Three Greens
Gear management in the Arrow — the checklist you cannot skip
The scenario
Field: Venice Municipal Airport (KVNC), Venice, FL — elevation 18 ft MSL. You are returning from a local flight and plan to land Runway 13. KVNC is non-towered; CTAF is active with moderate pattern traffic. The nearest controlled airspace is Class C at Sarasota (KSRQ), roughly 20 nm northeast — you are squarely in Class G.
Aircraft: Piper Arrow (PA-28R-201), fuel-injected IO-360, 200 hp, constant-speed propeller, hydraulically actuated retractable gear. You are the sole occupant, within weight and balance limits. The aircraft has been flying normally all day.
Weather: Clear, visibility unrestricted, winds calm. A perfect Florida afternoon — the kind that breeds complacency.
Situation: On the downwind leg for Runway 13, a student pilot on the CTAF makes a series of confused position calls that pull your attention away from the cockpit. You respond on the radio, help sort out the traffic picture, and feel good about being helpful. You turn base, then final. The runway is straight ahead, 5,640 ft of asphalt, plenty of room.
The question is what you did — or didn't do — on downwind while you were being helpful.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KVNC · Venice'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '4/22 · 13/31'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '18 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'PA-28R'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Takeoff'}
The decision
Before we run the scenario — which of these Arrow-specific gear facts are already in your head? (Pick all that apply; this is for your debrief, not a grade.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show — PA-28R gear-up landings
Gear-up landings in the Piper Arrow are among the most consistently documented accidents in the PA-28R fleet — not because the gear system is unreliable, but because the checklist is skipped. The NTSB probable cause language across CEN24LA288, CEN25LA133, CEN25LA120, and CEN26LA028 is nearly word-for-word: 'the pilot's failure to extend the landing gear before landing due to distraction and failure to conduct the before-landing checklist.'
The distraction sources vary — skydiving traffic, an unfamiliar airport, radio congestion, another aircraft in the pattern, a loose external seatbelt — but the mechanism is constant. Something external pulls the pilot's attention at the critical moment on downwind, the GUMPS check is deferred, and the deferral becomes an omission.
The gear warning horn is the last line of defense, not the first. In CEN26LA028 (a Beech A36, morphed here for the Arrow lesson), the pilot misidentified the warning horn and did not act on it. In CEN11LA418, the hydraulic power pack motor had failed and the pilot did not use the emergency free-fall extension — the backup system that would have saved the aircraft went unused.
WPR22LA040 adds a maintenance dimension: an improper bolt installed in the right main gear door prevented that gear from extending at all. The pilot had no way to know this preflight — but the three-green check on final would have revealed it before touchdown.
All of the real events cited here occurred at airports other than Venice Municipal (KVNC). The field, the runway, and the traffic environment in this scenario are KVNC — the accidents are not.
Key lesson — GUMPS on downwind and three greens confirmed on final are not suggestions — they are the two checkpoints that separate an Arrow pilot from an NTSB statistic. Distraction is always present; the checklist must run on schedule regardless. When gear state is uncertain at any altitude, the answer is a go-around.
Debrief — teaching points
GUMPS on downwind — every time, on schedule, not when convenient.
Gas (fuel selector LEFT or RIGHT, fullest tank), Undercarriage (gear DOWN — handle and three greens), Mixture (rich for landing), Prop (full forward), Seatbelts. Run it abeam the numbers on downwind, before any distraction can defer it. The Arrow's hydraulic gear takes several seconds to cycle; starting GUMPS abeam the numbers gives the system time to complete the cycle and illuminate three greens before you turn base. Deferring GUMPS to base or final compresses the time available and increases the chance of a missed confirmation.
Three greens is the only acceptable gear-down confirmation.
The gear handle position alone is not confirmation — a hydraulic failure, a popped circuit breaker, or a mechanical obstruction (as in WPR22LA040, where an improper bolt prevented right main extension) can leave the gear unlocked even with the handle DOWN. Three green lights — one for each gear, locked down — is the required confirmation. One amber or a dark indicator means the gear is in transit, unlocked, or the circuit has failed. Investigate before landing.
The gear warning horn is a last resort, not a checklist substitute.
The Arrow's gear warning horn activates when the throttle is reduced below approximately 14 in. manifold pressure with the gear not down. It is designed to catch the omission after everything else has failed. Pilots who rely on the horn instead of the checklist eventually encounter the one approach where the horn is misidentified, silenced, or — in the case of an electrical or system failure — inoperative. Treat the horn as a fire alarm: if it sounds, go around immediately and sort out the gear at altitude.
The emergency free-fall extension is a real system — know it cold.
When the Arrow's hydraulic system cannot extend the gear normally, the emergency extension procedure releases the gear for free-fall and gravity lock. The exact procedure is model-specific (T-handle pull or hand crank — know which your aircraft has), but the principle is the same: the gear free-falls and locks under gravity. After emergency extension, confirm three greens before landing. In CEN11LA418, the power pack motor had failed and the pilot did not use the emergency extension — the aircraft landed gear-up when a working backup was available. Know the procedure; practice it with your CFI.
Distraction breaks the checklist loop — protect the loop, not the distraction.
Every PA-28R gear-up accident in the NTSB record involves a distraction that interrupted the checklist at a critical moment. The distraction is always 'reasonable' — traffic, radio calls, an unfamiliar airport, a passenger question. The defense is not to eliminate distraction (impossible) but to treat the GUMPS check as non-interruptible: finish the checklist item before responding to the distraction, or return to the checklist immediately after. A 10-second radio call that defers GUMPS from downwind to base is a 10-second trade that has cost pilots their aircraft.
Built from the real accident record
Scenario built from multiple NTSB PA-28R gear-up landing events (CEN24LA288, WPR22LA040, CEN11LA418, CEN25LA133, CEN25LA120) and class-peer retractable-single gear-up events (ERA26LA045, CEN26LA028, WPR26LA016, ERA25LA343, CEN25LA319). All real events occurred at airports other than KVNC. Localized to Venice Municipal Airport for training purposes.
NTSB reports: CEN24LA288 · WPR22LA040 · CEN11LA418 · CEN25LA133 · CEN25LA120 · ERA26LA045 · CEN26LA028 · WPR26LA016 · ERA25LA343 · CEN25LA319 · CHI91DCJ01 · ANC93LA040
ACS tasks: PA.II.A — Preflight Assessment · PA.IV.A — Normal Approach and Landing · PA.IX.C — Systems and Equipment Malfunctions · PA.I.H — Human Factors
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
Open the interactive scenario →All sample scenarios · More Piper Arrow scenarios · More scenarios at KVNC