Total Power Loss Over Tampa Bay
Engine failure at 500 ft AGL departing a non-towered field surrounded by water — the forced-landing decision is immediate and unforgiving
The scenario
Departing Peter O Knight Airport (KTPF), Tampa, FL — Runway 22, climbing out on a 217° heading over open water. Elevation 8 ft MSL. Non-towered field; you are on CTAF 122.975. Overlying Class B airspace (Tampa Bravo) begins at 1,200 ft MSL; you are climbing through 500 ft AGL, well below Bravo floor.
It is a clear, calm morning in late spring: OAT 26°C, altimeter 29.98, winds calm. Visibility 10 SM. The Hillsborough Bay and open water stretch south and east of the runway. Dense development and medium development lie to the north and west — the off-runway-04 environment. Runway 22's departure end opens directly onto water.
You are 500 ft AGL, climbing at 90 KIAS (Vy, best rate of climb with gear up), heading 217°, when the engine suddenly loses all power. The propeller is still turning (windmilling), but there is no thrust. The water of Hillsborough Bay fills the windscreen ahead and below. You have roughly 30–45 seconds of useful altitude to make a decision.
Aircraft: Piper PA-28R-200, solo, full fuel, within limits. Lycoming IO-360, fuel-injected, constant-speed prop, retractable gear. The airplane came out of a 100-hour inspection three days ago; the mechanic signed off on the engine oil system and all systems. Nothing was written up. The preflight was normal — oil quantity and color normal, engine instruments in green.
Pilot: you — a Commercial pilot, current, roughly 800 hours total, 200 hours in type. You have flown from KTPF before. You are familiar with the field's water-surrounded departure environment. You did not apply full power until after gear retraction (standard procedure). The engine ran smoothly through the climb.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KTPF · Peter O Knight'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '4/22 · 18/36'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '8 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'PA-28R'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Approach'}
The decision
Before we get into the decision tree — what do you already know about total engine failure in the Piper Arrow? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
NTSB WPR12FA058 (2011, FATAL): A Piper PA-28R-200 on a personal flight from Whidbey Island Naval Air Station experienced total loss of engine power during cruise. The pilot attempted a forced landing near Coupeville, Washington, but impacted terrain below a ridge line. The probable cause was total loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined — post-accident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The undetermined cause is the most common finding in PA-28R engine-failure accidents.
NTSB ERA10FA074 (2009, FATAL): A Piper PA-28R-200 experienced an oil problem and total engine loss during climb after takeoff. The pilot made a forced landing in trees near Wappinger, New York. Post-accident examination revealed a delamination of the No. 3 connecting rod bearing — a bearing failure that would not necessarily show up in a preflight oil check. The probable cause was total loss of engine power due to connecting rod bearing delamination, with inadequate maintenance inspection of the engine oil system as a contributing factor. The lesson: a normal preflight oil quantity and color check does not guarantee bearing integrity.
NTSB NYC08FA053 (2007, FATAL): A Piper PA-28R-200 on a business flight experienced progressive engine roughness and loss of power during initial climb after a touch-and-go landing. The accident resulted from fatigue fracture of the number 2 cylinder attach studs and subsequent cylinder separation — total loss of engine power. This is a maintenance-related failure; the studs fatigued over time and failed during climb.
NTSB CEN25LA288 (2025): A Piper PA-28RT-201T experienced total engine failure during base-to-final turn while returning to the departure airport for a precautionary landing. The pilot executed a forced landing to a field, striking a fence. The cause of engine failure was undetermined pending further examination. Note: even a return to the airport does not guarantee a successful landing if the engine fails on the approach.
NTSB ERA22LA067 (2021): A Piper PA-28R-200 on a personal flight experienced total loss of engine power during initial climb at 500 feet AGL — exactly the scenario you just flew. The pilot returned and landed on grass, striking the airport perimeter fence. The accident resulted from a total loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined. The pilot survived because he returned to the airport and landed on available terrain, but the fence strike caused damage.
NTSB CEN20LA016 (2019): A Piper PA-28R-200 experienced a sudden total loss of engine power during cruise flight after an uneventful takeoff and climb. The accident was attributed to a total loss of engine power for undetermined reasons; post-recovery examination found no mechanical anomalies. The engine simply quit, and the cause remains unknown.
The consistent thread across all these events: PA-28R engine failures in flight are often undetermined in cause, even after teardown. A normal preflight — oil quantity, color, engine instruments green — does not guarantee that the engine will not quit during climb. The only reliable response is immediate best-glide establishment, rapid assessment of landing options, and execution of the best available outcome. At KTPF, departing Runway 22 or 18 or 36, the off-field environment is water — a ditching is not a worst-case scenario, it is the geographic reality.
The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports and in other aircraft — NOT at Peter O Knight Airport. KTPF has its own accident history (see field dominant patterns: FORCED_LANDING 19.4%, LOSS_OF_CONTROL_INFLIGHT 16.7%, DITCHING 11.1%), but these specific NTSB cases happened elsewhere. The scenario is localized to KTPF to make the off-field environment real and consequential for you as a student here.
