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SAMPLE SBTLanding

Three Greens

The Piper Arrow's gear trap — distraction, the GUMPS check, and a runway that doesn't forgive omissions

Piper Arrow · Albert Whitted Airport (KSPG) · Private · Landing

The scenario

Field: Albert Whitted Airport (KSPG), St. Petersburg, FL — elevation 7 ft MSL, Class D airspace (tower 0700–2100), overlying Tampa Class B above 3,000 MSL. You are landing Runway 07, heading 062°. Off the departure end of Runway 07 is Tampa Bay — open water. A gear-up landing here means sliding to a stop on asphalt in front of the tower; an engine failure on the Runway 07 climbout means a ditching.

Aircraft: Piper Arrow (PA-28R-201), solo, within limits. Hydraulically actuated retractable gear, constant-speed prop, fuel-injected Lycoming IO-360. Fuel selector on LEFT. The airplane has been back from annual maintenance for three flights.

Situation: You flew in from Tampa Executive (KVDF) for a $100 hamburger at the St. Pete waterfront. The pattern at KSPG is active — a Cessna on downwind, a helicopter transitioning the bay, and tower is sequencing you number two. You've been heads-up outside and on the radio. The approach is stable, the runway is in sight, and you feel good about the landing.

Pilot: Private certificate, 210 hours total, 85 hours in the Arrow. You've flown the Arrow consistently but have never had a gear system anomaly. GUMPS is in your vocabulary — but today the pattern was busy.

The decision

You're established on downwind for Runway 07, abeam the numbers, 1,000 ft AGL. Before the scenario unfolds — which of these are already in your head? (Pick all that apply — no wrong answers; this records your baseline awareness.)

What the record shows

What the NTSB files show

Gear-up landings in the Piper Arrow are not rare. The NTSB database contains multiple PA-28R events in recent years alone, and the causes cluster into two categories: (1) distraction-driven checklist omission — the pilot simply never extended the gear because something else captured their attention; and (2) hydraulic system failure — the gear was selected down but did not extend, and the pilot either did not recognize the failure or did not use the manual emergency extension.

CEN24LA288 (2024) and CEN25LA133 (2025) are textbook distraction cases: skydiving operations and an external seatbelt issue, respectively, broke the pilot's checklist flow. CEN25LA120 (2025) adds the instructor dimension — radio traffic and a moment of complacency by the CFI meant neither crewmember confirmed gear extension. The GUMPS check was the missing guardrail in every case.

CEN11LA418 (2011) is the hydraulic failure case: the power pack motor failed, the gear would not extend normally, and the pilot landed wheels-up without attempting the manual free-fall emergency extension. The Arrow has that system for exactly this scenario. WPR22LA040 (2021) adds the post-maintenance angle: an improper bolt installed during maintenance prevented the right main from extending — three flights after the annual, the failure appeared.

The real accidents occurred at various airports across the United States — not at Albert Whitted Airport. But the Arrow does operate at KSPG, and the pattern environment here — busy Class D, Tampa Bay off the Runway 07 departure end, overlying Tampa Class B — creates exactly the distraction and workload conditions that the NTSB files describe.

The common thread across all cases: the GUMPS check was either not run, run incompletely, or its output was not acted upon. Three green lights are not a formality — they are the only confirmation that all three gear are down and locked.

Key lesson — The Piper Arrow's gear-up landing accident is almost always a checklist accident, not a systems accident. GUMPS on downwind, three greens on final, and knowledge of the manual free-fall emergency extension procedure are the three defenses. When the hydraulic system fails, the emergency extension is not optional — it is the procedure. When a green light is missing on final, the answer is a go-around, not a guess.

Debrief — teaching points

GUMPS is not optional — it runs regardless of pattern workload.

Every distraction-driven gear-up in the NTSB database has the same structure: something captured the pilot's attention (traffic, radio, an external issue, ATC sequencing), and the checklist was deferred or skipped. The Arrow's GUMPS check — Gas, Undercarriage, Mixture, Prop, Seatbelts — must run abeam the numbers on downwind and be cross-checked on final. It is not a suggestion and it does not yield to busyness. Build the habit so that GUMPS runs even when — especially when — you are distracted.

Three green lights mean down AND locked — not just down.

The Arrow's gear position indicator shows three green lights when all three gear are down and locked in the extended position. A gear that has extended but not locked will show no green — and will collapse on touchdown. A missing green on final is a go-around, not a judgment call about indicator bulbs. After the go-around, troubleshoot at altitude: recycle the gear, check circuit breakers, and if the normal system has failed, execute the manual free-fall emergency extension per the POH.

The manual free-fall emergency extension exists — know it cold.

The Arrow's gear is hydraulically actuated. When the hydraulic system fails to extend the gear (pump runs but no greens — as in NTSB CEN11LA418), the manual free-fall emergency extension allows gravity and airstream to extend and lock the gear. The procedure is in the POH emergency section. You must know where the release handle is, how to operate it, and what to expect. In CEN11LA418, the pilot landed wheels-up without attempting it. The system was functional — the pilot did not use it.

Post-maintenance flights demand heightened gear vigilance.

NTSB WPR22LA040 documents a right main gear that would not extend due to an improper bolt installed during annual maintenance — the fault appeared on a routine approach, not during the maintenance run-up. Any flight within the first several sorties after maintenance that touched the gear system warrants extra attention: confirm gear extension early in the pattern, watch for asymmetric indications, and treat any anomaly as real until proven otherwise.

Declare early — tower and emergency services are assets, not embarrassments.

A gear malfunction in the pattern at a towered field like KSPG is a situation where declaring an emergency costs you nothing and gives you a cleared pattern, emergency services standing by, and tower's eyes on your aircraft for a low pass to visually confirm gear position. Pilots who delay declaring — hoping the problem resolves — arrive on short final with no options. The FAA does not punish pilots for declaring emergencies in good faith. Declare early, buy time, and use every resource available.

Built from the real accident record

Composite scenario built from multiple NTSB PA-28R gear-up landing events (CEN24LA288, WPR22LA040, CEN11LA418, CEN25LA133, CEN25LA120) and class-peer retractable-single gear-up events (ERA26LA045, CEN26LA028, WPR26LA016, ERA25LA343, CEN25LA319). Anonymized and localized to KSPG.

NTSB reports: CEN24LA288 · WPR22LA040 · CEN11LA418 · CEN25LA133 · CEN25LA120 · ERA26LA045 · CEN26LA028 · WPR26LA016 · ERA25LA343 · CEN25LA319 · LAX89LA222 · ERA10CA300

ACS tasks: PA.IV.A — Normal Approach and Landing · PA.IV.F — Slips to a Landing · PA.IX.C — Systems and Equipment Malfunctions · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.II.A — Preflight Preparation (Systems Knowledge)

Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13

Run this scenario yourself

Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.

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