out heading is approximately 062°, directly over Tampa Bay. From rotation to 1,000 ft AGL, you are over open water with no suitable off-field landing option. An engine failure on that departure is a ditching scenario, not a forced-landing scenario. This makes the pre-departure fuel check — selector position, quantity on both tanks, boost pump check — a non-negotiable item, not a formality.
Low-altitude restart: the fuel selector is the first thing you touch.
In a DA40 power loss, the memory items are: fuel selector to the fuller tank, boost pump ON, mixture FULL RICH, throttle cracked, attempt restart. The selector is first because fuel starvation is the most common cause of sudden power loss in this airplane, and the fix is instantaneous if caught early. Drilling this sequence until it is automatic — not something you have to think about — is what buys you the seconds that matter at 400 ft AGL.
A controlled ditching at minimum speed is survivable; a botched 180 often is not.
Below approximately 1,000 ft AGL over water, a 180° turn back to the departure runway is almost always a trap. The altitude loss in the turn, combined with the energy required to arrest the descent and align with the runway, exceeds what is available. The survivable option is a controlled ditching: establish best glide (73 KIAS), orient into the wind, extend flaps for the slowest possible touchdown speed, transmit MAYDAY, and execute a controlled water landing. Impact energy rises with the square of touchdown speed — every knot you shed matters. The DA40's composite airframe is robust; a controlled, slow-speed ditching in calm bay water is survivable. An uncontrolled impact after a failed low-altitude reversal is not.
Built from the real accident record
Composite scenario built from NTSB fuel-starvation events ERA12FA002, ANC17LA043, LAX97LA278, and LAX98LA168. Real events occurred at other locations; see outcome_reveal.
NTSB reports: ERA12FA002 · ANC17LA043 · LAX97LA278 · LAX98LA168
ACS tasks: PA.I.D — Cross-Country Flight Planning (fuel planning) · PA.II.A — Preflight Inspection · PA.III.E — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.151
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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