Engine Failure on Climbout — Tampa Bay Below
Total power loss at 400 ft AGL off Runway 22 at KTPF — open water ahead, dense development behind. The decision window is seconds.
The scenario
Departing Peter O Knight Airport (KTPF), Tampa, FL — Runway 22, climbing out on a 217° heading over open water. Elevation 8 ft MSL; the runway sits at the water's edge. This is a non-towered field (CTAF 122.8); you self-announce on the common frequency.
It is a clear, calm morning in late spring: OAT 24°C, winds calm, altimeter 29.98. Visibility 10 SM. The water of Tampa Bay stretches south and west off Runway 22's departure end. To the north and east, dense development — the city of Tampa. This is a water-surrounded airport; three of the four runway ends have open water as the primary off-field environment.
You are 400 ft AGL, climbing through 73 KIAS (Vy), heading 217°, when the engine loses total power. The tachometer drops to zero. No sputtering, no roughness — complete power loss. The water of Tampa Bay fills the windscreen ahead. You have roughly 30 seconds of useful glide time before you are committed to a water landing.
Aircraft: Cessna 172N, solo, full fuel (48 gallons usable), within limits. Lycoming O-320, fixed-pitch prop, steam panel, fuel selector on BOTH. The airplane was recovered from maintenance three days ago — a carburetor replacement and throttle-cable inspection during the annual inspection. The mechanic's log shows 'throttle cable re-attached and tested.' Nothing was written up as incomplete.
Pilot: you — a Private pilot, current, roughly 180 hours total. You completed a thorough preflight, ran the engine on the ground, and confirmed full throttle response. The engine ran smoothly at idle and at cruise power. You did not notice any anomaly during the run-up. You took off normally and began the climb.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KTPF · Peter O Knight'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '4/22 · 18/36'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '8 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'C172N'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Approach'}
The decision
Before we get into the decision tree — what do you already know about engine failure on climbout over water in the C172N? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
NTSB NYC06LA179 (2006): A Cessna 172N on a personal local flight experienced partial loss of engine power during cruise due to improper maintenance of the throttle shaft during the most recent annual inspection. The pilot made a forced landing that resulted in collision with trees. The probable cause was improper maintenance of the throttle shaft, which resulted in partial loss of engine power during cruise flight.
NTSB CEN25LA168 (2025): A Cessna 172N on an instructional flight lost engine power on final approach when the throttle cable was found disconnected from the carburetor. The pilot executed a forced landing to a field. The accident resulted from improper maintenance following carburetor replacement, with an apprentice's work not adequately inspected by the supervising mechanic.
NTSB CHI02FA247 (2002): A Cessna 172N on a night personal flight from Minnesota to Wisconsin experienced fuel exhaustion during final approach and was forced to land in a cornfield. The accident resulted from the pilot's failure to refuel before departure and inadequate fuel planning.
NTSB CEN25LA099 (2025): A Cessna 172N on a cross-country flight lost total engine power during a go-around after an aborted landing due to fuel exhaustion. The accident resulted from poor flight planning and the pilot's decision not to refuel at an intermediate stop despite instructor guidance.
Regional ditching precedents: NTSB ATL97LA099 (1997, P210N), NYC03LA109 (2003, C175A), BFO91LA069 (1991, C177RG), and ANC13LA048 (2013, PA-16) all document engine failures at low altitude over water. In each case, the pilot's decision to commit to a controlled ditching — rather than attempting a marginal return to land — resulted in survival. The common thread: recognize when altitude is insufficient for a safe return, commit decisively to ditching, and execute the controlled water-landing procedure.
The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports and in other aircraft — NOT at Peter O Knight Airport. KTPF has its own accident history (forced landing 19.4%, loss of control 16.7%, ditching 11.1% of the field's corpus), but these specific events happened elsewhere. The scenario is localized to KTPF to make the off-field environment real and consequential for you as a student here.
The consistent thread across all these events: engine failures in the C172N are often post-maintenance related (throttle-cable disconnection, fuel-system improper reconnection, carburetor installation error) or fuel-planning failures. A thorough ground run and preflight are essential. And when an engine fails at low altitude over water, the decision to ditch — rather than attempt a marginal return — is the decision that saves lives.
