Three Greens
Gear management, distraction, and the Arrow's most expensive checklist item
The scenario
Field: Sarasota Bradenton International Airport (KSRQ), elevation 30 ft MSL. You're inbound on the ILS Runway 32 after a two-hour cross-country from the north. KSRQ is towered and operating under Class C airspace — ceiling 4,000 ft MSL. You've been here twice before, but not recently.
Aircraft: Piper Arrow (PA-28R-201), fuel-injected IO-360, constant-speed prop, hydraulically actuated retractable gear. You're solo, within weight and balance limits, fuel selector on LEFT tank, fuel state comfortable. Nothing has felt unusual in flight.
Weather: Clear, winds 310° at 12 knots — nearly aligned with Runway 32. Visibility unrestricted. A textbook VFR afternoon in southwest Florida.
Situation: Tower is busy. On the 45 for the downwind to Runway 32, approach control hands you off and you're immediately sequenced behind a jet on a 5-mile final. Tower asks you to keep your speed up on downwind and calls your base turn late. You're a little high and a little fast as you roll onto final. The runway — 9,500 ft of asphalt — is right there in front of you. You're task-saturated: speed, glidepath, radio, traffic awareness.
The question this scenario asks: in the middle of that workload, did GUMPS happen — and what do you do when something in the gear system doesn't behave the way you expect?
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KSRQ · Sarasota Bradenton'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '4/22 · 14/32'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '30 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'PA-28R'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Takeoff / Landing'}
The decision
Before we put you on final, what's actually in your scan on downwind in the Arrow? (Pick all that apply — no wrong answers; this records your mental model.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
Gear-up landings in the Piper Arrow are not rare. The NTSB database contains multiple PA-28R events in recent years alone — CEN24LA288, CEN25LA133, CEN25LA120, CEN25LA319 — and the probable cause language is nearly identical across all of them: the pilot failed to extend the landing gear before landing due to distraction and failure to complete the before-landing checklist.
The distraction sources vary: skydiving traffic, another aircraft in the pattern, a loose external seatbelt, busy radio frequency, a late base call from ATC. The mechanism is the same. The Arrow's GUMPS check — specifically the Undercarriage item with three-green confirmation — is the primary defense. When it is skipped or rushed, the gear warning horn is the last automated defense. In several accidents, pilots silenced the horn or misidentified it.
CEN11LA418 adds a mechanical dimension: the hydraulic power pack motor failed, the gear would not extend normally, and the pilot did not use the emergency free-fall extension system. The Arrow has that system for exactly this reason — but it requires the pilot to recognize the failure and execute the procedure at altitude, not on short final.
WPR22LA040 documents a maintenance-induced failure: an improper bolt installed in the right main gear door prevented extension. The aircraft landed on two points; the right wing struck the runway. A single missing green light on final is a go-around, not a landing.
None of these accidents occurred at KSRQ. They occurred at airports across the United States. But the Arrow you fly, the checklist you carry, and the distraction environment of a busy Class C pattern are identical to the conditions in every one of these reports.
Key lesson — Three green lights — not the gear handle position, not the absence of a horn, not a quick glance — is the only acceptable confirmation that the Arrow's gear is down and locked. GUMPS on downwind is non-negotiable. Any incomplete gear indication, any doubt, any horn you can't immediately explain: go around. The runway will still be there.
Debrief — teaching points
GUMPS is most critical when workload is highest.
Every gear-up landing in the Arrow record involves elevated workload at the moment the checklist was skipped: ATC sequencing, traffic conflicts, unfamiliar airports, distractions in the cockpit. The instinct is to defer the checklist until things calm down. That instinct is exactly wrong. GUMPS on downwind abeam the numbers is a hard gate — run it before you accept the base turn, not after. If ATC pressure is preventing the checklist, say so: 'Unable, I need a moment for my before-landing checks.'
The gear handle position is not gear confirmation.
The Arrow's gear handle can be in the DOWN detent while one or more gear legs are not down and locked — due to hydraulic pressure loss, a slow power pack, a mechanical obstruction, or a maintenance error. The only confirmation that all three gear legs are extended and locked is three illuminated green lights on the gear indicator panel. Two greens is a go-around. One green is a go-around. No greens with the handle down is a go-around.
The gear warning horn is a system, not a nuisance.
The Arrow's gear warning horn activates when throttle is reduced below a threshold with the gear retracted. It is not the stall warning horn. It is not a radio tone. In multiple NTSB cases, pilots silenced the horn or misidentified it and continued to a gear-up touchdown. If the horn is sounding and you cannot immediately confirm three green lights, execute a go-around. Do not silence the horn and continue.
The emergency extension system exists — know it before you need it.
The Arrow's hydraulic gear system can fail: the power pack motor can seize, a circuit breaker can trip, a hydraulic line can lose pressure. The POH emergency gear extension procedure uses a manual free-fall system to release the gear uplocks and allow gravity and airstream to extend the gear. This procedure requires altitude and time — it cannot be executed effectively on short final. If the gear does not indicate down-and-locked during a normal approach, go around to altitude and execute the emergency procedure there, not at 300 ft AGL.
A go-around is always available until the wheels touch.
The go-around option exists at every point in the approach until the moment of touchdown. At KSRQ, Runway 32 is 9,500 ft — there is no runway-length pressure to force a landing. The off-field environment off Runway 32's departure end is poor (medium and dense development, marsh and wetland to the northwest), making a normal climbout on runway heading the strongly preferred option over any off-field outcome. A go-around from an uncertain gear state costs nothing. A gear-up landing costs the engine, the prop, the fuselage, and potentially the airframe.
Built from the real accident record
Composite scenario built from multiple NTSB gear-up landing events in Piper PA-28R series aircraft and retractable-gear peers. See based_on for case numbers. Anonymized and localized to KSRQ.
NTSB reports: CEN24LA288 · WPR22LA040 · CEN11LA418 · CEN25LA133 · CEN25LA120 · ERA26LA045 · CEN26LA028 · WPR26LA016 · ERA25LA343 · CEN25LA319 · GAA17CA105 · ERA17CA149
ACS tasks: PA.IV.A — Normal Approach and Landing · PA.IV.B — Normal Takeoff and Climb · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.IX.A — Emergency Descent / Systems Malfunction · PA.II.A — Preflight Inspection
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.205
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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