Low Approach, High Stakes
A go-around decision near Tampa International — wires, density, and the cost of a late abort
The scenario
Departing Tampa International Airport (KTPA), Tampa, FL — Runway 19L, on a local VFR flight. Elevation 26 ft MSL. You are a Private pilot with 280 hours total, current and proficient. This is your third visit to KTPA; you know the field is busy, Class B, and towered 24/7.
It is late afternoon, 1745 local. The sun is low on the western horizon — about 30 minutes to sunset. Visibility is 6 SM in haze. Scattered clouds at 2,500 ft, ceiling 4,000 ft. OAT 31°C, dew point 24°C. Density altitude is approximately 2,200 ft — the field feels higher than 26 ft. Winds are light and variable, 3–5 kt.
You have been flying a local practice area for 1.5 hours. Fuel on board: 42 gallons usable (you topped off before departure). Current fuel burn is 8 gal/hr at cruise; you have roughly 5 hours endurance. You are returning to KTPA for landing. ATC has cleared you to descend to 2,000 ft and vectors to Runway 19L. You are 8 nm northeast of the field.
Aircraft: Cessna 172R, solo, within limits. Lycoming IO-360-L2A, fuel-injected, 160 hp. Fixed gear, fixed-pitch prop, steam panel (vacuum-driven). Fuel selector on BOTH. Nothing was written up; the airplane is airworthy.
Pilot: you. You are current on KTPA but not a regular. The low light, the haze, and the Class B environment are all factors. You have not flown an approach to Runway 19L at KTPA in several months. The runway is 8,300 ft long — plenty of runway — but the approach environment is dense development on both sides. Off the runway 19L departure end (heading 182°), the off-field is dense development, medium development, and pasture — no open fields, no clear go-around zone. Off the runway 01R arrival end (heading 2°), the off-field is dense development, medium development, and open developed (parks/large lots) — marginal at best.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KTPA · Tampa'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '10/28 · 19L/01R · 19R/01L'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '26 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'C172R'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Takeoff'}
The decision
Before we get into the decision tree — what do you know about go-around decision-making and wire strike risk in the C172R? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
NTSB WPR21LA193 (2021): A Cessna 172 on a local flight struck powerlines during a go-around after the pilot misaligned with a road instead of the runway during approach in low light conditions. The pilot was attempting to land on a road, not the actual runway, in dusk light. When the pilot realized the error and went around, the airplane struck powerlines. The probable cause was the pilot's failure to locate the airport, with contributing factors including low light conditions and inoperative runway lighting. The accident was fatal.
NTSB ERA14WA437 (2014): A Cessna 172R impacted powerlines while performing a go-around maneuver near Comandante Gastao Airport in Brazil. The investigation is under the jurisdiction of Brazil's CENIPA. The probable cause has not been determined, but the mechanism — a go-around in low light with wires in the climb path — is the same trap that kills pilots in the United States.
The local environment at KTPA makes this scenario particularly unforgiving: Runway 19L's departure end (heading 182°) is dense development with no clear go-around zone. The arrival end (Runway 01R, heading 2°) is dense development and marginal open space. Powerlines and obstacles are common around busy airports in developed areas. In low light and haze, they are nearly invisible until very close.
The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports — NOT at Tampa International. KTPA has its own accident history (see field dominant patterns: forced landing 22.2%, loss of control inflight 11.1%, wire strike 6.7%), but these specific events happened elsewhere. The scenario is localized to KTPA to make the off-field environment and wire-strike risk real and consequential for you as a student here.
The consistent thread across all these events: a go-around in low light and haze is a high-risk maneuver. Wires and obstacles are invisible until very close. A go-around decision must be made early — by 500 ft AGL on approach — and executed immediately. Delaying the decision or attempting to salvage a bad approach with a slip or a hard landing invites a wire strike or a loss of control.
