Three Greens
Gear management, distraction, and the Arrow's most expensive checklist item
The scenario
Field: Tampa International Airport (KTPA), Tampa, FL — elevation 26 ft MSL. You are inbound for landing on Runway 19R, an 11,002-ft concrete runway. KTPA is a Class B airport with 24-hour ATCT/TRACON; you are operating under a VFR clearance into the Bravo, and Tampa Approach has been busy with airline traffic.
Aircraft: Piper Arrow (PA-28R-201), fuel-injected Lycoming IO-360, 200 hp, constant-speed prop, hydraulically actuated retractable gear. You are the sole occupant, within weight and balance limits. The airplane was last maintained six weeks ago; no squawks are open.
Weather: Clear, visibility unrestricted, winds 190° at 8 knots. A perfect VFR afternoon in Tampa — the kind of day where complacency grows quietly.
Pilot: you — a Private pilot with 310 hours total, 85 hours in the Arrow. You fly the Arrow regularly but primarily out of a smaller satellite field. KTPA is unfamiliar; the Class B environment, the long runway, and the volume of radio traffic are all higher than your normal operating environment.
The situation: Tampa Approach has handed you off to Tower. You are 5 miles out on a 3-mile final for Runway 19R, descending through 1,500 ft MSL. Tower has called traffic — a regional jet on a parallel approach to 19L — and asked you to keep your speed up to 100 knots until a 2-mile final. You acknowledged. You are task-saturated: monitoring the jet, managing the descent, and listening to a busy frequency. The GUMPS check on downwind was rushed.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KTPA · Tampa'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '10/28 · 19L/01R · 19R/01L'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '26 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'PA-28R'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Takeoff'}
The decision
On a 5-mile final in the Arrow, before the scenario unfolds — which of these are actively in your scan? (Pick all that apply — no wrong answers; this records your baseline awareness.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
Gear-up landings in the Piper Arrow are not rare. The NTSB database contains multiple PA-28R events in recent years alone — CEN24LA288, CEN25LA133, CEN25LA120, and others — and the probable cause language is nearly identical across all of them: distraction, failure to conduct the before-landing checklist, and failure to verify gear extension.
The Arrow is a capable, well-designed complex aircraft. Its hydraulic gear system is reliable. The emergency extension procedure works. The gear warning horn works. Three green lights work. And yet pilots land gear-up with regularity — because distraction is more powerful than any single system, and the checklist is the only defense that addresses all of them simultaneously.
The pattern across the NTSB cases is consistent: a high-workload environment (unfamiliar airport, traffic calls, ATC speed requests, a passenger distraction, a seatbelt issue) interrupts the downwind GUMPS check. The pilot believes the gear is down because the handle is in the DOWN detent. The three green lights are never explicitly confirmed. The gear warning horn sounds and is rationalized away. The airplane touches down on its belly.
In CEN11LA418, the gear power pack motor had failed — a mechanical cause — but the pilot did not use the emergency extension system and landed wheels-up anyway. In WPR22LA040, an improper maintenance bolt prevented the right main from extending — again, the emergency system was available and not used. Mechanical failures happen; the emergency procedure exists for exactly that reason.
The real events cited here occurred at various airports across the United States — not at Tampa International Airport. This scenario is localized to KTPA to reflect the realistic operating environment: Class B airspace, a busy ATCT, parallel runway operations, and the task saturation that comes with an unfamiliar, high-activity field. That environment is a contributing factor, not an excuse.
The off-field environment off Runway 19R's departure end (182°) is poor — dense development with only scattered pasture. A go-around from a low altitude at KTPA is not a casual decision; it commits you to a climb over built-up terrain with no viable off-airport option. That reality makes the early go-around — at 2 miles out, 775 ft AGL, before the situation degrades — the correct choice. Waiting until 200 ft AGL to discover a gear problem at KTPA is a much harder problem than the same discovery at a rural field with open terrain.