Key lesson — At KTPF, three of the four runway ends have open water as the primary off-field environment. An engine failure on the Runway 22 departure at 400 ft AGL is a ditching, not a field landing. Best glide is 65 KIAS. Recognize the failure immediately, establish best glide, and evaluate whether the airport is reachable. If the altitude is marginal or the approach is tight, commit to a controlled ditching. Survival rates in controlled ditchings are significantly better than in uncontrolled ones. Post-maintenance engine failures are common in the C172N — a thorough ground run and preflight are non-negotiable.
Debrief — teaching points
Post-maintenance engine failures in the C172N are often due to improper throttle-cable or fuel-system reconnection.
NTSB NYC06LA179 and CEN25LA168 both document C172N engine failures caused by improper maintenance of the throttle shaft and throttle cable during annual inspections and carburetor replacements. A thorough ground run — including full throttle response at idle and cruise power, and a careful visual inspection of the throttle cable and fuel system — is essential before flight. If the airplane has been in maintenance, do not assume the work was done correctly. Verify it yourself.
Best glide speed in the C172N is 65 KIAS — establish it immediately upon engine failure.
At 65 KIAS, the C172N achieves its maximum glide distance and maximum time aloft. This gives you the most time and distance to evaluate your options — return to the airport or commit to ditching. Any other speed (faster or slower) reduces glide distance and time. Establish 65 KIAS immediately upon recognizing engine failure.
At 400 ft AGL over water, the altitude margin for a return to the departure airport is very tight.
A 180° turn at 65 KIAS and 400 ft AGL will cost 100–150 ft of altitude. You will roll out at 250–300 ft AGL, roughly 0.5 nm from the airport. This is a marginal, high-risk approach. If the altitude is lower (300 ft or less), the return becomes extremely tight or impossible. Know your airport's distance from the departure end of the runway you are using. At KTPF, Runway 22's departure end is at the water's edge — the airport is very close. But at other airports, the airport may be farther away, making a return impossible at low altitude.
A controlled ditching is the correct outcome when altitude is insufficient for a safe return.
When the engine fails at low altitude over water and the airport is unreachable or the approach is marginal, a controlled ditching is the correct decision. This is not failure — it is airmanship. Best glide at 65 KIAS, doors unlatched before water contact, master off just before impact, flaps set for slowest possible touchdown speed. Impact energy rises with the square of touchdown speed; the slowest possible speed is the single most important factor for survival. Survival rates in controlled ditchings are significantly better than in uncontrolled ones or in stall/spin accidents trying to stretch a marginal glide.
At KTPF, three of the four runway ends have open water as the primary off-field environment.
Runway 22's departure end (heading 217°) is open water — Tampa Bay. Runway 18's departure end (heading 173°) is open water. Runway 36's departure end (heading 353°) is open water. Only Runway 04's departure end (heading 37°) has dense development as the primary off-field environment. If you depart Runway 22, 18, or 36 and lose the engine at low altitude, you are committed to a ditching. Know this before you line up on the runway.
Built from the real accident record
Scenario built from NTSB NYC06LA179 (2006 C172N throttle-shaft maintenance failure / forced landing), CHI02FA247 (2002 C172N fuel exhaustion / forced landing), CEN25LA168 (2025 C172N throttle-cable disconnection / forced landing), CEN25LA099 (2025 C172N fuel exhaustion / go-around power loss), and regional ditching precedents ATL97LA099 (1997 P210N engine failure / Gulf ditching), NYC03LA109 (2003 C175A engine failure / ocean ditching), BFO91LA069 (1991 C177RG engine failure / river ditching), ANC13LA048 (2013 PA-16 engine failure / ocean ditching). Localized to KTPF.
NTSB reports: NYC06LA179 · CHI02FA247 · CEN25LA168 · CEN25LA099 · ATL97LA099 · NYC03LA109 · BFO91LA069 · ANC13LA048
ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.II.B — Engine Starting / Systems Preflight
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.185
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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