Wrong Tank, Wrong Time
Fuel starvation in the DA40 — the selector you forgot, the water you can't avoid
The scenario
Field: Peter O Knight Airport (KTPF), Tampa, FL — elevation 8 ft MSL. You are returning from a 1.4-hour cross-country and entering the pattern for Runway 22, the preferred calm-wind runway. KTPF is non-towered, Class G; Tampa Class B begins overhead at 1,200 ft MSL. CTAF is in use.
Aircraft: Diamond DA40, solo, within limits. Lycoming IO-360-M1A, constant-speed prop, G1000 glass panel. Fuel selector has two positions only — LEFT and RIGHT. There is no BOTH.
Fuel state: You departed with full tanks (total usable 40.8 gal). You set the selector to LEFT before engine start and flew the entire outbound and return leg — about 1.4 hours — without switching tanks. You did not recheck the selector after the power reduction for descent. The G1000 fuel quantity display shows roughly 12 gallons total, but you have been drawing exclusively from the left tank.
The situation: On a 3-mile final for Runway 22, at 800 ft MSL, the engine stumbles, surges once, and goes to idle power. The prop is still windmilling. You have seconds to diagnose and act.
Pilot: you — a Private pilot, current, comfortable in the DA40. Fuel starvation is the accident that finds comfortable pilots.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KTPF · Peter O Knight'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '4/22 · 18/36'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '8 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'DA40'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Approach'}
The decision
Before we run the scenario — which of these are already in your head when you fly the DA40? (Pick all that apply; no wrong answers — this records your starting awareness.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
Fuel starvation — engine failure caused by a dry selected tank while usable fuel remains in the other tank — is among the most preventable accident causes in general aviation. It appears repeatedly in the NTSB database across aircraft types, and the mechanism is nearly identical every time: the pilot did not verify fuel selector position before flight, did not switch tanks during flight, or did not check the selector as the first response to power loss.
ERA12FA002 (2011): A Temco GC-1B lost power over the Chesapeake Bay and ditched after the pilot failed to verify fuel selector position before flight or after the power loss. The airplane had fuel — on the wrong side of a selector that was never checked. The pilot survived a controlled ditching but the cause was a preflight omission that took seconds to prevent.
ANC17LA043 (2017): A Cessna T207 on a scheduled commuter flight lost all engine power on approach due to fuel starvation, with unreliable fuel quantity indicators as a contributing factor. The crew made a controlled ditching near Coghlan Island. The lesson: fuel quantity gauges are advisory — physical verification and conservative fuel planning are the standard.
LAX97LA278 (1997) and LAX98LA168 (1998): Two separate California ditchings — one in the Pacific, one off Santa Barbara — both caused by improper fuel tank selector positioning. Both were preventable with a selector check.
The Diamond DA40 has no BOTH position. The pilot must actively choose LEFT or RIGHT and must switch tanks during flight to balance fuel and prevent starvation. The G1000 displays total fuel quantity but does not alert the pilot that one tank is dry while the other has fuel. That responsibility belongs to the pilot.
At KTPF, Runway 22 departs over Hillsborough Bay. The off-field environment off the Runway 22 end is open water. An engine failure on short final for Runway 22 — the field's instrument-approach runway — is a ditching scenario, not a field-landing scenario. Fuel management at this field is not a procedural nicety; it is the difference between landing on pavement and landing in the bay.
NOTE: The accidents cited above occurred at other locations — the Chesapeake Bay, Coghlan Island (Alaska), the Pacific Ocean off California, and Santa Barbara. None occurred at KTPF. The scenario above is a composite training exercise localized to KTPF and the DA40 for instructional purposes.
Key lesson — In the DA40, LEFT and RIGHT are the only fuel selector positions — there is no BOTH. Verify selector position before engine start, switch tanks at regular intervals, and make fuel selector the FIRST item on any engine-failure checklist. At KTPF, the water off Runway 22 makes this non-negotiable.
Debrief — teaching points
The DA40 has no BOTH — LEFT and RIGHT demand active management.
Unlike a Cessna 172 where the selector lives on BOTH for most flights, the DA40 requires the pilot to choose a tank and to switch it. If you depart on LEFT and never switch, you will eventually run the left tank dry while the right tank sits full and useless. The POH recommends switching tanks every 30 minutes. Build it into your cruise scan — it takes three seconds and prevents the accident entirely.
Fuel selector is the FIRST item when the engine stumbles.
When an IO-360 loses power unexpectedly, the first memory item is not throttle, not mixture, not the G1000 engine page — it is fuel selector. Check it and switch it. Fuel starvation restores engine power within 5–10 seconds of switching to a tank with fuel. Every second spent on other troubleshooting before checking the selector is a second of altitude and glide range consumed.
The G1000 fuel display shows total quantity — not per-tank starvation.
The G1000 EIS fuel quantity display is a useful cross-check but it does not warn you that one tank is dry. It shows total remaining fuel. A pilot who sees '12 gallons remaining' and assumes the fuel system is fine has missed the point: 12 gallons in the right tank and 0 in the selected left tank is an engine failure waiting to happen. Verify selector position; do not rely on the display to catch a starvation condition.
Off Runway 22 at KTPF is Hillsborough Bay — plan accordingly.
The Runway 22 approach path crosses open water. An engine failure on short final — or a departure on Runway 22 with an engine failure before Vy — puts you in the bay. There is no off-field landing option. The correct response to an engine failure in this environment is a controlled ditching: canopy unlatched before impact, MAYDAY transmitted with position, minimum airspeed (70 KIAS Vref) at touchdown, wings level, parallel to swells, master off before water contact. Prepare early — the water comes up fast.
Best glide is 73 KIAS — fly it exactly; do not stretch.
The DA40's composite airframe is aerodynamically slippery and glides well, but that glide ratio only exists at 73 KIAS. Raising the nose above best-glide attitude to 'stretch' the glide trades airspeed for a momentary altitude gain and then a steeper descent — and at low altitude, it risks a stall before water contact. Vs clean is 52 KIAS. Fly 73 KIAS to the water and slow to 70 KIAS (Vref) for touchdown. The numbers are not suggestions.
Built from the real accident record
Composite scenario built from NTSB fuel-starvation events ERA12FA002, ANC17LA043, LAX97LA278, and LAX98LA168. Localized to KTPF and the Diamond DA40. Anonymized.
NTSB reports: ERA12FA002 · ANC17LA043 · LAX97LA278 · LAX98LA168
ACS tasks: PA.I.D — Cross-Country Flight Planning (fuel planning) · PA.II.B — Preflight Inspection (fuel system) · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.151
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
Open the interactive scenario →All sample scenarios · More Diamond DA40 scenarios · More scenarios at KTPF