Partial Power Loss Over Tampa Bay
Engine failure on initial climb from Runway 22 at KTPF — open water ahead, low altitude, and a decision window measured in seconds
The scenario
Departing Peter O Knight Airport (KTPF), Tampa, FL — Runway 22, climbing out on a 217° heading over open water. Elevation 8 ft MSL; the runway is essentially at sea level.
It is a hazy Florida afternoon in late spring: OAT 29°C, dew point 23°C, altimeter 29.91. Scattered clouds at 2,500 ft, light rain shower one mile to the north. Visibility 7 SM. Classic Gulf Coast conditions — warm, moist, and exactly the environment the FAA icing probability chart marks as 'serious icing at glide power, moderate icing at cruise power.' You are in Class G airspace (non-towered, CTAF). The overlying Tampa Class B begins at 1,200 ft MSL.
You are 350 ft AGL, climbing through 74 KIAS (Vy), heading 217°, when the engine begins to run rough. Power is noticeably down — the tachometer is dropping. The water of Tampa Bay fills the windscreen ahead. There is no tower; you are on CTAF. The runway is behind you.
Aircraft: Piper Cherokee 180, solo, full fuel (both tanks), within limits. Carbureted Lycoming O-360-A, fixed-pitch prop, steam panel, fuel selector on RIGHT (you switched to RIGHT after takeoff as part of the climb checklist). Nothing was written up; the airplane was airworthy at departure.
Pilot: you — a Private pilot, current, roughly 250 hours total. You did not apply carburetor heat during the run-up because the engine ran smoothly. You did not apply it after takeoff because you were heads-down on the climb and the initial roughness was subtle.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KTPF · Peter O Knight'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '4/22 · 18/36'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '8 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'PA-28-180'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Approach'}
The decision
Before we get into the decision tree — what do you already know about engine failure on initial climb in the PA-28-180? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show
NTSB LAX01FA199 (2001): A Piper PA-28-180 student pilot on a solo instructional flight selected a downwind takeoff runway and stalled during initial climb at low altitude, striking trees. The accident was attributed to inadequate airspeed management and a downwind takeoff, with contributing factors including partial engine power loss from an inoperative right magneto and high density altitude. The student did not recognize the partial power loss early enough to abort or manage the climb.
NTSB ANC90LA112 (1990): A heavily loaded Piper PA-28 crashed into trees approximately 40 seconds after takeoff from a closed dirt strip after encountering a downdraft. The accident resulted from the aircraft's inability to overcome the downdraft with available power, compounded by heavy loading and engine degradation from improper maintenance. The pilot did not have sufficient altitude to recover.
NTSB WPR21LA020 (2020): A Piper PA-28-180 experienced partial loss of engine power during cruise flight due to a stuck exhaust valve on the No. 4 cylinder. The pilot declared an emergency and made a forced landing to a highway, during which the right wing struck a barbed wire fence. Early recognition and decisive action to land prevented a worse outcome.
NTSB WPR13LA366 (2013): A Piper PA-28-180 lost partial engine power during takeoff and made a forced landing beyond the runway departure end. The accident resulted from separation of exhaust muffler baffling that partially blocked airflow, with contributing factors including inadequate maintenance of the exhaust system. The pilot's failure to recognize the power loss early cost critical altitude.
Regional ditching precedents (ATL97LA099, NYC03LA109, BFO91LA069, ANC13LA048) show a consistent pattern: pilots who recognize engine failure early, commit decisively to ditching when altitude is insufficient for return to the airport, and execute a controlled water landing survive. Pilots who delay the ditching decision and attempt to stretch a marginal glide back to the runway do not.
The real accidents cited above occurred at other airports and in other conditions — NOT at Peter O Knight Airport. KTPF has its own accident history (forced landing 19.4%, loss of control 16.7%, ditching 11.1%), but these specific events happened elsewhere. The scenario is localized to KTPF to make the off-field environment real and consequential for you as a student here.
The consistent thread across all these events: partial engine power loss in the PA-28-180 is insidious. It builds gradually, the first symptom is roughness and a dropping tachometer (not a dramatic power cut), and by the time it is obvious, it may be too late for a comfortable recovery. The fix — full carburetor heat, immediately, at the first sign of roughness in conducive conditions — is simple. The failure is always a delay. Off Runway 22 at KTPF, the off-field environment is Tampa Bay: a delayed response means a ditching, not a field landing.