Key lesson — In the Piper Arrow, total engine failure can happen at any time, for reasons that may never be fully determined. The preflight check — oil quantity, color, engine instruments — is necessary but not sufficient. At 500 ft AGL over water, the decision window is 30–45 seconds. Establish best glide (79 KIAS) immediately. Assess landing options: can you make the airport, or must you commit to a water landing? If water is your only option, execute the ditching checklist: gear DOWN, flaps for slowest touchdown speed, fuel selector OFF, mixture IDLE cutoff, master OFF before impact, doors unlatched. Impact energy rises with the square of touchdown speed — the slowest possible speed is your entire margin. At KTPF, three of four runway departures (22, 18, 36) open onto water. Know this before you line up.
Debrief — teaching points
Best glide in the PA-28R is 79 KIAS — establish it immediately upon engine failure.
The moment the engine quits, lower the nose to 79 KIAS best glide. This is the speed that maximizes glide distance and gives you the most time and distance to manage the emergency. At 500 ft AGL, every second counts. Do not waste time troubleshooting, cycling the prop, or switching tanks before establishing best glide. Stabilize the descent first; then assess options. The PA-28R descends at roughly 600 fpm at best glide — you have roughly 40 seconds of altitude from 500 ft AGL.
Troubleshooting (prop cycle, fuel selector switch) is secondary to best-glide establishment.
If the engine quits, the first action is best glide. Prop cycle and fuel selector switching are valid troubleshooting steps, but only after you have stabilized the descent. At 500 ft AGL over water, you do not have time to try three different things before establishing glide. Establish glide first; then, if you have time and altitude, try the quick fixes. In most PA-28R engine-failure accidents, the cause is undetermined — do not count on a quick fix.
At KTPF, three of four runway departures (22, 18, 36) open onto water — a ditching is not a worst-case scenario, it is the geographic reality.
Off Runway 22 (climb-out 217°): open water, medium development, grassland. Off Runway 18 (climb-out 173°): open water, medium development. Off Runway 36 (climb-out 353°): low-density development, open water, dense development. Only Runway 04 (climb-out 037°) opens onto dense development and medium development — a field landing, not a ditching. If you lose the engine on a Runway 22, 18, or 36 departure at low altitude, you are ditching. Know this before you depart. Plan your departure runway accordingly if you have a choice.
A controlled ditching — gear DOWN, flaps for slowest touchdown speed, fuel selector OFF, mixture IDLE cutoff, master OFF before impact — is survivable.
Impact energy rises with the square of touchdown speed. A ditching at 79 KIAS is survivable; a ditching at 100 KIAS is not. Gear down provides stability and reduces landing distance. Flaps (up to Vfe 103 KIAS) reduce touchdown speed. Fuel selector OFF and mixture IDLE cutoff prevent fire. Master OFF just before water contact prevents electrical fire. Doors unlatched allow egress. The ditching checklist is not optional — it is the difference between survival and fatality. Practice it on the ground until it is automatic.
The PA-28R's constant-speed prop and retractable gear add complexity to an emergency.
In a forced landing, you must manage the prop (it will windmill if the engine is dead; you cannot feather it), the gear (DOWN for stability and landing distance, but only if you have time and altitude to lower it safely), and the flaps (for slowest touchdown speed). The workload is higher than in a fixed-gear, fixed-pitch airplane. In a ditching, gear DOWN is the correct call — it provides stability and reduces landing distance. Do not leave the gear up unless you are certain a belly landing is safer (it is not, in water).
Many PA-28R engine failures are undetermined in cause — a normal preflight does not guarantee engine reliability.
NTSB CEN20LA016, ERA22LA067, WPR12FA058, and others show total engine loss with no mechanical anomalies found post-accident. A normal preflight — oil quantity, color, engine instruments green — is necessary but not sufficient. Bearing failures, cylinder attach-stud fatigue, and other internal failures do not always show up in a preflight. The only reliable response is immediate best-glide establishment and rapid decision-making about landing options. Do not assume the engine will keep running just because the preflight was normal.
Built from the real accident record
Scenario built from NTSB WPR12FA058 (2011 PA-28R total engine loss, undetermined cause), ERA10FA074 (2009 PA-28R oil system failure / connecting rod bearing), NYC08FA053 (2007 PA-28R cylinder separation), CEN25LA288 (2025 PA-28RT engine failure on return), ERA22LA067 (2021 PA-28R total power loss at 500 ft AGL), and CEN20LA016 (2019 PA-28R sudden total power loss). Localized to KTPF, Tampa, FL.
NTSB reports: WPR12FA058 · ERA10FA074 · WPR09FA015 · NYC08FA053 · CEN25LA288 · ERA22LA067 · CEN20LA016 · CEN26FA049
ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.II.B — Engine Starting / Systems Preflight · PA.V.A — Preflight Inspection · PA.V.B — Cockpit Management
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.185 · §91.207
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
Open the interactive scenario →All sample scenarios · More Piper Arrow scenarios · More scenarios at KTPF