Key lesson — Three green lights — not the handle position, not the absence of a horn, not a feeling — are the only confirmation that the Arrow's gear is down and locked. GUMPS on downwind, three greens confirmed on final, and the POH emergency procedure used at altitude: these are the three guardrails. Any one of them, applied correctly, prevents every gear-up landing in the NTSB database.
Debrief — teaching points
The handle is not the gear — three greens are the gear.
The gear handle position tells you what you commanded, not what the airplane did. Hydraulic pressure, a faulty actuator, an improper maintenance bolt, or a stiff door linkage can all prevent a leg from locking even when the handle is in the DOWN detent. The only confirmation that all three legs are down and locked is three illuminated green position lights — nose, left main, right main — confirmed explicitly, with the panel shaded if necessary. 'The handle is down' is not a checklist item. 'Three greens' is.
GUMPS is a discipline, not a ritual.
Gas (fuel selector on the fullest tank), Undercarriage (gear DOWN, three greens confirmed), Mixture (rich for landing), Prop (full forward), Seatbelts — in the Arrow, this checklist is completed on downwind and verified again on final. In a high-workload environment — ATC speed requests, traffic calls, an unfamiliar Class B field — the temptation is to rush or skip it. That is precisely when it matters most. The NTSB cases are unanimous: the before-landing checklist was not completed. Distraction is the cause; checklist discipline is the defense.
The gear warning horn is a warning, not a confirmation.
The Arrow's gear warning horn sounds when throttle is reduced below approximately 12 inches of manifold pressure with the gear not down and locked. It tells you something is wrong — it does not tell you the gear is down. Pilots who rationalize the horn ('probably a sensor') and continue the approach have removed their last warning before touchdown. The correct response to the horn is to verify three greens, not to silence it mentally.
Use the POH emergency gear extension procedure — at altitude, in sequence.
The Arrow's hydraulic gear system can fail. The POH Emergency section contains a specific procedure: recycle the gear handle (UP then DOWN) to attempt hydraulic extension; if that fails, use the manual emergency extension system (free-fall/gravity). This procedure is tested and effective — CEN11LA418 is a case where it was available and not used, resulting in a wheels-up landing that was entirely preventable. The procedure must be used at altitude, with time, not on a 200-ft final. The go-around that buys you that altitude is the most important decision in the chain.
A go-around at 2 miles is cheap; a go-around at 200 ft AGL at KTPA is hard.
The off-field environment off Runway 19R's departure end is poor — dense development with limited open terrain. A go-around from 200 ft AGL commits you to a climb over built-up areas with no viable forced-landing option if the engine quits. The early go-around — at 2 miles out, 775 ft AGL, before the gear problem is confirmed — is the correct decision precisely because it preserves options. Waiting until short final to discover a gear problem at a busy Class B airport is a much harder problem to solve. Decide your go-around criteria before you are in the situation, not during it. 14 CFR §91.3 makes you the final authority — use it early.
Built from the real accident record
Composite scenario built from multiple NTSB PA-28R gear-up landing events (CEN24LA288, WPR22LA040, CEN11LA418, CEN25LA133, CEN25LA120) and class-peer retractable-single gear-up events (ERA26LA045, CEN26LA028, WPR26LA016, ERA25LA343, CEN25LA319), all morphed onto the PA-28R-201 Arrow. Real events occurred at various airports — not at KTPA.
NTSB reports: CEN24LA288 · WPR22LA040 · CEN11LA418 · CEN25LA133 · CEN25LA120 · ERA26LA045 · CEN26LA028 · WPR26LA016 · ERA25LA343 · CEN25LA319 · WPR24LA167 · GAA19CA534
ACS tasks: PA.IV.A — Normal Approach and Landing · PA.IV.B — Normal Approach and Landing (Complex Aircraft) · PA.IX.F — Emergency Equipment and Survival Gear · PA.I.H — Human Factors
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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