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SAMPLE SBTDescent / Approach

Fuel Starvation on Descent to Tampa

Improper fuel tank selection, power loss on final approach, and dense development off every runway — a forced landing in the heart of a major metropolitan area

Cessna 172N · Tampa International Airport (KTPA) · Private · Descent / Approach

The scenario

Departing Tampa International Airport (KTPA), Tampa, FL — Runway 19R, a 2-hour local flight in the C172N. Elevation 26 ft MSL. You are a Private pilot with 280 hours total; this is a familiar airport and a routine afternoon VFR flight.

You preflight the airplane at 1100 local. The fuel gauges show full tanks — both left and right. You visually confirm the tanks are full by opening the fuel caps and looking in. You do not dip the tanks with a stick (a habit you have not developed). The fuel selector is on BOTH. You brief the flight plan: depart Runway 19R heading 182°, climb to 2,500 ft MSL, cruise for 2 hours, return to KTPA for landing on Runway 01L (the reciprocal, heading 2°). You calculate fuel: 36 gallons usable at takeoff, 5.5 gallons per hour cruise burn, 2 hours flight time = 11 gallons burned, leaving 25 gallons on return. A comfortable reserve.

The flight goes smoothly. You cruise at 2,500 ft MSL, 105 KIAS, for 2 hours. At 1300 local you contact Tampa Approach and request descent to KTPA. Approach clears you to descend and maintain 1,500 ft MSL, vectors for Runway 01L. You begin a shallow descent.

At 1,800 ft MSL, 8 nm from the field, you notice the fuel gauges are lower than expected. The left tank reads roughly 1/4 full; the right tank reads roughly 1/2 full. You do a mental math: if you burned 11 gallons in 2 hours, you should have about 25 gallons remaining. Instead, the gauges suggest roughly 9–12 gallons total. Something is wrong. You do not know if the gauges are inaccurate, if there was a fuel leak, or if your preflight visual inspection missed a problem.

Aircraft: Cessna 172N, solo, fuel selector on BOTH. Carbureted Lycoming O-320, fixed-pitch prop, steam panel. The airplane was last serviced 3 days ago; the annual inspection was completed 6 months ago. Nothing was written up in the last inspection that would affect the fuel system.

Pilot: you — a Private pilot, current, 280 hours total. You have flown this airplane 40 times. You are comfortable with the airplane and the airport. You have never experienced a fuel emergency. You did not dip the tanks at preflight — you relied on the fuel gauges and a visual inspection of the fuel caps.

The decision

Before we get into the decision tree — what do you already know about fuel management in the C172N? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)

What the record shows

What the NTSB files show

NTSB CHI02FA247 (2002): A Cessna 172N on a night personal flight from Minnesota to Wisconsin experienced fuel exhaustion during final approach. The pilot had failed to refuel before departure and did not plan fuel adequately for the flight. The airplane was forced to land in a cornfield. Contributing factors included pilot fatigue and night conditions. The pilot did not survive.

NTSB CEN25LA099 (2025): A Cessna 172N on a cross-country flight lost total engine power during a go-around after an aborted landing. The accident resulted from fuel exhaustion caused by poor flight planning and the pilot's decision not to refuel at an intermediate stop despite instructor guidance. The pilot executed a forced landing but the outcome was not survivable.

NTSB NYC06LA179 (2006): A Cessna 172N on a local flight experienced partial loss of engine power during cruise due to improper maintenance of the throttle shaft during the most recent annual inspection. The pilot executed a forced landing that resulted in collision with trees. The pilot did not survive.

NTSB CEN25LA168 (2025): A Cessna 172N on an instructional flight lost engine power on final approach when the throttle cable was found disconnected from the carburetor. The accident resulted from improper maintenance following carburetor replacement, with an apprentice's work not adequately inspected by the supervising mechanic. The pilot executed a forced landing.

The common thread across these accidents: engine power loss at low altitude during approach, when options are most limited. In CHI02FA247 and CEN25LA099, fuel exhaustion was the cause — the pilot did not plan fuel adequately or did not refuel at intermediate stops. In NYC06LA179 and CEN25LA168, maintenance failures (throttle shaft, throttle cable) caused the power loss. In all cases, the pilot was committed to landing and had limited altitude to recover.

At KTPA, the off-field environment off every runway end is dense development — buildings, roads, parks. A forced landing at KTPA is not a field landing; it is an emergency landing in an urban area. The survival rate depends on finding an open space (park, large parking lot) and flying the airplane correctly (best glide speed, flaps for slowest touchdown speed, controlled descent). The accidents cited above occurred at other airports — NOT at KTPA. But the principle is the same: fuel management and early emergency declaration are the difference between a survivable forced landing and a fatal one.

The scenario at KTPA is localized to this field's geography: dense development off every runway end, a major metropolitan airport with 24-hour ATC, and the requirement to declare emergencies early to receive priority handling. The fuel-exhaustion accidents in the NTSB database show that pilots often do not declare emergencies until it is too late — when the engine has already failed. The correct procedure is to declare when fuel quantity is in doubt, not when the engine quits.

