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SAMPLE SBTTakeoff / Initial Climb

Fuel Selector Confusion on Climb

A Piper Cherokee 180's LEFT/RIGHT fuel selector is not BOTH — mismanagement at low altitude over open water turns a routine departure into a forced landing

Piper Cherokee 180 · Sarasota Bradenton International Airport (KSRQ) · Private / Commercial · Takeoff / Initial Climb

The scenario

Departing Sarasota Bradenton International Airport (KSRQ), Runway 22, on a VFR flight to a nearby destination. Elevation 30 ft MSL. The runway is essentially at sea level.

It is a clear morning in early spring: OAT 18°C, dew point 12°C, altimeter 29.95. Visibility 10 SM. Light winds from the northeast. A textbook VFR day — no weather complications, no distractions from the sky.

You are climbing out from Runway 22 (heading 218°) at 400 ft AGL, climbing through 74 KIAS (Vy, best rate of climb), when the engine begins to lose power. The tachometer is unwinding. The engine is not rough — it is simply losing RPM, as if the throttle is being pulled back. The water of the Gulf of Mexico and coastal bays fills the windscreen ahead. KSRQ's tower is active (0600–0000 local); you are in Class C airspace.

Aircraft: Piper Cherokee 180, solo, full fuel (both tanks), within limits. Lycoming O-360-A, carbureted, fixed-pitch prop, steam panel. The airplane was airworthy at departure. Nothing was written up.

Pilot: you — a Private or Commercial pilot, current, roughly 300–500 hours total. You completed a standard preflight and run-up. You did not pay particular attention to the fuel selector position during the run-up — it was on one tank or the other, and the engine ran fine. You did not brief yourself on the fuel-selector logic before takeoff: LEFT / RIGHT, no BOTH position. You did not establish a fuel-switching protocol for the flight.

The decision

Before we get into the decision tree — what do you already know about the Piper Cherokee 180's fuel system? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)

What the record shows

What the NTSB files show

NTSB DFW05FA028 (2004, fatal): A Piper PA-28-180 on a night cross-country flight lost engine power due to fuel starvation from the pilot's failure to switch fuel tanks. The pilot had been flying on one tank for an extended period and did not switch to the other tank. When the first tank ran dry, the engine quit. The pilot attempted a forced landing but impacted terrain in low-ceiling conditions. The probable cause was the pilot's in-flight mismanagement of the available fuel supply by failure to switch fuel tank position.

NTSB CEN24LA191 (2024): A Piper PA-28-180 on a cross-country personal flight lost engine power due to fuel starvation when the pilot failed to switch fuel tanks while distracted crossing a mountain range. The pilot had been flying on the left tank and became distracted by terrain navigation. When the left tank ran dry, the engine quit. The pilot made a forced landing in a field. The probable cause was the pilot's failure to switch fuel tanks while en route.

NTSB WPR24LA178 (2024): A Piper PA-28 lost engine power due to fuel starvation when the pilot placed the fuel selector in an intermediate position. The intermediate position blocks fuel flow to both tanks. The pilot made a forced landing. The probable cause was the pilot's incorrect movement of the fuel selector valve to an off or restricted position.

NTSB CEN24LA189 (2024): A Piper PA-28-180 on an instructional flight lost all engine power when the student pilot positioned the fuel selector valve between port positions during descent. The student did not understand the LEFT/RIGHT selector logic. The flight instructor did not adequately brief or monitor the student's fuel management. The probable cause was the student pilot's selection of an improper fuel tank selector position, with contributing factor of the instructor's inadequate oversight.

NTSB ERA24LA116 (2024): A Piper PA-28-180 experienced fuel starvation during the second approach to landing after the student pilot failed to switch fuel tanks despite instructor reminders. The student was distracted by the approach and did not execute the fuel-switching procedure. The flight instructor did not adequately monitor the student's compliance. The probable cause was the student pilot's lack of fuel management and the flight instructor's inadequate monitoring.

The local environment at KSRQ makes the Runway 22 departure particularly unforgiving: the climb-out environment (heading 218°) is open water, low-density development, and open developed areas (parks/large lots). An engine failure on the Runway 22 departure at low altitude is a ditching, not a field landing. There is no open field, no road, no park. The water is the primary off-field environment. This is not hypothetical; it is the USGS NLCD ground cover off that runway end.

The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports and in other aircraft — NOT at KSRQ. KSRQ has its own accident history (see field dominant patterns: LOSS_OF_CONTROL_GROUND 19.2%, FORCED_LANDING 15.4%, RUNWAY_EXCURSION 11.5%, HARD_LANDING 11.5%, LOSS_OF_CONTROL_INFLIGHT 11.5%), but these specific fuel-starvation events happened elsewhere. The scenario is localized to KSRQ to make the off-field environment real and consequential for you as a student here.

