Power Loss on Descent to Tampa
Fuel tank mismanagement in a constant-speed, fuel-injected Cirrus — dense development off every runway end, and the decision window is measured in seconds
The scenario
Departing Tampa International Airport (KTPA), Tampa, FL — Runway 19R, a 2-hour cross-country flight to a coastal destination. Elevation 26 ft MSL. You are a Private pilot with 280 hours total, 45 hours in the Cirrus SR20. This is your second flight in this particular aircraft after a 6-week gap.
The flight plan is filed VFR, cruising at 5,500 ft MSL. Weather is clear, winds light from the northeast. You completed a standard preflight, but you did not carefully verify fuel quantity in each tank — the fuel gauges on the Avidyne glass panel showed green (usable fuel), and you assumed full tanks from the FBO's line service. You did not visually check the tanks or ask the line crew directly.
You are now 1 hour 45 minutes into the flight, descending through 2,500 ft MSL into the approach environment for KTPA. ATC has cleared you to descend and vectors you toward Runway 19R. You are on a 5-mile final, 1,200 ft AGL, 100 KIAS (Vref + 20 for approach stability), when the engine begins to lose power. The tachometer is unwinding. The fuel selector is on the LEFT tank. You have not switched tanks during the flight.
Aircraft: Cirrus SR20, solo, fuel-injected Continental IO-360-ES, constant-speed prop, glass panel (Avidyne Perspective), fixed gear. The fuel selector has LEFT / RIGHT positions — there is NO BOTH position on this airplane. Fuel capacity is 38 gallons usable (19 per tank).
Pilot: you — Private, current, 280 hours total, 45 hours SR20. You did not establish a fuel tank switching plan before departure. You did not verify actual fuel quantity in each tank. You are now on final approach with a dying engine and dense development off every runway end.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KTPA · Tampa'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '10/28 · 19L/01R · 19R/01L'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '26 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'SR20'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Takeoff'}
The decision
Before we get into the decision tree — what do you already know about fuel management in the Cirrus SR20? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
NTSB WPR24LA167 (2024): A Canadian Car & Foundry Harvard MK IV lost all engine power due to fuel starvation when the pilot improperly selected the left fuel tank at low fuel levels. The aircraft was on descent to land when the engine quit. The probable cause was improper fuel tank selection and a malfunctioning fuel selector. The pilot executed a forced landing that struck a dirt berm.
NTSB GAA19CA534 (2019): A Piper PA-28-161 lost engine power during descent to land after the pilot switched to the left fuel tank and failed to follow the emergency power loss checklist. The pilot did not switch to the right tank, which contained usable fuel. The probable cause was improper fuel management and failure to troubleshoot the fuel system. The aircraft landed on a road.
NTSB WPR12LA023 (2011): A Cessna 185 lost engine power during descent near Bend, Oregon, when the pilot inadvertently left the fuel selector on the left tank despite having usable fuel in the right tank. The pilot executed a forced landing on an unpaved road and the aircraft nosed over during rollout. The probable cause was inadequate fuel selector discipline and failure to verify tank selection before descent.
NTSB CEN25LA081 (2025): A Piper PA-24-250 on a ferry flight lost engine power during approach due to fuel starvation after the pilots mismanaged fuel by not leaning the mixture and incorrectly switching fuel tanks. The probable cause was inadequate fuel management and was compounded by maintenance issues with the mixture control system.
The common thread: fuel tank mismanagement on descent or approach. In single-engine airplanes with LEFT / RIGHT fuel selectors (Piper, Cirrus), the pilot must actively manage which tank is feeding the engine. There is no BOTH position — if one tank runs dry, the engine quits. The SR20 has no crossfeed valve; you cannot feed the right tank from the left tank selector position.
At KTPA, the off-field environment off every runway end is dense development, medium development, and open developed areas (parks/lots). There is no open field or water. A forced landing off any runway end is into built-up terrain. This is not hypothetical; it is the USGS NLCD ground cover data for the Tampa area.
The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports and in other aircraft — NOT at Tampa International Airport. KTPA has its own accident history (forced landing 22.2%, loss of control 11.1%, gear-up landing 6.7%), but these specific fuel starvation events happened elsewhere. The scenario is localized to KTPA to make the off-field environment and the fuel selector discipline real and consequential for you as a student here.