Key lesson — In warm, moist Gulf Coast air, the PA-28-180's carbureted O-360-A can accumulate serious carburetor ice even at cruise power and above-freezing temperatures. Apply full carburetor heat at the first sign of engine roughness or unexplained RPM loss. At low altitude over water, the decision window is measured in seconds — not minutes. Off Runway 22 at KTPF, the off-field environment is Tampa Bay: a delayed response means a ditching, not a field landing. Know your best glide speed (65 KIAS), your fuel selector (LEFT/RIGHT, no BOTH), and your ditching procedure before you line up on Runway 22.
Debrief — teaching points
Carburetor ice forms in conditions you would not expect.
The FAA icing probability chart shows 'serious icing at glide power' at temperatures between roughly 20°C and 30°C when relative humidity is high — exactly the Gulf Coast afternoon conditions at KTPF. You do not need visible ice, freezing temperatures, or IMC. Warm, moist air at reduced power is the classic carb-ice environment. The PA-28-180's Lycoming O-360-A is carbureted; it has no fuel injection and no alternate air system. Carburetor heat is the only tool.
The first symptom is subtle — a dropping tachometer and engine roughness.
In a fixed-pitch airplane like the PA-28-180, carburetor ice first shows as engine roughness and an unexplained RPM decrease. There is no dramatic power cut. Pilots who are not actively monitoring the tachometer miss the early warning. By the time the roughness is obvious, significant ice has accumulated. Scan the tachometer as part of your regular instrument scan, especially in conducive conditions.
Apply full carburetor heat — not partial — and expect an initial RPM drop.
When you apply carb heat to an iced carburetor, the RPM will drop further before it rises. This is expected and normal: the heat is melting ice and the resulting water is briefly disrupting combustion. Do not remove carb heat when the RPM drops — that is the heat working. Hold it full on. The RPM will recover as the ice clears, typically within 15–30 seconds depending on ice accumulation. Partial carb heat can worsen the situation by partially melting ice into water ingestion without fully clearing the restriction.
At KTPF Runway 22, an engine failure on departure is a ditching.
The off-field environment off Runway 22's departure end (heading 217°) is open water — Tampa Bay. There is no alternate landing surface. If the engine quits on the Runway 22 departure and altitude is insufficient to return to the airport, the outcome is a ditching. This is not a worst-case scenario; it is the geographic reality. Best glide is 65 KIAS. Cabin door unlatched before water contact. Master off just before impact. Flaps for slowest possible touchdown speed — impact energy rises with the square of touchdown speed, so the slowest possible speed matters most. Know this before you line up on Runway 22.
The PA-28-180 fuel selector is LEFT/RIGHT — there is no BOTH position.
Unlike some aircraft, the PA-28-180 requires active tank switching. Running a selected tank dry is the signature starvation trap in this airplane. Before takeoff, confirm which tank is fullest and plan your switch point during climb. After takeoff, switch to the fullest tank as part of the climb checklist. If you experience engine roughness and suspect fuel starvation, switch to the opposite tank — but carb ice is far more likely in Gulf Coast conditions. Know your fuel selector position at all times.
Proactive carb heat use in conducive conditions is not optional.
The PA-28-180 POH and the FAA Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge both recommend applying carburetor heat when conditions are conducive to icing — before the symptom appears. In a Gulf Coast summer departure, with OAT near 28–29°C and dew point near 22–23°C, that means applying carb heat during the run-up check (and confirming the expected RPM drop, then recovery) and considering its use during climb in visible moisture or high humidity. Waiting for the roughness to appear at 350 ft AGL over Tampa Bay is waiting too long.
Built from the real accident record
Scenario built from NTSB LAX01FA199 (2001 PA-28-180 stall/partial power on climb), ANC90LA112 (1990 PA-28 downdraft/power loss), WPR21LA020 (2020 PA-28-180 partial power loss cruise), WPR13LA366 (2013 PA-28-180 exhaust baffling/power loss takeoff), and regional ditching precedents ATL97LA099, NYC03LA109, BFO91LA069, ANC13LA048. Anonymized and localized to KTPF.
NTSB reports: LAX01FA199 · ANC90LA112 · WPR21LA020 · WPR13LA366 · ATL97LA099 · NYC03LA109 · BFO91LA069 · ANC13LA048
ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.IX.C — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.II.B — Engine Starting / Systems Preflight
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.185
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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