Float and Overshoot at Sarasota Bradenton
Excess approach energy, a long runway, and the decision to go around — runway excursion risk in the C172R
The scenario
Departing Sarasota Bradenton International Airport (KSRQ), Sarasota/Bradenton, FL — Runway 14, 9,500 ft long. Elevation 30 ft MSL. You are a Private pilot with 180 hours total, current and proficient. This is your third landing at KSRQ; you are not yet familiar with the field's approach environment or the runway's visual cues.
It is a clear afternoon in late spring: OAT 26°C, altimeter 29.96, winds from 160° at 8 knots — a light crosswind from the right (Runway 14 is heading 134°). Visibility 10 SM. KSRQ tower is active (0600–0000 local). You are in Class C airspace; the ceiling is 4,000 ft MSL.
You are on a 3-nm final approach to Runway 14, descending through 1,200 ft AGL, configured for landing: flaps 30°, gear down (fixed), mixture leaned for field elevation, fuel selector BOTH. You are flying the Cessna 172R, a fuel-injected Lycoming IO-360 with steam gauges and a fixed-pitch prop. Approach speed is 62 KIAS (short-field full flaps); best glide is 65 KIAS.
The approach is stable at 62 KIAS. But as you descend through 500 ft AGL, you notice the descent rate is higher than expected — you are sinking faster than the glide slope. You add a touch of power to arrest the descent. The airspeed is still 62 KIAS, but you are now carrying extra energy. You are 2 nm from the runway threshold.
Aircraft: Cessna 172R, solo, 1,850 lbs (well within limits). Fuel-injected Lycoming IO-360-L2A, 160 hp, fixed-pitch prop, fixed gear, steam panel (vacuum-driven). No mechanical issues; the airplane is airworthy.
Pilot: you — Private, 180 hours, third landing at KSRQ. You have not flown this field often. You are not yet practiced at reading the approach environment here. You have not briefed the go-around procedure or the runway overshoot risk.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KSRQ · Sarasota Bradenton'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '4/22 · 14/32'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '30 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'C172R'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Takeoff / Landing'}
The decision
Before we get into the decision tree — what do you know about approach energy management and go-around decision-making in the C172R? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
NTSB CEN24LA263 (2024): A Cessna 172R performing a power-off 180° maneuver landed too high on the runway and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. The aircraft overran the runway end, breached the perimeter fence, and came to rest upright. The probable cause was the pilot's decision to continue the landing attempt with insufficient runway remaining. The pilot had not recognized the excess approach energy or the risk of runway overshoot.
NTSB CEN24LA233 (2024): A Cessna 172R on an instructional flight veered left of the runway centerline during landing. The pilot's correction attempts resulted in a right veer, causing the aircraft to exit the left side of the runway and strike a distance marker. The probable cause was the pilot's failure to maintain directional control during landing, likely due to hard braking or a loss of control authority during the landing rollout.
NTSB ERA22LA280 (2022): A Cessna 172 flown by a student pilot during touch-and-go landings experienced a porpoising landing after an improper flare. The student's attempt to recover by pulling back caused a skid, and subsequent overcompensation with rudder input resulted in a runway excursion and collision with a taxiway sign. The probable cause was the student pilot's improper flare and loss of control during landing.
NTSB ERA21LA249 (2021): A Cessna 172R on a solo cross-country instructional flight experienced loss of directional control during landing when the nose gear contacted the runway. The accident resulted from the student pilot's failure to maintain directional control, resulting in a runway excursion and collision with an airport sign.
NTSB ERA21LA119 (2021): A Cessna 172R on a personal flight veered left off the runway during landing in gusting crosswind conditions and struck the ground with the propeller and left wing tip. The probable cause was the pilot's failure to maintain directional control during landing in a gusting crosswind.
The common thread across all these accidents: excess approach energy (too much speed, too high descent rate, or a late touchdown) combined with a failure to recognize the need for a go-around. The pilots continued the landing attempt despite unstable approaches, floated down the runway, and ran out of distance to stop or lost directional control during the landing rollout.
