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SAMPLE SBTApproach / Landing

Low and Slow into Tampa Executive

A stabilized approach gone wrong — the runway is shorter than you think, and the decision to go around comes too late

Cessna 172R · Tampa Executive Airport (KVDF) · Private · Approach / Landing

The scenario

Departing Tampa Executive Airport (KVDF), Tampa, FL — Runway 23, a 5,000 ft asphalt runway. Elevation 22 ft MSL. You are on a local instructional flight with your CFI in the right seat. The flight plan is a short cross-country to a nearby field and return.

Current conditions: winds 210° at 12 kt gusting to 18 kt. Runway 23's magnetic heading is 222°. The crosswind component is roughly 8–10 kt steady, with gusts pushing toward 12–14 kt — within the C172R's demonstrated crosswind capability of 15 kt, but noticeably gusty. Ceiling 1,200 ft AGL, visibility 4 SM in light rain. VFR, but marginal. The field is non-towered (CTAF); you self-announce on 122.8.

You have completed the outbound leg and are now on a 10 nm final approach to Runway 23. The runway is in sight, but the ceiling is low and the rain is steady. Your CFI is observing and will intervene if necessary, but this is your landing to fly. You are at 800 ft AGL, 2 nm out, on a standard descent to pattern altitude.

Aircraft: Cessna 172R, solo (you and CFI), full fuel, within limits. Fuel-injected Lycoming IO-360-L2A, 160 hp, fixed-pitch prop, fixed gear. Steam panel (vacuum-driven attitude indicator, heading indicator, turn coordinator). No glass, no autopilot.

Pilot: you — a Private pilot, current, roughly 250 hours total. You have 15 hours in the C172R. You have landed at KVDF a dozen times. You know the runway. Your CFI has not briefed a specific landing distance or go-around criterion for today — that was your responsibility in the preflight planning.

The decision

Before we get into the approach — what do you know about landing distance planning and go-around decision criteria in the C172R? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline.)

What the record shows

What the NTSB files show

NTSB ERA09CA110 (2008): A Cessna 172R on an instructional instrument flight attempted landing in low ceiling and visibility conditions. The flight instructor failed to execute a missed approach when insufficient runway remained for landing. The airplane touched down long and collided with a snow bank. The probable cause was the flight instructor's failure to execute a missed approach when insufficient runway remained. Contributing factors were the low ceiling and visibility conditions.

NTSB MIA06CA005 (2005): A Cessna 172R on an instructional flight bounced during landing and overran the runway into a ditch. The student pilot misjudged distance and speed, and delayed braking. The probable cause was the pilot's misjudged distance/speed and delayed braking, which resulted in the airplane overrunning the runway.

NTSB GAA17CA105 (2016): A Piper PA-46 lost directional control during landing rollout in gusting crosswind conditions that exceeded the aircraft's demonstrated crosswind capability. The pilot did not abort the landing early when the approach became unstable.

NTSB ERA17CA149 (2017): A North American T-6G landed hard during a go-around attempt in gusting crosswind conditions. The right wingtip contacted the runway and the aircraft nosed over. The probable cause was the pilot's failure to maintain directional control during the landing roll and go-around in gusty wind.

The common thread across these accidents: pilots who are committed to landing despite unstable approaches, high/fast/steep descents, or crosswind conditions that exceed aircraft limits. The decision to go around is not a failure — it is the correct response to an unstable approach. At Tampa Executive Airport (KVDF), Runway 23 is 5,000 ft long — plenty of runway for a stable approach and landing. An undershoot or hard landing is a sign that the approach was unstable, and the correct response is to go around earlier, not to push harder to land.

The off-field environment off Runway 23's approach end (heading 222°) is pasture/hay, open water, and medium development. An undershoot landing short of the runway threshold is possible and could result in landing in the pasture or, worse, in the open water. This is not hypothetical — it is the real ground cover off that runway end per USGS NLCD data.

These real accidents occurred at other airports and in other aircraft — NOT at Tampa Executive Airport. KVDF has its own accident history (see field dominant patterns: LOSS_OF_CONTROL_GROUND 18.4%, HARD_LANDING 18.4%, FORCED_LANDING 15.8%). The scenario is localized to KVDF to make the runway length, crosswind conditions, and off-field environment real and consequential for you as a student here.

