The Float and the Stall
A balked landing, improper flap configuration, and a low-altitude stall in the traffic pattern — the Cirrus SR22's energy state demands precision
The scenario
Departing Tampa International Airport (KTPA), Tampa, FL — Runway 19R, returning to home base after a two-hour cross-country flight. Elevation 26 ft MSL. The runway is 11,002 ft of concrete, plenty of length.
It is a warm Florida afternoon in late July: OAT 32°C, dew point 24°C, altimeter 29.89. Scattered thermals, light wind from the south at 5 kt, visibility 10 SM. Density altitude is approximately 2,800 ft — high for sea level, but manageable. The Cirrus SR22 is performing normally.
You are on short final to Runway 19R, descending through 500 ft AGL, airspeed 85 KIAS, flaps 50% (Vfe 119 KIAS — you are well within limits). The approach is stable. Then, as you enter the flare at 50 ft AGL, the airplane floats — it does not want to touch down. You are drifting down the runway, still 30 ft above the surface, airspeed holding at 80 KIAS. You have plenty of runway ahead, but the float is obvious.
Aircraft: Cirrus SR22, solo, 3,200 lb, within CG and weight limits. Constant-speed prop, fuel-injected Continental IO-550-N, glass Perspective panel, CAPS system armed and ready. Nothing was written up; the airplane is airworthy.
Pilot: you — a Private pilot, 450 hours total, 120 hours in type (SR22). You are current and proficient. You have made dozens of landings in this airplane. You know the SR22's energy state — it floats, it carries speed, it does not forgive a slow approach. But today, something feels off.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KTPA · Tampa'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '10/28 · 19L/01R · 19R/01L'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '26 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'SR22'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Takeoff'}
The decision
Before we get into the decision tree — what do you know about the SR22's landing characteristics and the risks of a balked landing at low altitude? (Pick all that apply.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
NTSB WPR11LA169 (2011): A Cirrus SR22 on return to its home base at Falcon Field, Arizona, encountered excessive float during landing flare. The pilot aborted the landing and retracted flaps to climb out, but the aircraft stalled at low altitude and lost control. The airplane struck the runway, veered left, and collided with a parked Cessna 172. The probable cause was the pilot's attempt to correct a landing float by adding power, followed by his premature attempt to climb out of ground effect at insufficient airspeed, with improper flap configuration during the balked landing. The pilot survived; the occupants of the parked Cessna were not in the aircraft.
NTSB WPR20FA019 (2019, FATAL): A Cirrus SR22 stalled during landing approach while maneuvering in the traffic pattern at low airspeed and descended into a residential area. The probable cause was the pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack while maneuvering for landing, resulting in an aerodynamic stall and loss of control. The pilot and passenger were killed.
NTSB CEN18FA204 (2018, FATAL): A Cirrus SR22 on a personal flight from Midland to Ruidoso stalled during initial climb at 200 feet and entered an uncontrollable descent, impacting terrain. The probable cause was an inadvertent stall, with contributing factors including high density altitude and the student pilot's limited experience. Both occupants were killed.
NTSB ATL06LA035 (2006): A Cirrus SR22 on a business flight encountered icing conditions while climbing to 9,000 feet in an area where the aircraft was not certified to operate. The accident resulted from inadequate preflight planning, failure to obtain current weather information, and continued flight into known icing conditions, leading to ice accumulation, airspeed decay, stall, and spin. The pilot and passenger were killed.
The common thread across all these accidents: the SR22 stalls at low altitude, and the outcome is loss of control. The SR22's high energy state — fast approaches, long floats, quick onset in disorientation — makes it unforgiving of poor technique in the landing pattern. The float is a characteristic of the design. The stall trap is the improper flap retraction on a go-around at low airspeed.
Real accidents cited above occurred at Falcon Field (Arizona), Ruidoso (New Mexico), and other airports — NOT at Tampa International. KTPA has its own accident history (see field dominant patterns: FORCED_LANDING 22.2%, LOSS_OF_CONTROL_INFLIGHT 11.1%, GEAR_UP_LANDING 6.7%), but these specific fatal events happened elsewhere. The scenario is localized to KTPA to make the runway environment and off-field reality consequential for you as a pilot here.
