Three Greens
Gear management, distraction, and the Arrow's hydraulic trap at Zephyrhills
The scenario
Departing and returning to Zephyrhills Municipal Airport (KZPH), elevation 90 ft MSL — a non-towered field with CTAF. You are flying the traffic pattern for Runway 19, with a left-downwind for a full-stop landing.
Aircraft: Piper Arrow (PA-28R-201), single pilot, two aboard, within weight and balance limits. The airplane returned from a 100-hour inspection two days ago. Everything checked out on the preflight — or so you thought.
Conditions: Clear, calm, VMC. No weather factor. Traffic is light — one Cessna reported a 5-mile final for Runway 1 on CTAF, otherwise the pattern is yours. KZPH sits in Class G airspace; no tower, no radar service.
The scenario: You are on left downwind for Runway 19. You've been flying for 2.1 hours, you're fatigued, and CTAF has been busy with skydiving jump-plane calls from the drop zone operation on the field. The radio chatter has pulled your attention away from the cockpit twice already. Now you're abeam the numbers, setting up for the approach.
This is the scenario that fills NTSB files on the Arrow. The gear is hydraulic, the workload is real, and distraction is the common thread in every one of these accidents.
- {'label': 'Field', 'value': 'KZPH · Zephyrhills'}
- {'label': 'Runways', 'value': '19/1 · 5/23'}
- {'label': 'Elevation', 'value': '90 ft'}
- {'label': 'Aircraft', 'value': 'PA-28R'}
- {'label': 'Dominant phase', 'value': 'Landing / Cruise'}
The decision
Before we get into the scenario — which of these Arrow-specific gear facts are already in your head? (Pick all that apply; this records your baseline, not a grade.)
What the record shows
What the NTSB files show — and what happened at other airports
The real accidents behind this scenario did not happen at Zephyrhills. They happened at airports across the country — but the mechanism is identical every time, and the Arrow's accident record is consistent enough to constitute a pattern.
CEN24LA288 (2024): A PA-28R-180 pilot landed with the left main and nose gear not fully locked. The cause: distraction from skydiving operations and difficulty locating an unfamiliar airport led the pilot to skip the before-landing checklist entirely. Sound familiar? Zephyrhills hosts an active skydiving operation. The distraction vector is real here.
CEN11LA418 (2011): A PA-28R-201 made a full wheels-up landing after the hydraulic power-pack motor failed. The pilot did not use the emergency free-fall extension system. The system was functional; the pilot did not use it. The POH procedure existed; it was not executed.
CEN25LA133 and CEN25LA120 (2025): Two separate Arrow gear-up landings in the same year — one caused by distraction from an external seatbelt issue and pattern traffic, one by radio traffic distraction and instructor complacency. Both resulted in failure to complete the prelanding checklist.
The class-peer accidents (Beechcraft S35, A36, 95-series) tell the same story in different airframes: distraction, a missed checklist, a warning horn that was present but not acted upon, and a landing that destroyed a propeller and bent a fuselage.
The Arrow's gear warning horn is not a 'gear is down' annunciator — it is a 'gear is UP with low power' warning. Silencing it by adding throttle is a known trap. Three greens is the only confirmation that matters.
The off-field environment south of Runway 19 at KZPH — open developed land, evergreen forest, and low-density development — is marginal for an off-airport forced landing. A gear-up landing on the runway is survivable. A gear-up landing that departs the runway into that environment is a different scenario entirely. Stay on the pavement.
Key lesson — The Arrow's hydraulic gear system adds a failure mode that does not exist in fixed-gear airplanes: the gear can appear to be cycling normally while failing to lock. GUMPS on downwind, three greens verified on final, and immediate go-around on any ambiguous indication are the three guardrails. Distraction is the common cause in every one of these accidents — and Zephyrhills, with its active skydiving operation and busy CTAF, is exactly the environment where distraction happens.
Debrief — teaching points
GUMPS is a discipline, not a suggestion.
Gas (fuel selector to fullest tank — LEFT or RIGHT on the Arrow, never a 'BOTH' position), Undercarriage (gear handle DOWN, wait for the system to cycle, count three greens), Mixture (rich for landing), Prop (high RPM for go-around readiness), Switches/Seatbelts. Run it abeam the numbers on every approach, every time. The Arrow's hydraulic system takes several seconds to cycle — you must initiate gear extension early enough to verify the result before you are committed to the landing. Abeam the numbers at pattern altitude is the standard trigger.
Three greens is the only gear-down confirmation that counts.
The gear warning horn tells you the gear is UP with low power — it is not a gear-down indicator. The gear handle in the DOWN detent tells you you've commanded gear down — it does not confirm the gear locked. Only three illuminated green gear-position lights confirm all three gear are down and locked. Two greens, one green, or zero greens with the handle down means something is wrong. Do not land. Go around and troubleshoot.
The manual free-fall extension exists for exactly this failure.
The Arrow's hydraulic power-pack motor can fail — it has failed in multiple NTSB-documented accidents. When the hydraulic system cannot lock the gear, the POH emergency procedure directs you to slow below 87 KIAS and pull the manual free-fall extension handle. Gravity and airflow drop the gear into the locked position. This procedure is not exotic; it is a normal emergency response. Know where the handle is, know the airspeed, and do not skip it because you hope the hydraulic system will finish cycling.
Distraction is the proximate cause in nearly every Arrow gear-up accident.
Across CEN24LA288, CEN25LA133, CEN25LA120, and the class-peer events, the common thread is not a mysterious mechanical failure — it is a pilot whose attention was pulled away from the cockpit at the critical moment. Radio traffic, pattern conflicts, skydiving operations, external distractions. The checklist is the defense: a physical, deliberate action that does not depend on memory or attention. When CTAF gets busy at KZPH, that is exactly when you slow down and run the checklist more carefully, not less.
A go-around is always cheaper than a gear-up landing.
A gear-up landing on the Arrow means: a prop strike (mandatory engine teardown per Lycoming SI 1529), fuselage belly damage, possible firewall damage, and weeks out of service at a cost that routinely exceeds $30,000–$50,000. A go-around costs three minutes and a few gallons of fuel. Any ambiguous gear indication, any uncertainty about checklist completion, any 'I think I got it' moment on final — go around. The runway at KZPH is 5,072 feet; you will have another chance. The airplane belly-sliding down Runway 19 does not give you another chance to use the emergency extension handle.
Built from the real accident record
Composite scenario built from multiple NTSB PA-28R gear-up landing events (CEN24LA288, WPR22LA040, CEN11LA418, CEN25LA133, CEN25LA120) and class-peer retractable-gear accidents (ERA26LA045, CEN26LA028, WPR26LA016, ERA25LA343, CEN25LA319). All real events occurred at other airports. Localized to KZPH for training purposes.
NTSB reports: CEN24LA288 · WPR22LA040 · CEN11LA418 · CEN25LA133 · CEN25LA120 · ERA26LA045 · CEN26LA028 · WPR26LA016 · ERA25LA343 · CEN25LA319 · FTW91DRG06 · SEA07CA125
ACS tasks: PA.II.A — Pilot Qualifications and Currency · PA.IV.A — Normal Approach and Landing · PA.IV.F — Emergency Approach and Landing · PA.I.H — Human Factors · PA.II.B — Airworthiness Requirements
Relevant FARs: §91.3 · §91.13 · §91.205
Step through the full decision tree, make the calls, and see where each choice leads — then debrief it with your CFI.
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