The consistent thread across all these events: the Piper Cherokee 180's LEFT/RIGHT fuel selector is not BOTH. The pilot must actively switch tanks in flight. Failure to switch, or accidental positioning of the selector in an intermediate or OFF position, results in fuel starvation and engine failure. The fix is simple: establish a fuel-switching protocol before departure, execute it consistently, and never let a tank run completely dry. The failure is always a delay or a distraction.

Key lesson — The Piper Cherokee 180's fuel selector is LEFT / RIGHT — there is NO BOTH position. The pilot must actively switch tanks in flight, typically every 30 minutes, to balance fuel consumption and prevent one tank from running dry. Accidental positioning of the selector in an intermediate position or OFF blocks fuel flow and causes immediate engine failure. Off Runway 22 at KSRQ, the off-field environment is open water and low-density development: a fuel-starvation engine failure at low altitude is a ditching, not a field landing. Establish a fuel-switching protocol before departure, brief it clearly, and execute it consistently.

Debrief — teaching points

The Piper Cherokee 180 has LEFT / RIGHT fuel selector — no BOTH position.

Unlike the Cessna 172, which has a BOTH position, the PA-28-180's fuel selector is LEFT / RIGHT only. There is no BOTH. The pilot must actively switch tanks in flight. This is not optional. Failure to switch, or accidental positioning of the selector in an intermediate or OFF position, results in fuel starvation and total engine failure. The NTSB DFW05FA028, CEN24LA191, WPR24LA178, CEN24LA189, and ERA24LA116 accidents all resulted from fuel-selector mismanagement in the PA-28-180.

An intermediate fuel-selector position blocks fuel flow to both tanks.

If the fuel selector is positioned between LEFT and RIGHT (in the intermediate position), fuel flow to both tanks is blocked. The engine will quit. This can happen during a tank change if the selector is not moved fully to the next position, or if the selector is bumped during flight. Always move the selector fully to LEFT or fully to RIGHT — never leave it in an intermediate position. The NTSB WPR24LA178 and CEN24LA189 accidents both resulted from the selector being in an intermediate position.

Establish a fuel-switching protocol before departure.

Before takeoff, establish a clear fuel-switching schedule: typically switch tanks every 30 minutes, or every 20 minutes in a trainer flight. Write it down. Brief it to your passenger or instructor. Set a timer if necessary. Monitor fuel quantity on each tank. Never let a tank run completely dry — switch before the tank is empty. The NTSB CEN24LA191 and ERA24LA116 accidents both resulted from the pilot failing to switch tanks at the planned time, often due to distraction or complacency.

Verify fuel-selector operation during the preflight.

During the preflight, verify that the fuel selector moves freely between LEFT and RIGHT. Confirm that both tanks are full (or at least have the expected fuel quantity). Check that the selector detents are positive — it should not move to an intermediate position without deliberate force. A sticky or loose selector is a maintenance issue. Do not depart with a fuel-selector problem.

At KSRQ Runway 22, an engine failure on departure is a ditching.

The off-field environment off Runway 22's departure end (heading 218°) is open water, low-density development, and open developed areas (parks/large lots). There is no alternate landing surface. If the engine quits on the Runway 22 departure and altitude is insufficient to return to the airport, the outcome is a ditching. This is not a worst-case scenario; it is the geographic reality. Best glide is 65 KIAS. Fuel selector OFF (to prevent fuel spillage). Mixture rich. Master off just before impact. Cabin door unlatched. Flaps for slowest possible touchdown speed. Know this before you line up on Runway 22.

The first symptom of fuel starvation is a gradual loss of power — not roughness, not a cough, but a steady unwinding of the tachometer.

Carburetor ice causes roughness and a sudden RPM drop. Fuel starvation causes a gradual, steady loss of power — the tachometer unwinds as if the throttle is being pulled back. If you lose power and the engine is not rough, suspect fuel starvation first. Check the fuel selector position immediately: is it fully on LEFT or fully on RIGHT? Is it in an intermediate position? Is it in OFF? The fuel selector is the most likely culprit.

Built from the real accident record

Scenario built from NTSB DFW05FA028 (2004, fuel starvation from failure to switch tanks), CEN24LA191 (2024, failure to switch tanks en route), WPR24LA178 (2024, fuel selector in intermediate position), CEN24LA189 (2024, student positioned selector between ports), ERA24LA116 (2024, student failed to switch despite reminders), and CEN24LA108 (2024, inadvertent OFF position during tank change). All real events occurred at other airports — NOT at KSRQ.

NTSB reports: DFW05FA028 · CEN24LA191 · WPR24LA178 · CEN24LA189 · ERA24LA116 · CEN24LA108 · NYC03LA096 · MIA02FA144

ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.II.B — Engine Starting / Systems Preflight · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors

Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.185

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