The consistent lesson: fuel tank switching must be planned before descent. Verify fuel quantity in each tank before departure — do not rely on the Avidyne fuel gauges alone. Establish a fuel tank switching interval (e.g., switch tanks every 30 minutes, or at specific waypoints) and follow it religiously. In the SR20, the fuel selector is the most critical control on descent.
Key lesson — In the Cirrus SR20, the fuel selector has LEFT / RIGHT positions — there is NO BOTH position. If the left tank runs dry, the engine quits. There is no crossfeed valve. Fuel tank switching must be planned before descent and executed on schedule. Verify fuel quantity in each tank by visual inspection before departure — the Avidyne fuel gauges are capacitive and inaccurate at low fuel levels. At KTPA, the off-field environment off every runway end is dense development. A forced landing off any runway end is into built-up terrain, not open field. The decision window on final approach is measured in seconds — switch tanks immediately if power loss occurs.
Debrief — teaching points
The SR20 fuel selector has LEFT / RIGHT — there is NO BOTH position.
Unlike Cessnas (which have a BOTH position), the Cirrus SR20 fuel selector is LEFT / RIGHT only. You must actively manage which tank is feeding the engine. If the left tank runs dry, the engine quits. There is no crossfeed valve — you cannot feed the right tank from the left tank selector position. This is a fundamental difference from other single-engine airplanes. Fuel tank discipline is non-negotiable.
Fuel tank switching must be planned before descent — not during approach.
Establish a fuel tank switching plan before departure: e.g., 'Switch to the right tank at the 1-hour mark, then alternate every 30 minutes.' Write it down. Brief it to yourself. Follow it religiously. Switching tanks during approach or at low altitude is a distraction and a risk. The NTSB cases show pilots who switched tanks during descent and lost power because they switched to an empty tank. Plan the switching before you need it.
Verify fuel quantity by visual inspection — do not rely on the Avidyne fuel gauges alone.
The Avidyne fuel gauges are capacitive and notoriously inaccurate, especially at low fuel levels. Before departure, visually inspect each fuel tank — open the filler cap, look inside, and verify the fuel level. Ask the line crew directly: 'How much fuel did you put in each tank?' Do not assume 'full tanks' from the FBO. The NTSB cases show pilots who relied on fuel gauges and ran out of fuel because the gauges were wrong.
At KTPA, the off-field environment off every runway end is dense development.
Off Runway 10 (climb-out heading 92°): dense development, open developed areas, wooded wetland. Off Runway 28 (climb-out heading 272°): dense development, medium development, open developed areas. Off Runway 19L/19R (climb-out heading 182°): dense development, medium development, pasture/hay. Off Runway 01L/01R (climb-out heading 2°): dense development, medium development, open developed areas. There is no open field or water. A forced landing off any runway end is into built-up terrain. This is the USGS NLCD ground cover data for Tampa.
On final approach, if power is lost, switch tanks immediately — it is the first and most likely fix.
At 1,200 ft AGL on final approach, if the engine loses power, the most likely cause is fuel starvation from the current tank running dry. Switch the fuel selector to the other tank immediately. Do not waste time troubleshooting mixture, fuel pump, or electrical systems — switch tanks first. If power is restored, you have bought time and altitude. If power is not restored, you are no worse off and you can declare an emergency and prepare for a forced landing.
Best glide in the SR20 is 96 KIAS — establish it immediately if engine power is lost.
If the engine quits and you cannot restore power by switching tanks, establish 96 KIAS best glide immediately. This speed maximizes glide distance and gives you the most time and distance to find a landing site. At 800 ft AGL over Tampa, the off-field options are limited — dense development in all directions. Best glide buys you every second and every foot of altitude.
Built from the real accident record
Scenario built from NTSB WPR24LA167 (2024 Harvard fuel starvation / tank selection), GAA19CA534 (2019 PA-28 fuel mismanagement on descent), WPR12LA023 (2011 Cessna 185 fuel selector discipline), and CEN25LA081 (2025 PA-24 ferry flight fuel starvation). Localized to Tampa International Airport (KTPA) and the Cirrus SR20.
NTSB reports: WPR24LA167 · GAA19CA534 · WPR12LA023 · CEN25LA081
ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.II.A — Preflight Assessment · PA.II.B — Engine Starting / Systems Preflight · PA.III.A — Normal Takeoff and Climb · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.185
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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