Rough Climb Over Tampa Bay
Partial power loss on departure from a water-surrounded airport — the decision window is measured in seconds
The scenario
Departing Albert Whitted Airport (KSPG), St. Petersburg, FL — Runway 07, climbing out on a 062° heading. Elevation 7 ft MSL; the runway is essentially at sea level.
It is a hazy Florida afternoon in late spring: OAT 28°C, dew point 22°C, altimeter 29.92. Scattered clouds at 2,500 ft, light rain shower two miles to the northeast. Visibility 8 SM. Classic Gulf Coast conditions — warm, moist, and exactly the environment the FAA icing probability chart marks as 'serious icing at glide power, moderate icing at cruise power.'
You are 400 ft AGL, climbing through 79 KIAS (Vy, best rate of climb), heading 062°, when the engine begins to run rough. Power is noticeably down — the tachometer is dropping. The water of Tampa Bay fills the windscreen ahead. KSPG's tower is part-time (0700–2100) and is open; you are in Class D airspace.
Aircraft: Piper PA-28-161 Warrior, solo, left tank selected, within limits. Carbureted Lycoming O-320-D, fixed-pitch prop, steam panel, fuel selector on LEFT. Nothing was written up; the airplane was airworthy at departure.
Pilot: you — a Private pilot, current, roughly 200 hours total. You did not apply carburetor heat during the run-up because the engine ran smoothly. You did not apply it after takeoff because you were focused on the climb and the tower frequency.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KSPG · Albert Whitted'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '7/25 · 18/36'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '7 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'PA-28-161'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Takeoff'}
The decision
Before we get into the decision tree — what do you already know about carburetor ice in the PA-28-161 Warrior? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
NTSB CEN12LA175 (2012): A Piper PA-28-161 on an instrument instructional flight encountered carburetor icing during climb through 6,500 feet. The engine lost power progressively. The probable cause was carburetor icing in conditions conducive to serious icing, with a contributing factor of limited carburetor heat valve travel from recent maintenance — the heat valve could not open fully, preventing maximum carb heat application.
NTSB LAX03LA238 (2003): A Piper PA-28-161 experienced partial engine power loss during initial climb from Torrance due to carburetor icing. During a go-around attempt, the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed, resulting in a stall and collision with power lines and terrain. The probable cause was carburetor icing and the pilot's failure to use carburetor heat. A contributing factor was the pilot's failure to maintain airspeed during the aborted landing — the stall was the fatal event.
NTSB CHI05LA226 (2005, FATAL): A Piper PA-28-161 on an instructional flight from Culver, Indiana, lost engine power due to left magneto failure during initial climb after takeoff and subsequently stalled. The probable cause was partial magneto failure caused by improper maintenance, with contributing factors including the instructor's failure to maintain airspeed and follow emergency procedures. The stall at low altitude was fatal.
NTSB ERA14LA141 (2014): A Piper PA-28-161 experienced partial engine power loss during takeoff from Atlantic City International Airport and the pilot executed a forced landing to the airport perimeter road. The probable cause was a partial loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined during postaccident examination or engine test run — the engine ran normally after the accident.
The local environment at KSPG makes this scenario particularly unforgiving: Runway 07's departure end is open water — Tampa Bay. An engine failure on the Runway 07 departure at low altitude is a ditching, not a field landing. There is no open field, no road, no park. The water is the off-field environment. This is not hypothetical; it is the USGS NLCD ground cover off that runway end.
NTSB LAX03LA238 (2003, cited above) and CHI05LA226 (2005, cited above) show the trap that kills pilots: low altitude, low airspeed, pilot trying to stretch the approach to the runway instead of accepting a ditching. The stall is the fatal event. The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports and in other aircraft — NOT at Albert Whitted Airport. KSPG has its own accident history (see field dominant patterns), but these specific events happened elsewhere. The scenario is localized to KSPG to make the off-field environment real and consequential for you as a student here.
The consistent thread across all these events: carburetor ice in the PA-28-161 is insidious. It builds gradually, the first symptom is roughness and a dropping tachometer (not a dramatic power cut), and by the time it is obvious, it may be too late for a comfortable recovery. The fix — full carburetor heat, immediately, at the first sign of roughness in conducive conditions — is simple. The failure is always a delay.
Key lesson — In warm, moist Gulf Coast air, the PA-28-161's carbureted O-320-D can accumulate serious carburetor ice even at cruise power and above-freezing temperatures. Apply full carburetor heat at the first sign of engine roughness or unexplained RPM loss. At low altitude over water, the decision window is measured in seconds — not minutes. Off Runway 07 at KSPG, the off-field environment is Tampa Bay: a delayed response means a ditching, not a field landing. The PA-28-161 has a LEFT / RIGHT fuel selector with no BOTH position — tank management is your job. Know which tank you are on and why.