Fuel management and diversion planning are also critical. Multiple failed approaches in deteriorating conditions burn fuel and time. Recognize the decision point: if the approach is unstable or the light is fading, divert to a nearby airport with better conditions. Do not get trapped in a cycle of failed approaches and go-arounds.
Key lesson — At KTPA in low light and haze, wires and obstacles are a real hazard. A go-around decision must be made early — by 500 ft AGL — and executed immediately. If the approach is unstable or wires are visible, go around. Do not attempt to slip under wires or salvage a bad approach with a hard landing. If multiple approaches fail in deteriorating conditions, divert to a nearby airport with better VFR conditions. Fuel and light are finite resources — manage them carefully.
Debrief — teaching points
A go-around decision must be made early — by 500 ft AGL on approach.
If the approach is unstable, if wires or obstacles are visible, or if the runway is not clearly in sight, go around by 500 ft AGL. At 500 ft AGL in a C172R, you have enough altitude to climb away safely at Vy (79 KIAS) and have time to plan the next approach. Below 500 ft AGL, the go-around becomes marginal — you are low, slow, and have little margin for error. The decision to go around must be made early and executed immediately. Do not try to salvage a bad approach with a slip, a hard landing, or a steep descent.
Wires and powerlines are invisible in low light and haze.
Powerlines, guy wires, and antenna cables are often invisible in low light, haze, and dusk conditions — especially when you are on a go-around climb with the nose high. They do not show up on radar or GPS. They are not marked on charts in a way that helps you avoid them. The only defense is to recognize the hazard, plan the go-around path to avoid known wires, and execute the go-around early and aggressively. If you see wires on approach, go around immediately.
Low light and haze degrade depth perception and approach stability.
In low light and haze, it is hard to judge the glide path, descent rate, and distance to the runway. Approaches that feel stable in daylight become unstable in dusk. Visibility of 4 SM in haze is marginal VFR — it is at the edge of legal VFR minimums. If you are current on instruments and the field has an ILS, use it. If you are not current on instruments, consider a diversion to an airport with better VFR conditions. Do not attempt a visual approach in marginal VFR conditions.
Density altitude affects go-around performance.
At KTPA with OAT 31°C and field elevation 26 ft, density altitude is roughly 2,200 ft. The C172R performs as if it is at a 2,200 ft elevation airport. Go-around climb performance is reduced. Vy (79 KIAS) is still the correct speed for best rate of climb, but the actual climb rate is lower than at sea level. If you need to clear wires or obstacles on a go-around, plan for reduced climb performance and execute the go-around early.
Fuel management and diversion planning are critical in deteriorating conditions.
Each approach and go-around burns fuel. If you are on your second or third approach in low light and haze, and fuel is becoming a factor, divert to a nearby airport with better VFR conditions. Do not get trapped in a cycle of failed approaches and go-arounds. Recognize the decision point: if the light is fading, visibility is dropping, and fuel is becoming marginal, divert. A diversion is not a failure — it is airmanship.
The C172R fuel selector is BOTH — fuel starvation is not a C172R risk like it is in a Piper PA-28.
The C172R has a single fuel selector on BOTH. There is no L/R/OFF selector like a Piper PA-28. Fuel starvation from improper tank selection is not a C172R risk. However, fuel management — knowing how much fuel you have and planning for multiple approaches — is still critical. Monitor fuel quantity and burn rate. If you are on multiple approaches in deteriorating conditions, fuel will become a factor.
Built from the real accident record
Scenario built from NTSB WPR21LA193 (2021, C172 wire strike during go-around in low light), ERA14WA437 (2014, C172R powerline strike during go-around in Brazil), and regional fuel-starvation precedents WPR24LA167, GAA19CA534, WPR12LA023. Localized to Tampa International Airport (KTPA).
NTSB reports: ERA14WA437 · WPR21LA193 · WPR24LA167 · GAA19CA534 · WPR12LA023
ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.II.B — Engine Starting / Systems Preflight · PA.VIII.D — Go-Around / Rejected Landing
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.119
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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