Bounced Landing, Nose-Heavy Flare

Departing Peter O Knight Airport (KTPF), Tampa, FL — Runway 22, a 3,583 ft asphalt strip at 8 ft MSL. Elevation is essentially sea level; density altitude is moderate (roughly 1,200 ft DA). You are a Commercial pilot with 850 hours total, 120 hours in the Cessna 182 Skylane, and you hold a high-performance endorsement. This is your second flight in the 182 from this field.

It is a clear VFR afternoon: OAT 26°C, altimeter 29.98, wind 180° at 8 kt gusting to 12 kt. Runway 22 is oriented 217° true; the wind is nearly aligned, a slight left crosswind (about 4 kt). Visibility 10 SM. Smooth air. A textbook landing day — except for one thing: the airplane was returned from maintenance yesterday. The elevator trim was rigged during a control-cable inspection. You performed a preflight and a short functional test, but you did not fly the airplane before this flight.

You are on short final to Runway 22, 400 ft AGL, 70 KIAS (Vref, power-off approach speed for short-field landing). The runway is made. Flaps are full (40°). Prop is set to high RPM (full forward). Cowl flaps are open for cooling. You are configured for a short-field landing — the 182 is nose-heavy in this configuration, and the flare requires deliberate elevator back-pressure to arrest the descent and touch down on the main gear first.

You begin the flare at 20 ft AGL. You apply back-pressure on the yoke to raise the nose and slow the descent. The elevator feels normal — responsive. But as you continue the flare, the nose does not come up as much as you expect. You are sinking faster than you anticipated. The main gear touches down at 50 ft down the runway, but the descent rate is high — you feel the impact. The nose gear follows hard. The airplane bounces.

Aircraft: Cessna 182 Skylane, solo, within limits. Continental O-470 carbureted, constant-speed prop, cowl flaps, fixed gear, steam panel. The elevator trim was rigged yesterday; you did not detect any issue in the preflight or the functional test.

Pilot: you — a Commercial pilot, 850 hours total, 120 hours in type, high-performance endorsement current. You are familiar with the 182's nose-heavy pitch characteristics and the need for deliberate elevator back-pressure on landing. You did not apply full back-pressure on the flare because you did not anticipate the elevator authority to be compromised.

NTSB ERA21LA113 (2021): A Cessna 182 on a personal flight experienced a hard landing and runway excursion when the pilot failed to properly recover from a bounced landing. The pilot did not apply sufficient back-pressure during the flare, resulting in a hard landing. The airplane bounced, and the pilot did not recover from the bounce — the nose wheel separated and the airplane nose-overed. The probable cause was the pilot's improper recovery from the bounced landing. The accident was fatal.

NTSB WPR20CA269 (2020): A Cessna 182 landed hard more than halfway down the runway, bounced, and the pilot delayed the go-around decision until insufficient runway remained. The airplane departed the runway and collided with trees. The probable cause was the pilot's decision to continue an unstable approach and the delayed go-around decision. The pilot and passenger were seriously injured.

NTSB ERA26LA009 (2025): A Cessna 182H made a hard landing on the nose gear after the pilot, while holding the jump door closed, attempted to add elevator trim for the landing flare. Maintenance personnel had improperly rigged the elevator trim system during a control-cable inspection. The pilot and maintenance personnel failed to perform adequate post-maintenance and preflight inspections that would have detected the defect. The probable cause was maintenance personnel's improper rigging of the elevator trim system, with contributing factors being the failure to perform post-maintenance and preflight inspections.

The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports and in other aircraft — NOT at Peter O Knight Airport. KTPF has its own accident history (see field dominant patterns: FORCED_LANDING 19.4%, LOSS_OF_CONTROL_INFLIGHT 16.7%, LOSS_OF_CONTROL_GROUND 11.1%, DITCHING 11.1%, STALL_SPIN 8.3%), but these specific events happened elsewhere. The scenario is localized to KTPF to make the off-field environment real and consequential for you as a student here.

The consistent thread across all these events: the Cessna 182 is nose-heavy on landing, and the flare requires deliberate, sustained back-pressure to raise the nose and touch down on the main gear first. A hard landing or a bounce requires immediate, full back-pressure to recover — hesitation or inadequate back-pressure results in a second hard landing, nose wheel separation, and potential nose-over. Additionally, post-maintenance inspections are critical: improper elevator trim rigging can compromise the elevator authority available during the flare, making the hard landing more likely.

Off Runway 22's departure end (heading 217°), the off-field environment is open water — Tampa Bay. An engine failure or a marginal climb-out with full flaps in this configuration could result in a ditching. The decision to retract flaps to 10° immediately during a go-around is not optional — it is the difference between a successful climb-out and a water landing.