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SAMPLE SBTLanding

Drifting Right

A gusty crosswind, a deteriorating rollout, and the decision that ends it cleanly — or doesn't

Cessna 172S · Tampa Executive Airport (KVDF) · Private · Landing

The scenario

Field: Tampa Executive Airport (KVDF), Tampa, FL — elevation 22 ft MSL. You're returning from a local flight and landing Runway 05 (magnetic heading approximately 042°). KVDF is non-towered; CTAF is active with light traffic. The Tampa Class B floor is 3,000 ft MSL overhead — no factor at pattern altitude.

Aircraft: Cessna 172S with the G1000 glass panel, two aboard, within weight and balance limits. Fuel-injected Lycoming IO-360-L2A, 180 hp. Fixed gear, fixed-pitch prop. Flaps 30° selected on short final.

Weather: ASOS reporting winds 350° at 14 knots, gusting 22. That puts a left crosswind component on Runway 05 of roughly 13 knots mean, gusting near 17 — close to the C172S's demonstrated crosswind component of 15 knots. Visibility 10 SM, clear. Density altitude near field elevation — no performance penalty.

Pilot: you — a Private pilot with about 180 hours, comfortable at KVDF, but gusty crosswind landings are not your strongest suit. You've been flying the approach well, but the gusts have been variable and the last two aircraft on CTAF both mentioned 'active' conditions on rollout.

Off-field reality: Off the Runway 05 departure end (climb-out 042°) the environment is mostly wooded wetland, pasture/hay, and medium development — a forced landing off that end is workable. Off the Runway 23 end behind you is pasture/hay, open water, and medium development — also workable. Know your outs.

The decision

On short final, before the wheels touch — which of these is actually in your head? (Pick all that apply — no wrong answers; this records your pre-landing mindset.)

What the record shows

What the NTSB files show

KVDF's own accident corpus shows LOSS_OF_CONTROL_GROUND and HARD_LANDING as the two most common accident types at this field, each at 18.4% — followed by FORCED_LANDING at 15.8%. Crosswind and gusty conditions are a recurring thread. This scenario is built from that pattern.

NTSB CEN23LA159 (2023): A Cessna 172S on a personal flight had a tailwind on final and attempted a go-around when the landing appeared long. The aircraft porpoised, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the aircraft departed the runway. The NTSB cited the pilot's failure to maintain airplane control during the go-around attempt. The real event occurred at an airport other than KVDF.

NTSB ERA21LA202 (2021): A Cessna 172S on short final in gusting crosswind conditions was high and slow. The pilot initiated a go-around but improper pitch control resulted in a tail strike and runway excursion to the left into grass. The NTSB cited improper pitch control during a go-around in gusting crosswind conditions. The real event occurred at an airport other than KVDF.

The regional precedents (GAA17CA105, ERA17CA149, GAA16CA149, CHI02TA149) all occurred at airports other than KVDF. They reinforce the same pattern: crosswind conditions near or beyond demonstrated limits, late or improper go-around decisions, and loss of directional control on rollout.

The common thread across all these events: the pilot continued into a deteriorating situation — a long landing, a bounced touchdown, a drifting rollout — rather than committing to a go-around at the first sign of instability. In every case, the go-around option existed earlier and was not taken.

Key lesson — The go-around is not a last resort — it is the standard response to any approach or landing that is not proceeding normally. In gusty crosswind conditions near the demonstrated limit, the decision gate must be set early and held: not stabilized at the threshold means going around, every time. A bounced landing is always a go-around. Directional control on rollout requires active, increasing rudder and aileron inputs — not passive waiting.

Debrief — teaching points

Set your go-around gate before short final — and hold it.

A go-around decision made in the flare or after touchdown is almost always too late to be clean. The gate belongs on short final: if you are not stabilized, aligned, on speed (65 KIAS for the C172S), and in control at the threshold, you are going around. In gusty crosswind conditions near the C172S's 15-knot demonstrated limit, that gate should be strict. Continuation bias — 'I've come this far, I'll make it work' — is the human factor that converts a manageable approach into an NTSB report.

A bounce is always a go-around — never push it back on.

The moment the airplane bounces back into the air, the landing is over. The only correct response is an immediate go-around: full throttle on the IO-360 (no carb heat — this is a fuel-injected engine), pitch to a positive climb attitude, retract flaps from 30° to 10° as airspeed builds through 65 KIAS, then flaps fully up in the climb. Pushing the nose forward to force the airplane back onto the runway after a bounce loads the nose gear in a way it is not designed to handle and initiates the porpoise sequence documented in CEN23LA159.

Crosswind control inputs increase as airspeed decreases on rollout.

At touchdown, aerodynamic control surfaces are still effective — but their effectiveness decreases as the airplane slows. The upwind aileron input that was adequate at 55 KIAS is insufficient at 35 KIAS. Crosswind rollout is not a passive event: it requires active, continuously increasing rudder (to counter weathervaning) and upwind aileron (to keep the upwind wing down) from touchdown to taxi speed. The pilot who relaxes inputs after touchdown in a crosswind is the pilot who drifts off the edge.

Know your demonstrated crosswind component — and treat it as a real limit.

The C172S demonstrated crosswind component is 15 knots. 'Demonstrated' means a Cessna test pilot demonstrated a landing in that condition — it is not a guaranteed capability for every pilot in every condition. When gusts push the crosswind component past 15 knots, the margin for error shrinks to near zero. The regional precedent GAA16CA149 (Grumman AA-1) shows what happens when a pilot exceeds the demonstrated limit and loses directional control on both takeoff and landing. Know the number; respect it; set your personal limit below it.

Go-around technique on the C172S: no carb heat, flaps in stages.

The C172S has a fuel-injected Lycoming IO-360-L2A — there is no carburetor and no carburetor heat. Go-around procedure: full throttle smoothly, simultaneously establish a positive climb attitude, retract flaps from 30° to 10° (not all the way — the C172S POH specifies an intermediate step to avoid a sudden loss of lift), then retract remaining flaps after a positive rate of climb is established and airspeed is above 65 KIAS. Pitch control during the go-around in gusty conditions is critical — ERA21LA202 shows what happens when pitch is mismanaged: tail strike, runway excursion.

Built from the real accident record

Scenario built from NTSB cases CEN23LA159 and ERA21LA202 (Cessna 172S crosswind/go-around runway excursions) and regional precedents GAA17CA105, ERA17CA149, GAA16CA149, CHI02TA149. All real events occurred at airports other than KVDF. Anonymized and localized for training purposes.

NTSB reports: CEN23LA159 · ERA21LA202 · ERA11LA421 · GAA17CA105 · ERA17CA149 · GAA16CA149 · CHI02TA149

ACS tasks: PA.IV.A — Normal and Crosswind Approach and Landing · PA.IV.B — Soft-Field Approach and Landing · PA.IV.N — Go-Around / Rejected Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors

Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13

Run this scenario yourself

Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.

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