Key lesson — Fuel management in the C172N begins with an accurate preflight check — dip the tanks with a stick, do not rely on gauges alone. Plan fuel for the flight with a legal reserve (30 minutes day, 45 minutes night). During flight, monitor fuel consumption against your plan. If fuel quantity is in doubt, declare an emergency to ATC immediately — do not gamble. At KTPA, a forced landing due to fuel exhaustion will be in dense development; your survival depends on finding an open space and flying the airplane correctly. Early emergency declaration gives ATC the information they need to help you.

Debrief — teaching points

Fuel gauges in the C172N are notoriously inaccurate — dip the tanks at preflight.

The C172N's fuel gauges are capacitive and subject to errors, especially at low fuel levels. A visual dip-stick check is the only reliable method to verify fuel quantity. At preflight, open the fuel caps and look into each tank with a flashlight. Do not rely on the gauges alone. If you did not dip the tanks and the gauges show less fuel than expected during flight, you have a problem: you do not know how much fuel you actually have. This is the scenario that killed the pilot in CHI02FA247 — inadequate preflight fuel planning and no dip-stick check.

Plan fuel before every flight — calculate burn rate, flight time, and reserve.

Before departing, calculate your fuel burn at the planned cruise power setting and altitude. Multiply burn rate by flight time to get total fuel burned. Subtract from usable fuel to get fuel remaining at destination. Verify you have a legal reserve: 30 minutes day VFR, 45 minutes night VFR. In the scenario, the calculation showed 25 gallons remaining — a comfortable reserve. But the actual fuel was much less because the preflight check was inaccurate. The lesson: accurate preflight fuel planning depends on accurate fuel quantity at the start.

The C172N fuel selector is BOTH — there is no single-tank operation.

The C172N fuel selector has two positions: BOTH and OFF. BOTH draws fuel from both tanks simultaneously. There is no LEFT or RIGHT position. You cannot select a single tank. This is different from some other aircraft (like the Piper PA-28, which has L / R / BOTH / OFF). Know your airplane's fuel system. In this scenario, if you tried to switch to the RIGHT tank thinking you could select a single tank, you would have made an error — the selector would remain on BOTH.

Declare a fuel emergency to ATC early — when fuel quantity is in doubt, not when the engine fails.

If your fuel gauges show less fuel than your calculations predict, declare a fuel emergency to ATC immediately. Do not wait for the engine to fail. ATC can give you priority handling, vectors to the nearest suitable airport, and emergency services standing by. In the scenario, declaring at 8 nm out (when the discrepancy was first noticed) would have given you priority approach and reduced workload. Declaring at 5 nm out (after continuing the approach) still works, but the margin is thinner. Declaring after the engine fails (at 800 ft AGL) is too late — you are now managing a forced landing without ATC support.

At KTPA, the off-field environment is dense development — a forced landing will be in an urban area.

Off every runway end at KTPA, the off-field environment is dense development: buildings, roads, parks, parking lots. There is no open field, no clear area. A forced landing at KTPA is an emergency landing in an urban area. Your survival depends on finding an open space (a park, a large parking lot, an empty field) and flying the airplane correctly. Best glide speed is 65 KIAS. Lower the flaps to 30° (Vfe 85 KIAS) to reduce touchdown speed — impact energy rises with the square of speed, so the slowest possible touchdown speed matters most. Aim for the largest open space you can see. Do not aim for buildings, roads with traffic, or water.

Best glide speed in the C172N is 65 KIAS — this is the speed to fly immediately if the engine fails.

If the engine fails at any altitude, lower the nose to 65 KIAS best glide immediately. This speed maximizes your glide distance and gives you the most time to find a landing spot. At 800 ft AGL and 65 KIAS, you have roughly 10–12 minutes of glide time. Use that time to scan ahead for the best landing option. Do not attempt to restart the engine or troubleshoot systems while gliding — fly the airplane first. Once you have identified a landing spot and are committed to it, then manage the descent with flaps and configuration.

Built from the real accident record

Scenario built from NTSB NYC06LA179 (2006 C172N throttle maintenance failure / forced landing), CHI02FA247 (2002 C172N fuel exhaustion / night forced landing), CEN25LA168 (2025 C172N throttle cable disconnection / power loss on final), CEN25LA099 (2025 C172N fuel exhaustion go-around), and regional fuel-starvation precedents WPR24LA167, GAA19CA534, WPR12LA023, CEN25LA081. Localized to KTPA.

NTSB reports: NYC06LA179 · CHI02FA247 · CEN25LA168 · CEN25LA099 · WPR24LA167 · GAA19CA534 · WPR12LA023 · CEN25LA081

ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.II.A — Preflight Assessment · PA.II.B — Engine Starting / Systems Preflight · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors

Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.151 · §91.185

Run this scenario yourself

Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.

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