Fuel Tank Discipline at Tampa International
Fuel starvation on descent into a Class B airport — the fuel selector is the first thing to check, and the last thing pilots remember to verify
The scenario
Departing Tampa International Airport (KTPA), Tampa, FL — Runway 10, a 2.5-hour cross-country flight to a coastal field. Elevation 26 ft MSL. You are a commercial pilot with roughly 600 hours total, 150 in the Cirrus SR22. The SR22 is a high-performance, fuel-injected constant-speed machine: 310 hp Continental IO-550-N, glass Perspective panel, fixed gear. Fuel capacity is 102 gallons total — 51 gallons usable in each wing tank. The fuel selector is LEFT / RIGHT (no BOTH position).
It is a clear, calm afternoon. OAT 24°C, altimeter 29.98, winds light and variable. You filed IFR but are flying VFR today — the weather is benign. You are cruising at 6,500 ft MSL, about 1.5 hours into the flight. Fuel burn is running 16 GPH. You have been on the LEFT tank for the entire flight — a common practice to keep the airplane balanced, since you burned from the left tank during the climb-out and initial cruise.
You are now 45 minutes from your destination. You check the fuel gauges: LEFT tank shows 12 gallons, RIGHT tank shows 28 gallons. The total is 40 gallons — enough to reach the destination with a comfortable reserve. But you have not switched tanks yet. You are still on LEFT. The left tank is running low. You decide it is time to switch to the RIGHT tank and let the left tank run dry on the descent and approach.
You reach down, move the fuel selector from LEFT to RIGHT, and continue the descent. ATC clears you to descend to 3,000 ft MSL for approach to Runway 10. You are 20 minutes out. The engine is running smoothly. You have not leaned the mixture — you are at 3,000 ft MSL, which is low enough that leaning is not critical, and you are focused on the descent and approach setup.
At 2,500 ft MSL, 10 minutes from the airport, the engine begins to run rough. The manifold pressure drops. You glance at the fuel gauges. The RIGHT tank gauge is fluctuating. The LEFT tank gauge reads zero. Your heart rate spikes. You have 10 minutes to figure out what is happening and land the airplane.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KTPA · Tampa'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '10/28 · 19L/01R · 19R/01L'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '26 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'SR22'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Takeoff'}
The decision
Before we get into the decision tree — what do you already know about fuel management in the SR22? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
NTSB WPR24LA167 (2024): A Canadian Car & Foundry Harvard MK IV lost all engine power due to fuel starvation when the pilot improperly selected the left fuel tank at low fuel levels. The accident resulted from improper fuel tank selection and a malfunctioning fuel selector, requiring a forced landing that struck a dirt berm. The probable cause was the pilot's failure to properly manage fuel tank selection and a malfunctioning fuel selector valve.
NTSB GAA19CA534 (2019): A Piper PA-28 lost engine power during descent to land after the pilot switched to the left fuel tank and failed to follow the emergency power loss checklist. The accident resulted from improper fuel management and failure to switch to the right tank containing usable fuel, leading to fuel starvation and a forced landing on a road. The probable cause was the pilot's inadequate fuel management and failure to troubleshoot the fuel system.
NTSB WPR12LA023 (2011): A Cessna 185 lost engine power during descent near Bend, Oregon, when the pilot inadvertently left the fuel selector on the left tank despite having usable fuel in the right tank. The pilot executed a forced landing on an unpaved road and the aircraft nosed over during rollout. The probable cause was the pilot's failure to establish and maintain fuel selector discipline.
NTSB CEN25LA081 (2025): A Piper PA-24 on a ferry flight lost engine power during approach due to fuel starvation after the pilots mismanaged fuel by not leaning the mixture and incorrectly switching fuel tanks. The accident resulted from inadequate fuel management and was compounded by maintenance issues with the mixture control system. The probable cause was the pilots' failure to plan fuel tank usage and verify fuel quantity before descent.
The consistent thread across all these accidents: fuel tank mismanagement and delayed diagnosis of fuel system problems. In each case, the pilot had usable fuel in one tank but was drawing from a tank that was empty or not feeding properly. The fix — switching to the other tank — was simple and took 10 seconds. The failure was always a delay in diagnosis or a failure to systematically troubleshoot the fuel system.
At KTPA, the off-field environment off Runway 10's departure end (heading 92°) is dense development with scattered open areas. A forced landing in that environment is survivable if you have altitude and time to find an open area, but it is far better to diagnose the fuel problem at 2,500 ft MSL and land safely at the airport than to wait until the engine quits at 1,500 ft MSL and execute a forced landing in dense development.