Key lesson — An unstable approach — high, fast, steep, or misaligned — is a reason to go around, not a reason to push harder to land. Establish a stable descent by 500 ft AGL. If you are not stable and aligned by that point, go around. At KVDF, Runway 23 is 5,000 ft long — there is always time for a second approach. The decision to go around is not a failure; it is airmanship. A hard landing or undershoot is the consequence of pushing an unstable approach to the ground.

Debrief — teaching points

Brief a landing distance plan before the approach.

The C172R POH provides landing distance tables for different weights, altitudes, temperatures, and wind conditions. Before you begin the approach, calculate the landing distance required for your weight and the field conditions. At KVDF, Runway 23 is 5,000 ft long. In calm conditions, the C172R requires roughly 1,500–1,800 ft to land and stop. In a headwind, that distance decreases. In a tailwind or with a high/fast approach, it increases. Know the required distance before you commit to landing. If you are not confident you can land and stop in the available runway, go around or divert.

Establish a stable approach by 500 ft AGL — or go around.

A stable approach means: on the runway heading, on the glide slope (3° descent), at the correct airspeed (62 KIAS for short-field landing in the C172R), and descending at a steady rate (300 ft/min). If you are high, fast, steep, or misaligned at 500 ft AGL, go around. Do not push an unstable approach to the ground. The runway will still be there for a second approach. A go-around at 500 ft AGL is a normal, expected procedure — not a failure.

Recognize when crosswind conditions exceed your limits.

The C172R's demonstrated crosswind capability is 15 kt. Gusts beyond that should trigger a go-around or diversion. At KVDF, if the winds are 210° at 12 kt gusting 18 kt, the crosswind component is roughly 8–10 kt steady with gusts to 12–14 kt — within limits, but noticeably gusty. If you lose directional control or alignment during the approach, go around. If you are uncomfortable with the crosswind, divert to a nearby airport with a more favorable wind direction or a longer runway.

The flare consumes significant runway distance.

The flare — the last 50 ft of descent where you reduce descent rate and slow the airplane — consumes 300–500+ ft of runway distance depending on how high you flare and how fast you are. A high flare at 70 KIAS will consume more runway than a low flare at 62 KIAS. If you are high and fast on short final, you have already consumed runway distance with the steep descent. The flare will consume more. An undershoot is the result. Plan the flare as part of the landing distance calculation.

A hard landing is a sign of an unstable approach.

If you land hard (touching down at 70+ KIAS or with a steep descent rate), the approach was unstable. A hard landing is not a normal landing — it is a sign that something went wrong: you were high, fast, steep, or misaligned. Debrief the approach with your CFI. What led to the unstable approach? How can you recognize and abort earlier next time? A hard landing can cause structural damage and is a reportable event.

The decision to go around must be made early — not on short final.

A go-around at 500 ft AGL is a normal procedure. A go-around at 200 ft AGL is possible but requires more altitude and is riskier. A go-around at 50 ft AGL is marginal and may not be possible if the airplane is slow or the descent rate is high. Make the go-around decision early — by 500 ft AGL — based on whether the approach is stable and aligned. Do not wait until short final to decide.

Built from the real accident record

Scenario inspired by NTSB ERA09CA110 (2008 C172R undershoot/long landing in low visibility) and MIA06CA005 (2005 C172R landing distance misjudgment). Regional precedents GAA17CA105, ERA17CA149, GAA16CA149 (crosswind/directional control loss during landing). Real events occurred at other airports — NOT at Tampa Executive Airport (KVDF).

NTSB reports: ERA09CA110 · MIA06CA005 · GAA17CA105 · ERA17CA149 · GAA16CA149

ACS tasks: PA.I.F — Weather Information · PA.I.G — Cross-Country Flight Planning · PA.III.A — Normal Approach and Landing · PA.III.B — Forward Slip to a Landing · PA.III.C — Go-Around / Rejected Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors

Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.103

Run this scenario yourself

Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.

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