The Cirrus SR22 is equipped with CAPS — the whole-airframe parachute. CAPS is not a last resort. It is the POH's primary response to unrecoverable stall/spin at low altitude. If you find yourself in an inadvertent stall below 1,000 ft AGL with no recovery in sight, deploy CAPS. The descent rate under the parachute is roughly 20 ft/sec — survivable. The alternative — trying to recover by conventional control inputs — is not.
Key lesson — The SR22 floats in the flare. Accept it. Reduce power and let the airplane settle. If you abort the landing and go around, retract flaps gradually while maintaining climb attitude and accelerating to Vy (101 KIAS). Retracting flaps too quickly at low airspeed is a stall trap. An inadvertent stall at low altitude is unrecoverable by conventional control inputs — deploy CAPS. The float is not a failure; it is a characteristic of the airplane. Precision in the approach and flare is the answer.
Debrief — teaching points
The SR22 floats — it is a design characteristic, not a failure.
The Cirrus SR22's aerodynamic design and energy state result in a tendency to float in the flare, especially on warm days with high density altitude. This is normal and expected. The correct response is to accept the float, maintain the flare attitude, reduce power to idle, and let the airplane settle naturally. The runway is long — there is no pressure to land immediately. Trying to force the airplane onto the ground or aborting the landing to go around is often the wrong decision. Accept the float and land.
A go-around from low altitude requires precise flap management.
If you abort a landing and go around, the flap retraction is critical. Retracting flaps too quickly at low airspeed causes a sudden loss of lift and a stall. The correct procedure is to retract flaps gradually (50% → 25% → 0°) while maintaining a shallow climb attitude and allowing the airspeed to build toward Vy (101 KIAS). At low altitude, the flap retraction must be coordinated with the airspeed build. Do not retract flaps to 0° until airspeed is at least 90 KIAS and altitude is above 100 ft AGL.
Stall speed in landing configuration is 59 KIAS (Vs0); approach speed is 77 KIAS (Vref).
The SR22's stall speed in landing configuration (full flaps) is 59 KIAS. Approach speed (Vref, short-field) is 77 KIAS. Any descent below 70 KIAS in a turn or during a go-around risks a stall. Maintain approach speed (77 KIAS) on final approach and during the flare. If you abort the landing and go around, accelerate to at least 90 KIAS before retracting flaps. The margin between stall speed and approach speed is narrow — precision matters.
An inadvertent stall at low altitude is unrecoverable by conventional control inputs.
If you find yourself in a stall below 1,000 ft AGL with no recovery in sight, deploy the CAPS parachute. CAPS is not a last resort; it is the POH's primary response to unrecoverable stall/spin at low altitude. The whole-airframe parachute arrests the descent at roughly 20 ft/sec — survivable. Attempting to recover by pushing the nose down or pulling back on the yoke at low altitude will result in a dive or a secondary stall. CAPS is the system. Deploy it.
Fatigue and frustration degrade decision-making in the landing pattern.
A float on the first approach is normal. A second approach is reasonable. A third go-around in the pattern is a sign that something is wrong with your planning or your technique — not with the airplane. If you find yourself aborting multiple landings, climb to a safe altitude (1,500 ft AGL), level off, and reset. Breathe. Review your approach plan. Commit to a stable descent at Vref (77 KIAS). Fatigue and frustration narrow your scan and degrade your judgment. A reset is not a failure; it is airmanship.
Off Runway 19R at KTPA, the off-field environment is dense development and pasture.
The climb-out environment off Runway 19R (heading 182°) is dense development and pasture — marginal for a forced landing. If you lose an engine on the Runway 19R departure or encounter an emergency that requires an immediate landing, your options are limited. The runway is your best option. A forced landing in dense development or pasture is survivable only if the airplane is under control. Maintain airspeed, maintain control, and return to the runway if possible. CAPS is an option if the airplane is uncontrollable.
Built from the real accident record
Scenario inspired by NTSB WPR11LA169 (2011 SR22 balked landing stall), ATL06LA035 (2006 SR22 stall/spin in icing), WPR20FA019 (2019 SR22 stall during landing approach), and CEN18FA204 (2018 SR22 stall on initial climb). Localized to Tampa International Airport (KTPA). Real accidents occurred at other airports — NOT at KTPA.
NTSB reports: WPR11LA169 · ATL06LA035 · WPR20FA019 · CEN18FA204
ACS tasks: PA.II.E — Landing · PA.II.F — Go-Around / Rejected Landing · PA.III.A — Stall Recognition and Recovery · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.303
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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