The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports and in other aircraft — NOT at KTPA. The scenario is localized to KTPA to make the off-field environment real and consequential for you as a student here. The lesson is universal: fuel tank discipline and systematic troubleshooting of the fuel system are non-negotiable.
Key lesson — In the SR22, the fuel selector is LEFT / RIGHT only — there is no BOTH position. You must actively manage which tank is feeding the engine. When the engine begins to run rough or loses power, the first troubleshooting step is to verify the fuel pump is ON, then systematically switch fuel tanks to isolate the problem. A fuel gauge reading zero does not mean the tank is empty — fuel gauges are notoriously inaccurate at low levels. At 2,500 ft MSL on descent, a 10-second fuel selector switch can prevent a forced landing. Delay that diagnosis, and you will be executing a forced landing in dense development at 1,500 ft MSL with minimal options.
Debrief — teaching points
The SR22 fuel selector is LEFT / RIGHT only — no BOTH position.
Unlike many general aviation airplanes, the SR22 has no BOTH position on the fuel selector. You must actively select LEFT or RIGHT. This design requires discipline: you must know which tank you are on at all times, and you must plan your tank switching in advance. Forgetting to switch tanks, or switching to a tank that is not feeding properly, will result in fuel starvation. The fuel selector is the first thing to check when the engine begins to run rough or loses power.
Fuel gauges are inaccurate at low fuel levels.
A fuel gauge reading zero does not mean the tank is truly empty. Fuel gauges in general aviation are notoriously inaccurate, especially at low fuel levels. The float mechanism in the tank can stick, the gauge can fail, or the wiring can be corroded. A gauge reading zero may mean the tank is empty, or it may mean the gauge is not reading correctly. When you see a fuel gauge reading zero, do not assume the tank is empty — switch to the other tank and see if the engine runs smoothly. If it does, you have usable fuel in the tank with the zero gauge.
Plan your fuel tank switching in advance.
Before you depart, plan which tank you will use for climb, cruise, and descent. A common practice is to use the LEFT tank for climb and initial cruise, then switch to the RIGHT tank for the remainder of cruise and descent. This keeps the airplane balanced and ensures you are not running one tank dry while the other has fuel. Write down your tank-switching plan and stick to it. Do not make ad-hoc decisions about tank switching during descent — that is when mistakes happen.
When the engine runs rough or loses power, systematically troubleshoot the fuel system.
The fuel system troubleshooting sequence is: (1) Verify the fuel pump is ON. (2) Check the fuel selector position — is it on the tank you intended? (3) Switch to the other tank and see if the engine runs smoothly. (4) If the engine runs smoothly on the other tank, you have identified the problem — the first tank is not feeding properly. (5) Continue on the tank that is feeding and plan your descent to the nearest airport. Do not assume the engine has a mechanical problem until you have ruled out fuel system issues.
Declare an emergency if you have a fuel system malfunction at low altitude.
If you have a fuel system malfunction (one tank not feeding, fuel pump failure, fuel selector malfunction) at low altitude, declare an emergency with ATC. This gives you priority handling and clears the airspace around you. ATC will vector you to the nearest airport and clear you for an immediate landing. A fuel system malfunction at low altitude is a serious issue — do not hesitate to declare an emergency.
At KTPA, the off-field environment off Runway 10 is dense development — forced landing options are limited.
The off-field environment off Runway 10's departure end (heading 92°) is dense development with scattered open areas (parks, parking lots). If you have an engine failure on the Runway 10 departure and altitude is insufficient to return to the airport, your forced landing options are limited. A park or parking lot is your best bet, but you may have to land in trees or buildings. This is why fuel system discipline is critical at KTPA — a fuel system problem diagnosed at 2,500 ft MSL can be resolved with a landing at the airport. A fuel system problem diagnosed at 1,500 ft MSL may result in a forced landing in dense development.
Built from the real accident record
Scenario built from NTSB WPR24LA167 (2024 Harvard fuel starvation / selector error), GAA19CA534 (2019 PA-28 fuel tank mismanagement), WPR12LA023 (2011 Cessna 185 fuel selector discipline), and CEN25LA081 (2025 PA-24 ferry-flight fuel mismanagement). Localized to KTPA.
NTSB reports: WPR24LA167 · GAA19CA534 · WPR12LA023 · CEN25LA081
ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.II.A — Preflight Inspection · PA.II.B — Engine Starting / Systems Preflight · PA.III.B — Descent, Approach, and Landing · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.185 · §91.207
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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