Debrief — teaching points
Carburetor ice forms in conditions you would not expect.
The FAA icing probability chart shows 'serious icing at glide power' at temperatures between roughly 20°C and 30°C when relative humidity is high — exactly the Gulf Coast afternoon conditions at KSPG. You do not need visible ice, freezing temperatures, or IMC. Warm, moist air at reduced power is the classic carb-ice environment. The PA-28-161's Lycoming O-320-D is carbureted; it has no fuel injection and no alternate air system. Carburetor heat is the only tool. Recognize the conditions and apply carb heat proactively, not reactively.
The first symptom is subtle — a dropping tachometer and engine roughness.
In a fixed-pitch airplane like the PA-28-161, carburetor ice first shows as engine roughness and an unexplained RPM decrease. There is no dramatic power cut. Pilots who are not actively monitoring the tachometer miss the early warning. By the time the roughness is obvious, significant ice has accumulated. Scan the tachometer as part of your regular instrument scan, especially in conducive conditions. In the PA-28-161, the tach is a steam gauge — watch it continuously during climb.
Apply full carburetor heat — not partial — and expect an initial RPM drop.
When you apply carb heat to an iced carburetor, the RPM will drop further before it rises. This is expected and normal: the heat is melting ice and the resulting water is briefly disrupting combustion. Do not remove carb heat when the RPM drops — that is the heat working. Hold it full on. The RPM will recover as the ice clears, typically within 15–30 seconds depending on ice accumulation. Partial carb heat can worsen the situation by partially melting ice into water ingestion without fully clearing the restriction. NTSB CEN12LA175 shows the danger: a maintenance issue that limited carb heat valve travel prevented full heat application and contributed to the accident.
At KSPG Runway 07, an engine failure on departure is a ditching.
The off-field environment off Runway 07's departure end (heading 062°) is open water — Tampa Bay. There is no alternate landing surface. If the engine quits on the Runway 07 departure and altitude is insufficient to return to the airport, the outcome is a ditching. This is not a worst-case scenario; it is the geographic reality. Best glide is 73 KIAS. Doors unlatched before water contact. Master off just before impact. Flaps for slowest possible touchdown speed — impact energy rises with the square of touchdown speed, so the slowest possible speed matters most. Know this before you line up on Runway 07.
The PA-28-161 has a LEFT / RIGHT fuel selector with no BOTH position — tank management is your job.
Unlike some aircraft with a BOTH position, the PA-28-161 requires you to actively select LEFT or RIGHT. Fuel starvation from not switching tanks is a classic Piper accident. In this scenario, you departed on the LEFT tank. If the engine roughness is due to fuel starvation (contaminated left tank, left tank empty), switching to RIGHT will restore power. If the roughness is due to carburetor icing, switching tanks will not help. Know which tank you are on and why. Fuel starvation is a failure of preflight and tank management; carburetor icing is a failure of weather recognition and carb heat use. Both are pilot errors, but the diagnosis and fix are different.
Proactive carb heat use in conducive conditions is not optional.
The PA-28-161 POH and the FAA Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge both recommend applying carburetor heat when conditions are conducive to icing — before the symptom appears. In a Gulf Coast summer departure, with OAT near 28°C and dew point near 22°C, that means applying carb heat during the run-up check (and confirming the expected RPM drop, then recovery) and considering its use during climb in visible moisture or high humidity. Waiting for the roughness to appear at 400 ft AGL over Tampa Bay is waiting too long. The decision window is measured in seconds.
Built from the real accident record
Scenario built from NTSB CEN12LA175 (2012 PA-28-161 carburetor ice / power loss during climb), LAX03LA238 (2003 PA-28-161 carb ice / stall on go-around), CHI05LA226 (2005 PA-28-161 magneto failure / stall, fatal), ERA14LA141 (2014 PA-28-161 partial power loss at takeoff), WPR10FA264 (2010 PA-28-161 in-flight fire / forced landing), CHI08LA197 (2008 PA-28-161 power loss / runway overrun), IAD05LA133 (2005 PA-28-161 total engine failure / forced landing), and DEN03LA139 (2003 PA-28-161 performance-limited climb / forced landing). Anonymized and localized to KSPG.
NTSB reports: CEN12LA175 · LAX03LA238 · CHI05LA226 · ERA14LA141 · WPR10FA264 · CHI08LA197 · IAD05LA133 · DEN03LA139
ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.II.B — Engine Starting / Systems Preflight · PA.III.A — Normal Takeoff and Climb
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.185
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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