At KSRQ, Runway 14 is 9,500 ft long — plenty of runway for a normal landing. But the off-field environment to the northeast (heading 134°) is dense development. An overshoot into that area is a collision risk. The correct decision is a go-around at 500 ft AGL when the approach is unstable or when you are unsure about landing distance. The go-around is not a failure — it is airmanship.
Real accidents cited above occurred at various airports and in various conditions — NOT specifically at KSRQ. However, KSRQ's own accident corpus shows LOSS_OF_CONTROL_GROUND (19.2%), FORCED_LANDING (15.4%), RUNWAY_EXCURSION (11.5%), HARD_LANDING (11.5%), and LOSS_OF_CONTROL_INFLIGHT (11.5%) as dominant patterns. Runway excursion is a real risk at this field. The scenario is localized to KSRQ to make the runway environment and the off-field consequences real for you as a student here.
Key lesson — Excess approach energy at 500 ft AGL on an unfamiliar field is a red flag. The go-around decision must be made early, not at the last moment. At KSRQ, Runway 14 is long, but the off-field environment to the northeast is dense development. A late go-around or a continued landing with excess energy risks a runway excursion and collision. Recognize the unstable approach, execute the go-around, and try again. The go-around is always the safer choice.
Debrief — teaching points
Excess approach energy is a runway excursion risk — recognize it early.
Excess approach energy means you are carrying too much speed, too high a descent rate, or both. In the C172R, approach speed is 62 KIAS (full flaps). If you are descending faster than the glide slope or if you add power to arrest the descent, you are carrying extra energy. At 500 ft AGL on an unfamiliar field, this is a red flag. The airplane will float down the runway, and you may not have enough distance to land and stop. Recognize the excess energy early and execute a go-around.
The go-around decision must be made at 500 ft AGL, not at the runway threshold.
A go-around at 500 ft AGL is safe and straightforward: advance the throttle to full power, reduce flaps to 10°, and establish a climb at Vy (79 KIAS). A go-around at 300 ft AGL is tighter but still safe. A go-around at 100 ft AGL is very tight and risky. A go-around at the runway threshold is nearly impossible. The decision window is narrow. If the approach is unstable or if you are unsure about landing distance, make the go-around decision early.
Floating down the runway is a loss of runway — you are eating up the early part of the runway and may not have enough distance to land and stop.
If you carry excess energy into the landing, the airplane will float. Floating means the airplane is not settling to the ground — it is maintaining altitude or descending very slowly. Each second of float costs you runway. If you touched down at 2,000 ft down the runway and then floated another 1,000 ft, you have only 6,500 ft remaining to stop. In the C172R, landing distance from 50 ft AGL is roughly 1,000–1,500 ft depending on weight and conditions. If you have floated 3,000 ft down the runway, you may not have enough distance to stop.
Directional control during landing rollout is critical — especially in a crosswind.
The light crosswind at KSRQ (8 knots from 160° on Runway 14) is within limits, but it requires active directional control during landing. Hard braking or a loss of control authority can cause the nose to veer left or right. If you lose directional control during the landing rollout, you may exit the runway. Maintain rudder pressure to keep the nose aligned with the runway centerline, and apply braking smoothly — not abruptly.
At KSRQ, the off-field environment to the northeast (Runway 14 heading 134°) is dense development — a runway overshoot is a collision risk.
Runway 14 at KSRQ is 9,500 ft long, but the off-field environment to the northeast is dense development (trees, buildings, roads). If you overshoot the runway end, you are at risk of collision. The correct response to an unstable approach or excess energy is a go-around, not a continued landing attempt. The go-around is always the safer choice.
Built from the real accident record
Scenario built from NTSB CEN24LA263 (2024 C172R power-off 180° landing overshoot), CEN24LA233 (2024 C172R directional control loss on landing), ERA22LA280 (2022 C172R porpoising and runway excursion), ERA21LA249 (2021 C172R loss of directional control on solo cross-country), and ERA21LA119 (2021 C172R crosswind directional control loss). Localized to KSRQ.
NTSB reports: CEN24LA263 · CEN24LA233 · ERA22LA280 · ERA21LA249 · ERA21LA119
ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.VIII.A — Approaches and Landings · PA.VIII.B — Go-Around / Rejected Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.103
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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